claim preclusion doctrine in Colorado

2025Highway Auth., 109 P.3d 604, 611 (Colo. 2005). ¶ 14 Contrary to the homeowners’ argument, claims arising under CCIOA aren’t exempt from the claim preclusion doctrine.

2019Highway Auth ., 109 P.3d 604 , 608 (Colo. 2005) (noting that the claim preclusion doctrine precludes the relitigation of matters that have been decided or that could have been raised in a prior proceeding).

2015Id. 137 Here, even assuming without deciding that the 1968 Order was a final judgment and that the prior proceeding and the present one involved identical subject matter (Le., designated ground water in the Basin), Meridian has not established 'that the prior and current proceedings involved identical claims for relief. 138 The identity of claims element "is bounded by the injury for which relief is demanded, and not by the legal theory on which the person asserting the claim relies." Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 199 (Colo.1999). 139 As noted above,

2015Id. ¶37 Here, even assuming without deciding that the 1968 Order was a final judgment and that the prior proceeding and the present one involved identical subject matter (i.e., designated ground water in the Basin), Meridian has not established that the prior and current proceedings involved identical claims for relief. ¶38 The identity of claims element “is bounded by the injury for which relief is demanded, and not by the legal theory on which the person asserting the claim relies.” Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 199 (Colo. 1999). ¶39 As noted above,

2025See Cruz v. Benine, 984 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Colo. 1999).

2025See Benine, 984 P.2d at 1176 .

2016This limitation is consistent with the broader principle that “statutes may not be interpreted to "abrogate the common .law unless such abrogation was clearly the intent of the General’ Assembly.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 440 (Colo. 2001)).

2005We agree with the Authority. “[SJtatutes may not be interpreted to abrogate the common law unless such abrogation was clearly the intent of the General Assembly.” Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 440 (Colo.2001); Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 52 , 355 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1960).

2015Court , 906 P.2d 72, 79 (Colo. 1995); Mitchell v. Ryder , 104 P.3d 316, 319 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶59       In MIC I , slip op. at 11-12, the division concluded: Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MIC knew or should have known that there was a dispute concerning the Assignment’s validity or the ownership of the Property when it filed its Utah action, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred MIC’s claim that the Assignment was invalid.

2015Court, 906 P.2d 72, 79 (Colo. 1995); Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316, 319 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶ 59 In MIC I, slip op. at 11-12, the division concluded: Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MIC knew or should have known that there was a dispute .concerning the Assignment’s validity or the ownership of the Property when it filed its Utah action, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred MIC’s claim that the Assignment was invalid.

2015The division did not direct the trial court to find when MIC knew or should have known of the Assignment dispute. ¶60       Undaunted, FIF contends that “[f]actual findings underlying a claim preclusion or other similar issue are determined by a district court not a jury,” and cites Antelope Co. v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc. , 51 P.3d 995, 1002 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[T]he factual determination of the privity issue should be made by the court, not by the jury.” (citing Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Phila.

2015The division did not direct the trial court to find whén MIC knew or should have known of the Assignment dispute. ¶ 60 Undaunted, FIF contends that “[f]actual findings .underlying a claim preclusion or other .similar issue are determined by a district court not a jury,” and cites Antelope Co. v., Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc., 51 P.3d 995, 1002 (Colo. App. 2001) (“[T]he factual determination of the privity issue should be made by the court, not by the jury.” (citing Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Phila.

2015Court , 906 P.2d 72, 79 (Colo. 1995); Mitchell v. Ryder , 104 P.3d 316, 319 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶59       In MIC I , slip op. at 11-12, the division concluded: Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MIC knew or should have known that there was a dispute concerning the Assignment’s validity or the ownership of the Property when it filed its Utah action, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred MIC’s claim that the Assignment was invalid.

2015Court, 906 P.2d 72, 79 (Colo. 1995); Mitchell v. Ryder, 104 P.3d 316, 319 (Colo. App. 2004). ¶ 59 In MIC I, slip op. at 11-12, the division concluded: Because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether MIC knew or should have known that there was a dispute .concerning the Assignment’s validity or the ownership of the Property when it filed its Utah action, we conclude that the district court erred in ruling that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred MIC’s claim that the Assignment was invalid.

2025Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “once a particular issue is finally determined in one proceeding, parties to this proceeding are barred from [relitigating] that particular issue again 16 in a second proceeding, even when the actual claims for relief in the two proceedings are different.” Id. “[T]he doctrine of issue preclusion is broader than the doctrine of claim preclusion because it applies to claims for relief different from those litigated in the first action, but narrower in that it applies only to issues actually litigated.” Id. ¶ 44 Issue preclusion prohibits litigation of an i

2025Under the doctrine of issue preclusion, “once a particular issue is finally determined in one proceeding, parties to this proceeding are barred from [relitigating] that particular issue again 16 in a second proceeding, even when the actual claims for relief in the two proceedings are different.” Id. “[T]he doctrine of issue preclusion is broader than the doctrine of claim preclusion because it applies to claims for relief different from those litigated in the first action, but narrower in that it applies only to issues actually litigated.” Id. ¶ 44 Issue preclusion prohibits litigation of an i

2025Ass’n v. Menor, 166 P.3d 205, 211-12 (Colo. App. 2007). ¶ 13 The claim preclusion doctrine prevents parties from relitigating claims that were or that could have been litigated in a prior 6 proceeding.

2025And “[i]t is well-settled in Colorado that a 4 dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits, and therefore does not preclude a subsequent action on the same claim in a proper forum.” In re Estate of Murphy, 195 P.3d 1147, 1153 (Colo. App. 2008) (also noting that it “makes no difference” that the dismissal was “with prejudice” when the basis for dismissal is the court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction). ¶ 10 The presence of all four elements is required for the doctrine of claim preclusion to apply.

2020Comm’rs, 789 P.2d 475, 477 (Colo. App. 1990) (concluding that the district court had erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s section 1983 claim when the plaintiff had filed a complaint seeking both judicial review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) and damages under section 1983 but the district court had concluded that the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim was untimely under the short limitations period applicable to that claim, a decision that is fully consistent with this court’s later ruling in Sundheim); Wilson v. Town of Avon, 749 P.2d 990, 992 (Colo. App. 1987) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ section 1983 cl

2020In so ruling, the district court rejected Gale’s argument that in Board of County Commissioners v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545 4 (Colo. 1996), and State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997), this court had concluded that section 1983 claims need not be brought in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action and therefore his section 1983 claims were not barred under the claim preclusion doctrine. ¶10 Gale then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, where, among other things, he renewed his argument that this court has crafted an exception to the claim preclusion doctrine such that a prio

2020In so ruling, the district court rejected Gale’s argument that in Board of County Commissioners v. Sundheim, 926 P.2d 545 4 (Colo. 1996), and State Board of Chiropractic Examiners v. Stjernholm, 935 P.2d 959 (Colo. 1997), this court had concluded that section 1983 claims need not be brought in a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action and therefore his section 1983 claims were not barred under the claim preclusion doctrine. ¶10 Gale then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, where, among other things, he renewed his argument that this court has crafted an exception to the claim preclusion doctrine such that a prio

2020Id. at 967.

2020Comm’rs, 789 P.2d 475, 477 (Colo. App. 1990) (concluding that the district court had erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s section 1983 claim when the plaintiff had filed a complaint seeking both judicial review under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) and damages under section 1983 but the district court had concluded that the C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) claim was untimely under the short limitations period applicable to that claim, a decision that is fully consistent with this court’s later ruling in Sundheim); Wilson v. Town of Avon, 749 P.2d 990, 992 (Colo. App. 1987) (concluding that the plaintiffs’ section 1983 cl

2017See id.

2012Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, often referred to as res judicata, ""a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645 ; see Pomeroy, 183 Colo. at 349-50 , 517 P.2d at 399 . .

2012Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, often referred to as res judicata, ""a judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action." Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645 ; see Pomeroy, 183 Colo. at 349-50 , 517 P.2d at 399 . .

2011See Hernandez v. Woodard, 873 P.2d 20, 21 (Colo.App.1993) (discussing claim preclusion under its former name, "res judicata," and holding that res judicata is not applicable "if the plaintiff was unable to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of certain legal restraints"); In re Marriage of Wright, 841 P.2d 358, 860 (Colo.App.1992) (discussing claim preclusion under its former name, "res judicata," and holding that "res judicata does not apply when the initial forum lacked the authority to award the full measure of relief sought in the subsequent litigation").

2011See Hernandez v. Woodard, 873 P.2d 20, 21 (Colo.App.1993) (discussing claim preclusion under its former name, "res judicata," and holding that res judicata is not applicable "if the plaintiff was unable to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in the first action because of certain legal restraints"); In re Marriage of Wright, 841 P.2d 358, 860 (Colo.App.1992) (discussing claim preclusion under its former name, "res judicata," and holding that "res judicata does not apply when the initial forum lacked the authority to award the full measure of relief sought in the subsequent litigation").

2008Dash v. Rubey, 144 Colo. 481, 484 , 357 P.2d 81, 83 (1960); Batterman v. Wells Fargo Ag Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Colo.App.1990).

2008Dash v. Rubey, 144 Colo. 481, 484 , 357 P.2d 81, 83 (1960); Batterman v. Wells Fargo Ag Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Colo.App.1990).

2008Dash v. Rubey, 144 Colo. 481, 484 , 357 P.2d 81, 83 (1960); Batterman v. Wells Fargo Ag Credit Corp., 802 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Colo.App.1990).

2005We agree with the Authority. “[SJtatutes may not be interpreted to abrogate the common law unless such abrogation was clearly the intent of the General Assembly.” Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 440 (Colo.2001); Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 52 , 355 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1960).

2005We agree with the Authority. “[SJtatutes may not be interpreted to abrogate the common law unless such abrogation was clearly the intent of the General Assembly.” Preston v. Dupont, 35 P.3d 433, 440 (Colo.2001); Robinson v. Kerr, 144 Colo. 48, 52 , 355 P.2d 117, 119-20 (1960).