inapplicable instruction in California

2025(See People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 [giving an inapplicable instruction is generally only a technical error that does not constitute ground for reversal].) We presume juries are intelligent and follow the trial court’s instructions.

2016“Giving an instruction that is correct as to the law but irrelevant or inapplicable is error. [Citation.] Nonetheless, giving an irrelevant or inapplicable instruction is generally ‘“only a technical error which does not constitute a ground for reversal.”’ [Citation.]” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 67 .) When the trial court gives a correct but inapplicable instruction, the error is reviewed under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .

1963Whether the error was prejudicial must be predicated on whether it “ ... appears probable that a different result would have obtained but for the giving of the inapplicable instruction.” (Powell v. Bartmess, 139 Cal.App.2d 394, 407 [ 294 P.2d 150 ]; Smith v. Sugich Co., 179 Cal.App.2d 299, 313 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; Yochel v. Hatley, 172 Cal.App. 2d 1, 4 [ 341 P.2d 816 ].) From the evidence adduced at the trial, it seems unlikely that a jury would have come to a conclusion different from that at which the jury in the instant case arrived.

1963Whether the error was prejudicial must be predicated on whether it “ ... appears probable that a different result would have obtained but for the giving of the inapplicable instruction.” (Powell v. Bartmess, 139 Cal.App.2d 394, 407 [ 294 P.2d 150 ]; Smith v. Sugich Co., 179 Cal.App.2d 299, 313 [ 3 Cal.Rptr. 718 ]; Yochel v. Hatley, 172 Cal.App. 2d 1, 4 [ 341 P.2d 816 ].) From the evidence adduced at the trial, it seems unlikely that a jury would have come to a conclusion different from that at which the jury in the instant case arrived.

2025(People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1155 (Mehserle); People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30 .) This court warned this jury there may be inapplicable instructions.

2025(United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 163, fn. 6 (Malibu Hillbillies).) In claiming the benefit of an inapplicable standard of review, plaintiffs ignore the correct one: abuse of discretion.

2024(Cf. In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 499 [we presume the trial juvenile court was aware of, and followed, applicable law].) Father’s reliance on In re N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th 1090 , is misplaced.

2015XIII D, § 2, subd. (i), "a special benefit must affect the assessed property in a way that is particular and distinct from its effect on other parcels and that real property in general and the public at large do not share."].) Additionally, the trial court ruled Plaintiff lacked standing to assert injury to its beneficial interests, for lack of any proper claim that any of its members qualified for standing as having paid, or being obligated to pay, any allegedly illegal 2014 MAD levies, collections, or assessments. (§ 367 [real party in interest requirement for standing].) The court found ina

2012(Jensen v. Amgen, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1326 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 ].) Here, Silas argued two bases for lack of probable cause: first, that Arden could not argue her negligence in failing to bring a claim based upon an inapplicable exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity; and second, he lacked any factual basis for believing Gunnell’s misappropriation claims when presented with the notarized settlement documents and endorsed checks which admittedly all contained Gunnell’s genuine signature.

2012(Jensen v. Amgen, Inc. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1326 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 ].) Here, Silas argued two bases for lack of probable cause: first, that Arden could not argue her negligence in failing to bring a claim based upon an inapplicable exception to worker’s compensation exclusivity; and second, he lacked any factual basis for believing Gunnell’s misappropriation claims when presented with the notarized settlement documents and endorsed checks which admittedly all contained Gunnell’s genuine signature.

2011(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1185 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ] [when a jury has been given standard statutory instructions, we assume it has followed such instructions and has concluded that mitigating factors were inapplicable if not supported by the evidence].) Nor was the trial court “constitutionally required to instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors are aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either mitigating or aggravating, depending upon the ju

2011(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1185 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ] [when a jury has been given standard statutory instructions, we assume it has followed such instructions and has concluded that mitigating factors were inapplicable if not supported by the evidence].) Nor was the trial court “constitutionally required to instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors are aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either mitigating or aggravating, depending upon the ju

2011(People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1274; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 166 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 186 P.3d 437 ].) The trial court was not required, at defendant’s request, to delete the inapplicable factors in aggravation and mitigation.

2011(People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1274; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 166 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 186 P.3d 437 ].) The trial court was not required, at defendant’s request, to delete the inapplicable factors in aggravation and mitigation.

2011(People v. Russell, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1274; People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 166 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 186 P.3d 437 ].) The trial court was not required, at defendant’s request, to delete the inapplicable factors in aggravation and mitigation.

2011(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1185 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ] [when a jury has been given standard statutory instructions, we assume it has followed such instructions and has concluded that mitigating factors were inapplicable if not supported by the evidence].) Nor was the trial court “constitutionally required to instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors are aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either mitigating or aggravating, depending upon the ju

2011(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1185 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ] [when a jury has been given standard statutory instructions, we assume it has followed such instructions and has concluded that mitigating factors were inapplicable if not supported by the evidence].) Nor was the trial court “constitutionally required to instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors are aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either mitigating or aggravating, depending upon the ju

2011(People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1185 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297 , 163 P.3d 4 ]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439-440 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561 , 68 P.3d 1 ] [when a jury has been given standard statutory instructions, we assume it has followed such instructions and has concluded that mitigating factors were inapplicable if not supported by the evidence].) Nor was the trial court “constitutionally required to instruct the jury as to which of the listed sentencing factors are aggravating, which are mitigating, and which could be either mitigating or aggravating, depending upon the ju

1990(See, e.g., People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 770 ; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) In addition, in this case the prosecutor was careful not to exploit the inapplicable factors or to suggest that the absence of a mitigating factor could be considered an aggravating circumstance (cf. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]), properly informing the jurors in closing argument not to consider factors on which there was no evidence.

1990(See, e.g., People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 770 ; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) In addition, in this case the prosecutor was careful not to exploit the inapplicable factors or to suggest that the absence of a mitigating factor could be considered an aggravating circumstance (cf. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]), properly informing the jurors in closing argument not to consider factors on which there was no evidence.

1990(See, e.g., People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 770 ; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) In addition, in this case the prosecutor was careful not to exploit the inapplicable factors or to suggest that the absence of a mitigating factor could be considered an aggravating circumstance (cf. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]), properly informing the jurors in closing argument not to consider factors on which there was no evidence.

1990(See, e.g., People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 770 ; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 104-105 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 594 , 744 P.2d 1127 ].) In addition, in this case the prosecutor was careful not to exploit the inapplicable factors or to suggest that the absence of a mitigating factor could be considered an aggravating circumstance (cf. People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [ 221 Cal.Rptr. 794 , 710 P.2d 861 ]), properly informing the jurors in closing argument not to consider factors on which there was no evidence.