posttrial hearing in California

2015Second, defendants’ motion, which was labeled “POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF JURY VERDICT,” was an appropriate way to address the legal issue left open in the October 2012 “JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT.” (See Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 342 ] [defendant in auto accident case filed a motion for adjustment or reduction of verdict amounts to reflect amount of past medical expenses actually paid to medical providers]; Olsen v. Reid (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 200, 203, fn. 2 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 ] [what form a motion to reduce judgment should take is unclear and

2015Second, defendants’ motion, which was labeled “POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF JURY VERDICT,” was an appropriate way to address the legal issue left open in the October 2012 “JUDGMENT ON JURY VERDICT.” (See Sanchez v. Strickland (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 758 [ 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 342 ] [defendant in auto accident case filed a motion for adjustment or reduction of verdict amounts to reflect amount of past medical expenses actually paid to medical providers]; Olsen v. Reid (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 200, 203, fn. 2 [ 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 255 ] [what form a motion to reduce judgment should take is unclear and

2013(Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367, 377 .) ― ‗ ―Particular considerations relevant to the retroactivity determination include the reasonableness of the parties‘ reliance on the former rule, the nature of the change as substantive or procedural, retroactivity‘s effect on the administration of justice, and the purposes to be served by the new rule. [Citations.]‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (Id. at pp. 378-379.) The parties here relied on the former rule allowing the admission of evidence of the full amounts billed, but did so subject to Lampkin‘s right to seek a reduction of damages in a posttrial hea

2013(Claxton v. Waters (2004) 34 Cal.4th 367, 377 [18 *1335 Cal.Rptr.3d 246, 96 P.3d 496 ].) “ ‘ “Particular considerations relevant to the retroactivity determination include the reasonableness of the parties’ reliance on the former rule, the nature of the change as substantive or procedural, retroactivity’s effect on the administration of justice, and the purposes to be served by the new rule. [Citations.]” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 378-379.) The parties here relied on the former rule allowing the admission of evidence of the full amounts billed, but did so subject to Lampkin’s right to seek a

2022(See Mackovska, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 15.) The cases cited do not address relief from a prior jury waiver, but denial of the right to a jury trial “‘in the first instance.’” (Id. at p. 16; see, e.g., Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 18-19 [acknowledging that courts require a showing of prejudice “in the prior waiver context when a party appeals after losing a court trial, rather than seeking immediate writ review of the order denying relief from waiver, . . . [b]ut . . . here, no valid waiver has occurred and a trial court has ‘denied [a party] i

2022(See also United States v. Lattimore (D.D.C. 2021) 525 F.Supp.3d 142 , 150 [rejecting defendant’s argument that video appearance would hamper his ability to participate in suppression hearing and concluding “there is no reason to think that a video hearing would deprive the defendant of any due process rights”]; United States v. Rosenschein (D.N.M. 2020) 474 F.Supp.3d 1203 , 1209 [“Though presence through a screen is not precisely the same as direct physical presence, the difference between the two is not enough to render the [suppression hearing] fundamentally unfair and does not deprive [d]e

2022(See also United States v. Lattimore (D.D.C. 2021) 525 F.Supp.3d 142 , 150 [rejecting defendant’s argument that video appearance would hamper his ability to participate in suppression hearing and concluding “there is no reason to think that a video hearing would deprive the defendant of any due process rights”]; United States v. Rosenschein (D.N.M. 2020) 474 F.Supp.3d 1203 , 1209 [“Though presence through a screen is not precisely the same as direct physical presence, the difference between the two is not enough to render the [suppression hearing] fundamentally unfair and does not deprive [d]e

2022(See Mackovska, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 15.) The cases cited do not address relief from a prior jury waiver, but denial of the right to a jury trial “‘in the first instance.’” (Id. at p. 16; see, e.g., Rincon EV Realty LLC v. CP III Rincon Towers, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1, 18-19 [acknowledging that courts require a showing of prejudice “in the prior waiver context when a party appeals after losing a court trial, rather than seeking immediate writ review of the order denying relief from waiver, . . . [b]ut . . . here, no valid waiver has occurred and a trial court has ‘denied [a party] i

2011(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. ‘ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him .... [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ].) 5 “On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court’s exclusion of a crimina

2011(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. ‘ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him .... [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ].) 5 “On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court’s exclusion of a crimina

2011Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution .... [Citations.] A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The d

2011Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution .... [Citations.] A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The d

2011(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. ‘ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him .... [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ].) 5 “On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court’s exclusion of a crimina

2011(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. ‘ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him .... [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ].) 5 “On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court’s exclusion of a crimina

2011(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. ‘ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him .... [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ].) 5 “On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court’s exclusion of a crimina

2011(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 433 [ 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324 , 28 P.3d 78 ]; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 742 .) “The standard under sections 977 and 1043 is similar. ‘ “[T]he accused is not entitled to be personally present during proceedings which bear no reasonable, substantial relation to his opportunity to defend the charges against him .... [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 855 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 141 P.3d 135 ].) 5 “On appeal, we apply the independent or de novo standard of review to a trial court’s exclusion of a crimina

2011Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution .... [Citations.] A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The d

2011Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution .... [Citations.] A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The d

2011Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution .... [Citations.] A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The d

2011Defendant was also removed from court during part of a posttrial hearing when the court identified by name the jurors who had spoken at a previous hearing. “ ‘A criminal defendant’s right to be personally present at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution .... [Citations.] A defendant, however, “does not have a right to be present at every hearing held in the course of a trial.” [Citation.] A defendant’s presence is required if it “bears a reasonable and substantial relation to his full opportunity to defend against the charges.” [Citation.] The d

2009Co. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 528, 543 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 ].) Posttrial Bad Faith Hearing Appellants contend that the trial court erred in not conducting a posttrial hearing to address the issue of bad faith.

2009Co. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 528, 543 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 888 ].) Posttrial Bad Faith Hearing Appellants contend that the trial court erred in not conducting a posttrial hearing to address the issue of bad faith.