mandatory registration requirement in California

2015In Hofsheier, our Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to section 290’s requirement of mandatory sex offender registration by those convicted of voluntary oral copulation with a minor who is 16 or 17 years of age in violation of section 288a, subdivision (b)(1). ( Hofsheier, supra, at p. 1199 .) The defendant in that case claimed the mandatory registration requirement violated his right to equal protection because defendants convicted of a different crime involving minors of the same age--voluntary sexual intercourse with minors in violation of section 261.5--were subject to

2015In Hofsheier, our Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to section 290’s requirement of mandatory sex offender registration by those convicted of voluntary oral copulation with a minor who is 16 or 17 years of age in violation of section 288a, subdivision (b)(1). ( Hofsheier, supra, at p. 1199 .) The defendant in that case claimed the mandatory registration requirement violated his right to equal protection because defendants convicted of a different crime involving minors of the same age--voluntary sexual intercourse with minors in violation of section 261.5--were subject to

2012In People v. Garcia (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 475 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 681 ] (Garcia), the court extended Hofsheier’s holding to violations of section 288a, subdivision (b)(2), which provides that “any person over the age of 21 years who participates in an act of oral copulation with another person who is under 16 years of age is guilty of a felony.” In that case the defendant was 26 years old and the minor 14.

2009The 26-year-old defendant had pled guilty to unlawful intercourse with a minor under section 261.5 and to nonforcible oral copulation under section 288a, subdivision (b)(2), which provides, "Except as provided in Section 288, any person over the age of 21 years who participates in an act of oral copulation with another person who is under 16 years of age is guilty of a felony." The victim was 14 years old at the time of the offense. ( Garcia, at p. 478.) The Court of Appeal agreed with the defendant that equal protection precluded a mandatory registration requirement for a violation of section

2012(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ]; see also People v. Ranscht (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ] [“Courts which have applied Hofsheier beyond section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) have similarly focused on the offense to which the defendant challenging the mandatory registration requirement pleaded, without looking to the underlying acts.”].) “ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly

2012(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ]; see also People v. Ranscht (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ] [“Courts which have applied Hofsheier beyond section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) have similarly focused on the offense to which the defendant challenging the mandatory registration requirement pleaded, without looking to the underlying acts.”].) “ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly

2010As the J.P. court explained, this approach "jibes with the mandatory registration statutes themselves, which are triggered by certain convictions or juvenile adjudications, and not by the underlying conduct of those offenses per se." ( J.P., supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 1299 .) In Ranscht , the 18-year-old defendant was charged with four counts of lewd conduct on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (a)) and two counts of sexually penetrating a minor (§ 289, subd. (h)). ( Ranscht, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371 .) He pleaded guilty to one count of violating section 289, subdivision (h), then chal

2009“This approach jibes with the mandatory registration statutes themselves, which are triggered by certain convictions . . . , and not by the underlying conduct of those offenses per se.” (In re J.P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1299 [ 89 Cal.Rptr.3d 17 ]; see Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1196 [“Section 290 requires anyone convicted of certain sex offenses to register for life as a sex offender.” (Italics added.)].) Courts which have applied Hofsheier beyond section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) have similarly focused on the offense to which the defendant challenging the mandatory registration

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 ; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rational basis review].) The statutory

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 ; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rational basis review].) The statutory

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 257 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 ]; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rat

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 257 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 ]; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rat

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 257 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 ]; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rat

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 ; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rational basis review].) The statutory

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 257 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 ]; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rat

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 ; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rational basis review].) The statutory

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 [ 125 L.Ed.2d 257 , 113 S.Ct. 2637 ]; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rat

2015It is in this sense that we have termed the distinction drawn in section 290 between unlawful sexual intercourse and oral copulation “a historical atavism.” (Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1206 .) Even under deferential rational basis review, justifications for legal discrimination “must find some footing in the realities of the subject addressed by the legislation.” (Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S. 312, 321 ; accord, People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 75 [recognizing that “the realities of the subject matter cannot be completely ignored” under rational basis review].) The statutory

2012(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ]; see also People v. Ranscht (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ] [“Courts which have applied Hofsheier beyond section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) have similarly focused on the offense to which the defendant challenging the mandatory registration requirement pleaded, without looking to the underlying acts.”].) “ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly

2012(See Tobe v. City of Santa Ana (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1069, 1084 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 402 , 892 P.2d 1145 ]; see also People v. Ranscht (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1369, 1375 [ 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 800 ] [“Courts which have applied Hofsheier beyond section 288a, subdivision (b)(1) have similarly focused on the offense to which the defendant challenging the mandatory registration requirement pleaded, without looking to the underlying acts.”].) “ ‘The first prerequisite to a meritorious claim under the equal protection clause is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly

2012This is because “[a] prosecutor’s ‘ “traditional charging discretion,” ’ which can determine whether an offender is subject to the mandatory registration requirement or, in fact, any charges at all, will not support an equal protection challenge. ([People v.] Cavallaro, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 116 .)” (People v. Honan (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 175, 183 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 ] [rejecting equal protection challenge of defendant convicted of both lewd conduct, for which registration is discretionary, and indecent exposure, for which registration is mandatory, for same conduct].) Nor do we find

2012This is because “[a] prosecutor’s ‘ “traditional charging discretion,” ’ which can determine whether an offender is subject to the mandatory registration requirement or, in fact, any charges at all, will not support an equal protection challenge. ([People v.] Cavallaro, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 116 .)” (People v. Honan (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 175, 183 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 ] [rejecting equal protection challenge of defendant convicted of both lewd conduct, for which registration is discretionary, and indecent exposure, for which registration is mandatory, for same conduct].) Nor do we find

2012The court clarified that it was using “the term ‘voluntary’ in a special and restricted sense to indicate both that the minor victim willingly participated in the act and to the absence of various statutory aggravating circumstances: the perpetrator’s use of ‘force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); the perpetrator’s ‘threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(3)); and the commission of the act while the victim is unconscious (§ 288a, subd. (f))

2012The court clarified that it was using “the term ‘voluntary’ in a special and restricted sense to indicate both that the minor victim willingly participated in the act and to the absence of various statutory aggravating circumstances: the perpetrator’s use of ‘force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); the perpetrator’s ‘threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(3)); and the commission of the act while the victim is unconscious (§ 288a, subd. (f))

2012The court clarified that it was using “the term ‘voluntary’ in a special and restricted sense to indicate both that the minor victim willingly participated in the act and to the absence of various statutory aggravating circumstances: the perpetrator’s use of ‘force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); the perpetrator’s ‘threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(3)); and the commission of the act while the victim is unconscious (§ 288a, subd. (f))

2012The court clarified that it was using “the term ‘voluntary’ in a special and restricted sense to indicate both that the minor victim willingly participated in the act and to the absence of various statutory aggravating circumstances: the perpetrator’s use of ‘force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(2)); the perpetrator’s ‘threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person’ (§ 288a, subd. (c)(3)); and the commission of the act while the victim is unconscious (§ 288a, subd. (f))

2009(See People v. Hernandez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 641, 651 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ]; People v. Garcia (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 475, 482 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 681 ].) Under this approach, Ranscht is similarly situated with an offender convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old victim.

2009(See People v. Hernandez (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 641, 651 [ 83 Cal.Rptr.3d 29 ]; People v. Garcia (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 475, 482 [ 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 681 ].) Under this approach, Ranscht is similarly situated with an offender convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a 13-year-old victim.