newly announced constitutional principle in California

2021When, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture.” (Castellano, at p. 489; accord, Belloso, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Santos (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 931-932 ; contra, People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 [defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting to the assessments and restitution fine at sentencing]; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1154 [same].) However,

2021At least two cases, People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485 and People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1315 , have found that failure to object to the imposition of restitution fines and other fines, fees, and assessments at the time of their imposition did not forfeit the issue because Dueñas was “ ‘a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial.’ ” ( Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1032 , quoting Castellano, at p. 489.) However, in another case, People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126 , the court found that defendant had

2021When, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture.” (Castellano, at p. 489; accord, Belloso, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Santos (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 923, 931-932 ; contra, People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 [defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting to the assessments and restitution fine at sentencing]; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126, 1153-1154 [same].) However,

2020When, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture.” (Accord, People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647 , 662; People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 138 ; contra, People v. Ramirez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 305 , 312 [defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting to the assessments and restitution fine at sentencing]; People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 [same]; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.

2021When, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture.’ [Citations].” (People v. Belloso (2019) 42 32 Cal.App.5th 647, 662 (Belloso), review granted March 11, 2020, S259755, quoting People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489 (Castellano).) As in Castellano and Belloso, we decline to find Waltz forfeited his constitutional challenge to the imposition of the assessments and restitution fines.

2021At least two cases, People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485 and People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1315 , have found that failure to object to the imposition of restitution fines and other fines, fees, and assessments at the time of their imposition did not forfeit the issue because Dueñas was “ ‘a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial.’ ” ( Gutierrez, supra, at p. 1032 , quoting Castellano, at p. 489.) However, in another case, People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126 , the court found that defendant had

2020Although recognizing we have rejected similar forfeiture arguments in the past (see People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489 [“[w]hen, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture”]; see generally People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 92 [“‘[r]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substan

2019(See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ohio (1966) 385 U.S. 92 , 93, [ 87 S.Ct. 252 , 17 L.Ed.2d 189 ] ; People v. Doherty (1967) 67 Cal.2d 9 , 13-14, 59 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 429 P.2d 177 ; see generally People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 92, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 [" '[r]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence' "].) We similarly decline to apply the forfeiture doctrine to Castellano's constitutional challenge. *142 b.

2021(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293 [“application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic,” although “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; Unzueta v. Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199 , 215 [“‘[N]either forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.’”].)12 12 Delgado contends that if we find forfeiture, his attorney’s failure to object to imposition of the fines and fees was ineffective assistance of counsel.

2021(In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287 , 1293 [“application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic,” although “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue”]; Unzueta v. Akopyan (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 199 , 215 [“‘[N]either forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.’”].)10 10 Navas contends if we find forfeiture, his attorney’s failure to object to imposition of the fines and fees was ineffective assistance of counsel.

2020(People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 489 [“When, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture.”]; see Belloso, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 662; People v. Santos, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 931-932; People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 137-138 .) As to the restitution fines, Burkhart had a right under section 1202.4, subdivision (d), to challenge imposition of a restitution fine above the $300

2020When, as here, the defendant’s challenge on direct appeal is based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial, reviewing courts have declined to find forfeiture.” (Accord, People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647 , 662; People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 138 ; contra, People v. Ramirez (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 305 , 312 [defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting to the assessments and restitution fine at sentencing]; People v. Bipialaka (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 455, 464 [same]; People v. Frandsen (2019) 33 Cal.

2021(Son, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 598; People v. Montes, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 1107 ; Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034 ; but see, People v. Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1153-1154 [defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting to the assessments and restitution fine at sentencing].) We therefore reject the People’s assertion that Zyszkiewicz forfeited his challenge to imposition of the court operations and facilities assessments.

2021(Son, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 598; People v. Montes, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 1107 ; Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034 ; but see, People v. Frandsen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1153-1154 [defendant forfeited challenge by not objecting to the assessments and restitution fine at sentencing].) We therefore reject the People’s assertion that Zyszkiewicz forfeited his challenge to imposition of the court operations and facilities assessments.

2020Although Oberdiear could have challenged the trial court’s imposition of the restitution fine to the extent it was above the statutory minimum, “neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 ; accord, In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 , superseded in part by statute as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962.) Here, neither the trial court nor Oberdiear’s counsel had the benefit of our decision in Dueñas, and the court understandably did not advise Oberdiear he had a due process right to argue he di

2020Although Burkhart failed in the trial court to challenge imposition of the $5,000 restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine, “neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 [finding defendant forfeited challenge to imposition of booking fee where he failed to raise his ability to pay the fee in the trial court]; accord, In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [“application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic,” although “the appellate court’s discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely an

2019(See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ohio (1966) 385 U.S. 92 , 93, [ 87 S.Ct. 252 , 17 L.Ed.2d 189 ] ; People v. Doherty (1967) 67 Cal.2d 9 , 13-14, 59 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 429 P.2d 177 ; see generally People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 92, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 [" '[r]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence' "].) We similarly decline to apply the forfeiture doctrine to Castellano's constitutional challenge. *142 b.

2019(See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ohio (1966) 385 U.S. 92 , 93, [ 87 S.Ct. 252 , 17 L.Ed.2d 189 ] ; People v. Doherty (1967) 67 Cal.2d 9 , 13-14, 59 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 429 P.2d 177 ; see generally People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1 , 92, 219 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 , 396 P.3d 480 [" '[r]eviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly unsupported by substantive law then in existence' "].) We similarly decline to apply the forfeiture doctrine to Castellano's constitutional challenge. *142 b.

2020Although Oberdiear could have challenged the trial court’s imposition of the restitution fine to the extent it was above the statutory minimum, “neither forfeiture nor application of the forfeiture rule is automatic.” (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 593 ; accord, In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 , superseded in part by statute as stated in In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953 , 962.) Here, neither the trial court nor Oberdiear’s counsel had the benefit of our decision in Dueñas, and the court understandably did not advise Oberdiear he had a due process right to argue he di

2020(People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14 ; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 854 ; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 861 ; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 362 , overruled on another ground in People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176 .) Anticipating this result, Irvin argues we should address the merits because the contention is “based on a newly announced constitutional principle that could not reasonably have been anticipated at the time of trial”; the claimed error affects his fundamental constitutional rights; and his trial counsel rendered constitutiona