prestige bar in California

2016Ensuring ―objectivity‖ in attorney compensation ― ‗is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.‘ ‖ (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 48, fn. 23 .) Moreover, ―[p]robably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies. . . .

2016Ensuring “objectivity” in attorney compensation “ ‘is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” (Serrano III, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p. 48, fn. 23.) Moreover, “[pjrobably to a unique degree, American law relies upon private litigants to enforce substantive provisions of law that in other legal systems are left largely to the discretion of public enforcement agencies. . . .

2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644

2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644

2015(Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 20 Cal.3d [25], 49 [(Serrano III)].)” (Ketchum, at p. 1134.) The court reaffirmed this approach yet again in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 [“ ‘anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method “ ‘is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”) Use of the lodestar does not, however, mean a party seeking attorneys’ fees is “necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services ac

1992(Ibid.)” ( Aetna, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d 865, 881 ; see also Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrigation Dist. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 953 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 839 ], noting that Serrano cited City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corporation (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470 , concerning an award of attorney fees in an antitrust case.) In Aetna , the trial court approved a contingent fee of 20 percent of the gross amount awarded to plaintiffs, which included damages, prejudgment interest, and all costs of the suit, including court costs, expert witness fees and attorney fees already figured as 20 percen

2016Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.‘ (City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470 ; see also Lindy Bros.

2016Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ (City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 470 ; see also Lindy Bros.

2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644

2018Anchoring the analysis to this concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.' " ( Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311 , 322, 193 Cal.Rptr. 900 , 667 P.2d 704 .) In setting attorney's fees "[t]he basis for the trial court's calculation must be the actual hours counsel has devoted to the case, less those that result from inefficient or duplicative use of time." ( Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359 , 395, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644

2016In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Id. at p. 1132.) “[Anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method ‘ “is the only way of *272 approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees ... , the ultimate goal

2016In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for such services.” (Id. at p. 1132.) “[Anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method ‘ “is the only way of *272 approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “When using the lodestar method to calculate attorney fees ... , the ultimate goal

2015(Serrano [v. Priest (1977)] 20 Cal.3d [25], 49 [(Serrano III)].)” (Ketchum, at p. 1134.) The court reaffirmed this approach yet again in Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 579 [“ ‘anchoring the calculation of attorney fees to the lodestar adjustment method “ ‘is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ ” [Citation.]’ ”) Use of the lodestar does not, however, mean a party seeking attorneys’ fees is “necessarily entitled to compensation for the value of attorney services ac

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

2014(Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [ 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 866 ].) “‘[T]he court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide “ ‘a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims.’ ” [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, *487 how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expend

1998Thus its pronouncements cannot be read as necessarily limited only to fees awarded under section 1021.5.” (Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 640 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 632 ], citations omitted.) 10 We are persuaded by Flannery that the California Supreme Court intended its lodestar method to apply to a statutory attorney’s *449 fee award unless the statutory authorization for the award provided for another method of calculation.

1998Thus its pronouncements cannot be read as necessarily limited only to fees awarded under section 1021.5.” (Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 640 [ 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 632 ], citations omitted.) 10 We are persuaded by Flannery that the California Supreme Court intended its lodestar method to apply to a statutory attorney’s *449 fee award unless the statutory authorization for the award provided for another method of calculation.

1998The court held that the trial court had properly calculated the award by computing a “touchstone” amount based on “a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation” and augmenting or diminishing this touchstone amount based on a number of “relevant factors.” 8 {Serrano at pp. 48-49 .) “ ‘Anchoring the analysis to this [touchstone] concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ . . {Serrano at p. 48, fn. 23 , citation omitted, italics added.) None of the “releva

1998The court held that the trial court had properly calculated the award by computing a “touchstone” amount based on “a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation” and augmenting or diminishing this touchstone amount based on a number of “relevant factors.” 8 {Serrano at pp. 48-49 .) “ ‘Anchoring the analysis to this [touchstone] concept is the only way of approaching the problem that can claim objectivity, a claim which is obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ . . {Serrano at p. 48, fn. 23 , citation omitted, italics added.) None of the “releva

1986It is ‘obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ [Citation.] Such a rigid requirement, however, is not equally ‘vital’ when such precipitating facts are not present. [1Í] Furthermore, there is no indication Serrano III intended to change long standing California decisions setting forth the principle under which attorney fees are to be set by a court in statutory and contractual settings.” (Id., at p. 225.) Thus, having determined that Serrano III has not changed our standard of review, our search is for a “manifest abuse of discretion.” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d

1986It is ‘obviously vital to the prestige of the bar and the courts.’ [Citation.] Such a rigid requirement, however, is not equally ‘vital’ when such precipitating facts are not present. [1Í] Furthermore, there is no indication Serrano III intended to change long standing California decisions setting forth the principle under which attorney fees are to be set by a court in statutory and contractual settings.” (Id., at p. 225.) Thus, having determined that Serrano III has not changed our standard of review, our search is for a “manifest abuse of discretion.” (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d

1985The trend of courts in California and around the country is to regard the existence of a contingent fee contract as either irrelevant 8 or as but one *954 factor to be considered by the court when it determines what is a reasonable attorney fee (see City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 468 ; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. (5th Cir. 1974) 488 F.2d 714, 719 ; Clark v. American Marine Corporation (E.D.La. 1970) 320 F.Supp. 709, 711 [16 A.L.R.Fed. 637], affd. (5th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 959 ; Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 519 ; Jutkowitz v. Bourns, I

1985The trend of courts in California and around the country is to regard the existence of a contingent fee contract as either irrelevant 8 or as but one *954 factor to be considered by the court when it determines what is a reasonable attorney fee (see City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. (2d Cir. 1974) 495 F.2d 448, 468 ; Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. (5th Cir. 1974) 488 F.2d 714, 719 ; Clark v. American Marine Corporation (E.D.La. 1970) 320 F.Supp. 709, 711 [16 A.L.R.Fed. 637], affd. (5th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 959 ; Vella v. Hudgins, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d 515, 519 ; Jutkowitz v. Bourns, I