person to make inquiry in California

2008(Cf. Tarke v. Bingham (1898) 123 Cal. 163, 164-166 [ 55 P. 759 ] [cause of action based on mistake in mortgage’s description of promissory note began to accrue on plaintiff’s discovery of the mistake, rather than on the date of the mistake].) Although a plaintiff generally has a duty to show diligence and investigation based on sources of information available to him or her, “[w]here no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances ‘a prudent man’ would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has n

1964In Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal.2d 329, 343 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ], the court said: “... ‘discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that where a party defrauded has received information of facts which should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge. ’ (Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 240 [ 193 P. 243 ].) ‘The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omission. ’ (Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163

2014However, based upon the accounting duty Engstrom owed to plaintiffs under the Professional Rules of Conduct, and the fact plaintiffs’ allegations indicate they received an insufficient amount of information concerning the disposition of the aggregate settlement, this ground for sustaining Engstrom’s demurrer is without merit because the plaintiffs’ lack of information resulted from Engstrom’s alleged failure to adequately account. “ ‘Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances “a prudent man” would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that

2014However, based upon the accounting duty Engstrom owed to plaintiffs under the Professional Rules of Conduct, and the fact plaintiffs’ allegations indicate they received an insufficient amount of information concerning the disposition of the aggregate settlement, this ground for sustaining Engstrom’s demurrer is without merit because the plaintiffs’ lack of information resulted from Engstrom’s alleged failure to adequately account. “‘Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances ‘a prudent man’ would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that

2018As our Supreme Court has explained, "In many cases it has been said that means of knowledge are equivalent to knowledge. [Citations.] This is true, however, only where there is a duty to inquire, as where plaintiff is aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent person suspicious.... [¶] It follows that plaintiff is not barred because the means of discovery were available at an earlier date provided he has shown that he was not put on inquiry by any circumstances known to him or his agents at any time prior to the commencement of the three-year period." ( Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at pp

2018As our Supreme Court has explained, "In many cases it has been said that means of knowledge are equivalent to knowledge. [Citations.] This is true, however, only where there is a duty to inquire, as where plaintiff is aware of facts which would make a reasonably prudent person suspicious. . . . [¶] It follows that plaintiff is not barred because the means of discovery were available at an earlier date provided he has shown that he was not put on inquiry by any circumstances known to him or his agents at any time prior to the commencement of the three-year period." ( Hobart, supra, 26 Cal.2d at

1964In Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal.2d 329, 343 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ], the court said: “... ‘discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that where a party defrauded has received information of facts which should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge. ’ (Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 240 [ 193 P. 243 ].) ‘The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omission. ’ (Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163

1964In Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal.2d 329, 343 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ], the court said: “... ‘discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that where a party defrauded has received information of facts which should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge. ’ (Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 240 [ 193 P. 243 ].) ‘The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omission. ’ (Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163

1964In Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal.2d 329, 343 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ], the court said: “... ‘discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that where a party defrauded has received information of facts which should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge. ’ (Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 240 [ 193 P. 243 ].) ‘The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omission. ’ (Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163

1964In Vai v. Bank of America, 56 Cal.2d 329, 343 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 71 , 364 P.2d 247 ], the court said: “... ‘discovery is different from knowledge, [so] that where a party defrauded has received information of facts which should put him upon inquiry, and the inquiry if made would disclose the fraud, he will be charged with a discovery as of the time the inquiry would have given him knowledge. ’ (Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 240 [ 193 P. 243 ].) ‘The circumstances must be such that the inquiry becomes a duty, and the failure to make it a negligent omission. ’ (Tarke v. Bingham, 123 Cal. 163

1998Code, § 3548; Estate of Neilson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 733 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 371 P.2d 745 ] [It is presumed that a person obeys the law.].) Under these circumstances, they had no reason to check the public records to see if reconveyances had been made. “ ‘ “ ‘[W]here no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances a prudent man would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself of them, does not debar him from relief when thereafter he shall make actual discovery.’ [Citations.]” ’ ”

1998Code, § 3548; Estate of Neilson (1962) 57 Cal.2d 733 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 371 P.2d 745 ] [It is presumed that a person obeys the law.].) Under these circumstances, they had no reason to check the public records to see if reconveyances had been made. “ ‘ “ ‘[W]here no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances a prudent man would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself of them, does not debar him from relief when thereafter he shall make actual discovery.’ [Citations.]” ’ ”

1990(Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951, 955 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 233 ].) Constructive knowledge is codified in Civil Code section 19: “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.” “ ‘Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances “a prudent man” would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a [person], an

1990(Fosgate v. Gonzales (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 951, 955 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 233 ].) Constructive knowledge is codified in Civil Code section 19: “Every person who has actual notice of circumstances sufficient to put a prudent man upon inquiry as to a particular fact, has constructive notice of the fact itself in all cases in which, by prosecuting such inquiry, he might have learned such fact.” “ ‘Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances “a prudent man” would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a [person], an

1956(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra; Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal.App.2d 278, 294 [ 295 P.2d 113 ].) The applicable law has been well expressed recently in the Schaefer case, supra (hearing denied): “The statute commences to run only after one has notice of circumstances sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. ‘Where no ditty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances “a prudent man” would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that, means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not ava

1956(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., supra; Schaefer v. Berinstein, 140 Cal.App.2d 278, 294 [ 295 P.2d 113 ].) The applicable law has been well expressed recently in the Schaefer case, supra (hearing denied): “The statute commences to run only after one has notice of circumstances sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. ‘Where no ditty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances “a prudent man” would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that, means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not ava

1956(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 437 [159 P.2d 958]; Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 70 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]; Stoll v. Selander, 81 Cal.App.2d 286, 292 [ 183 P.2d 935 ].) The statute commences to run only after one *295 has notice of circumstances sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. “ Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances ‘a prudent man’ would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself

1956(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 437 [159 P.2d 958]; Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 70 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]; Stoll v. Selander, 81 Cal.App.2d 286, 292 [ 183 P.2d 935 ].) The statute commences to run only after one *295 has notice of circumstances sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. “ Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances ‘a prudent man’ would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself

1956(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 437 [159 P.2d 958]; Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 70 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]; Stoll v. Selander, 81 Cal.App.2d 286, 292 [ 183 P.2d 935 ].) The statute commences to run only after one *295 has notice of circumstances sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. “ Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances ‘a prudent man’ would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself

1956(Hobart v. Hobart Estate Co., 26 Cal.2d 412, 437 [159 P.2d 958]; Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal.App.2d 50, 70 [ 172 P.2d 533 ]; Stoll v. Selander, 81 Cal.App.2d 286, 292 [ 183 P.2d 935 ].) The statute commences to run only after one *295 has notice of circumstances sufficient to make a reasonably prudent person suspicious of fraud, thus putting him on inquiry. “ Where no duty is imposed by law upon a person to make inquiry, and where under the circumstances ‘a prudent man’ would not be put upon inquiry, the mere fact that means of knowledge are open to a plaintiff, and he has not availed himself