claim preclusion doctrine in Arizona

2023See Airfreight Express Ltd., 215 Ariz. at 108, ¶ 13 (explaining that an involuntary dismissal order stating that it is without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar a second action under the doctrine of claim preclusion); see also Banner Univ.

2019THE SUPERIOR COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED THE NAME- CHANGE REQUEST. ¶5 Mother contends that the superior court should not have considered Father’s request to alter the child’s name because he did not appear in the civil name-change proceeding. ¶6 “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Airfreight Express Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 Ariz. 103, 108, ¶ 12 (App. 2007).

2013We are bound to affirm if the superior court was “correct in its ruling for any reason.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 213 Ariz. 400 , 404 n. 7, ¶ 17, 142 P.3d 708 , 712 n. 7 (App.2006). ¶ 5 In her motion to dismiss, Fentzlaff asserted that Peterson’s lawsuit in superior court was barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion, which prevents a plaintiff from bringing a second lawsuit when a prior “judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the form

2013We are bound to affirm if the superior court was “correct in its ruling for any reason.” Phelps Dodge Corp. v. El Paso Corp., 213 Ariz. 400 , 404 n. 7, ¶ 17, 142 P.3d 708 , 712 n. 7 (App.2006). ¶ 5 In her motion to dismiss, Fentzlaff asserted that Peterson’s lawsuit in superior court was barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion, which prevents a plaintiff from bringing a second lawsuit when a prior “judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the form

2024See Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, 533, ¶ 10 (App. 2008) (precluding the father from litigating paternity after failing to do so in a prior proceeding).

2017Pettit v. Pettit, 218 Ariz. 529, 531, ¶ 4 , 189 P.3d 1102, 1104 (App. 2008) (citation omitted). ¶ 28 Assuming, without deciding, that San-bome and Maza have established the first two elements of claim preclusion, an identity of claims and a final judgment on the merits, Sanborne and Maza have failed to establish the final element of claim preclusion, the same parties or the parties’ privies.

2024We “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts, but mere conclusory statements are insufficient.” Id. at 356, ¶ 9 . ¶11 The superior court found that Giersz’s lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, which prevents a plaintiff from bringing a lawsuit when a prior final “judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the former action.” Peterson v. Newton, 232 Ariz. 593, 595, ¶

2016Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 , 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). ¶16 “Compulsory counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and if such claims are not pled in the first action, they are waived and barred in any subsequent action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.” Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70, ¶ 8 , 326 P.3d 335, 337 (App. 2014) (citing Lansford v. Harris, 174 Ariz. 413, 418-19 (App. 1992)).

2016Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 , 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). ¶16 “Compulsory counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and if such claims are not pled in the first action, they are waived and barred in any subsequent action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.” Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70, ¶ 8 , 326 P.3d 335, 337 (App. 2014) (citing Lansford v. Harris, 174 Ariz. 413, 418-19 (App. 1992)).

2016The “same transaction or occurrence” standard is a flexible one “that is met when a logical relationship exists between the current cause of action and the previous one.” Id. (citing Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968)). 6 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court ¶17 Clearly there was a “logical relationship” between Donald’s claim for partition and James’s claim against Donald for breach of contract involving the same property.

2011El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. State, 123 Ariz. 219, 223 , 599 P.2d 175, 179 (1979).

2011El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. State, 123 Ariz. 219, 223 , 599 P.2d 175, 179 (1979).

2007Cf. Norman A. Koglin Assocs. v. Valenz Oro, Inc., 176 Ill.2d 385 , 223 Ill.Dec. 550 , 680 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1997) (“A counterclaim differs from an ... affirmative defense.

2007Cf. Norman A. Koglin Assocs. v. Valenz Oro, Inc., 176 Ill.2d 385 , 223 Ill.Dec. 550 , 680 N.E.2d 283, 288 (1997) (“A counterclaim differs from an ... affirmative defense.

2015Claim preclusion prevents parties from re-litigating an issue once there has been a final judgment on that matter: “[u]nder the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties . . . bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Dressler, 212 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 15 , 130 P.3d at 981 .

2015Claim preclusion prevents parties from re-litigating an issue once there has been a final judgment on that matter: “[u]nder the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties . . . bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Dressler, 212 Ariz. at 282, ¶ 15 , 130 P.3d at 981 .

2007Co., 152 Ariz. 490 , 495 n. 3, 733 P.2d 1073 , 1078 n. 3 (1987) (‘We urge trial judges to articulate their reasoning so appel *108 late courts can determine on appeal whether the ruling was erroneous.”). ¶ 12 AFX first contends the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply “because all of [its] claims in the first lawsuit were dismissed without prejudice before the counterclaim trial.” “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Dressler, 212 Ariz. 279, ¶ 15 ,

2007Co., 152 Ariz. 490 , 495 n. 3, 733 P.2d 1073 , 1078 n. 3 (1987) (‘We urge trial judges to articulate their reasoning so appel *108 late courts can determine on appeal whether the ruling was erroneous.”). ¶ 12 AFX first contends the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply “because all of [its] claims in the first lawsuit were dismissed without prejudice before the counterclaim trial.” “Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on the same claim.” Dressler, 212 Ariz. 279, ¶ 15 ,

2007P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, an involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the merits” unless “the court in its order ... otherwise specifies.” A dismissal without prejudice, however, is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar a second action under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 4 See Union Interchange, Inc. v. Van Aalsburg, 102 Ariz. 461, 464 , 432 P.2d 589, 592 (1967) (“A dismissal without prejudice does not go to the merits of the plaintiffs cause and does not bar plaintiff from later filing on the same cause of action.”); cf. Phillips v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 59

2007P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, an involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the merits” unless “the court in its order ... otherwise specifies.” A dismissal without prejudice, however, is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar a second action under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 4 See Union Interchange, Inc. v. Van Aalsburg, 102 Ariz. 461, 464 , 432 P.2d 589, 592 (1967) (“A dismissal without prejudice does not go to the merits of the plaintiffs cause and does not bar plaintiff from later filing on the same cause of action.”); cf. Phillips v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 59

2024We “assume the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and indulge all reasonable inferences from those facts, but mere conclusory statements are insufficient.” Id. at 356, ¶ 9 . ¶11 The superior court found that Giersz’s lawsuit was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, which prevents a plaintiff from bringing a lawsuit when a prior final “judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the former action.” Peterson v. Newton, 232 Ariz. 593, 595, ¶

2024“To successfully assert the defense of claim preclusion, a party must prove: (1) an identity of claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered and the current litigation, (2) a final judgment on the merits in the previous litigation, and (3) identity or privity between parties in the two suits.” Id.

2021By failing to properly raise the spoliation of evidence argument in the superior court, Myers waived it on appeal, and we will not consider it.2 See Trantor v. Fredrikson, 179 Ariz. 299, 300 (1994) (holding the failure to raise an issue in the superior court waives the issue on appeal). ¶14 This court reviews de novo the dismissal of a complaint.

2021Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).

2020Co., 231 Ariz. 517, 519, ¶ 6 (App. 2013) (explaining the “doctrine of claim preclusion, or res judicata, bars a claim when a former judgment on the merits was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and the matter now in issue between the same parties or their privities was, or might have been, determined in the former action”) (internal quotation omitted).

2019Thomas v. Newell, 221 Ariz. 112, 114, ¶ 6 (App. 2009) (internal quotation omitted). 4 Given our resolution of Investments’ arguments on appeal, we need not determine whether its collateral attack on the receivership court’s orders is precluded under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 9 MW2 INVESTMENTS v. IMH SPECIAL, et al.

2016Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 , 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). ¶16 “Compulsory counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and if such claims are not pled in the first action, they are waived and barred in any subsequent action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.” Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70, ¶ 8 , 326 P.3d 335, 337 (App. 2014) (citing Lansford v. Harris, 174 Ariz. 413, 418-19 (App. 1992)).

2016Coleman v. City of Mesa, 230 Ariz. 352, 355, ¶ 7 , 284 P.3d 863, 866 (2012). ¶16 “Compulsory counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and if such claims are not pled in the first action, they are waived and barred in any subsequent action under the doctrine of claim preclusion.” Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 235 Ariz. 68, 70, ¶ 8 , 326 P.3d 335, 337 (App. 2014) (citing Lansford v. Harris, 174 Ariz. 413, 418-19 (App. 1992)).

2016The “same transaction or occurrence” standard is a flexible one “that is met when a logical relationship exists between the current cause of action and the previous one.” Id. (citing Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968)). 6 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court ¶17 Clearly there was a “logical relationship” between Donald’s claim for partition and James’s claim against Donald for breach of contract involving the same property.

2016The “same transaction or occurrence” standard is a flexible one “that is met when a logical relationship exists between the current cause of action and the previous one.” Id. (citing Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968)). 6 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court ¶17 Clearly there was a “logical relationship” between Donald’s claim for partition and James’s claim against Donald for breach of contract involving the same property.

2013P., without first seeking to recall an appellate court’s mandate, US West Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 199 Ariz. 101, ¶ 11 , 14 P.3d 292, 295 (2000), Tumacacori did not file such a motion. ¶ 6 Even assuming the trial court had the authority to consider Tumacacori’s motion to amend, we agree with Union Pacific’s contention that the court’s grant of summary judgment was “res judicata as to all theories that [Tumaeacori] asserted in this now-concluded action, or could have asserted.” The doctrine of claim preclusion, 4 or res judicata, bars a claim “when a former judgment on the meri

2013P., without first seeking to recall an appellate court’s mandate, US West Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 199 Ariz. 101, ¶ 11 , 14 P.3d 292, 295 (2000), Tumacacori did not file such a motion. ¶ 6 Even assuming the trial court had the authority to consider Tumacacori’s motion to amend, we agree with Union Pacific’s contention that the court’s grant of summary judgment was “res judicata as to all theories that [Tumaeacori] asserted in this now-concluded action, or could have asserted.” The doctrine of claim preclusion, 4 or res judicata, bars a claim “when a former judgment on the meri

2013In Arizona, the doctrine rests on the long-accepted principle that “[i]t is against public policy to split a cause of action and to make two or more suits of it when one is sufficient.” Williams v. Williams, 32 Ariz. 164, 168 , 256 P. 356, 357 (1927); see also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ariz., 188 Ariz. 237, 241 , 934 P.2d 801, 805 (App.1997) (noting that a purpose of the claim preclusion doctrine is “barring the splitting of claims”).

2013In Arizona, the doctrine rests on the long-accepted principle that “[i]t is against public policy to split a cause of action and to make two or more suits of it when one is sufficient.” Williams v. Williams, 32 Ariz. 164, 168 , 256 P. 356, 357 (1927); see also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ariz., 188 Ariz. 237, 241 , 934 P.2d 801, 805 (App.1997) (noting that a purpose of the claim preclusion doctrine is “barring the splitting of claims”).

2013In Arizona, the doctrine rests on the long-accepted principle that “[i]t is against public policy to split a cause of action and to make two or more suits of it when one is sufficient.” Williams v. Williams, 32 Ariz. 164, 168 , 256 P. 356, 357 (1927); see also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ariz., 188 Ariz. 237, 241 , 934 P.2d 801, 805 (App.1997) (noting that a purpose of the claim preclusion doctrine is “barring the splitting of claims”).

2013In Arizona, the doctrine rests on the long-accepted principle that “[i]t is against public policy to split a cause of action and to make two or more suits of it when one is sufficient.” Williams v. Williams, 32 Ariz. 164, 168 , 256 P. 356, 357 (1927); see also Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., State of Ariz., 188 Ariz. 237, 241 , 934 P.2d 801, 805 (App.1997) (noting that a purpose of the claim preclusion doctrine is “barring the splitting of claims”).

2013P., without first seeking to recall an appellate court’s mandate, US West Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 199 Ariz. 101, ¶ 11 , 14 P.3d 292, 295 (2000), Tumacacori did not file such a motion. ¶ 6 Even assuming the trial court had the authority to consider Tumacacori’s motion to amend, we agree with Union Pacific’s contention that the court’s grant of summary judgment was “res judicata as to all theories that [Tumaeacori] asserted in this now-concluded action, or could have asserted.” The doctrine of claim preclusion, 4 or res judicata, bars a claim “when a former judgment on the meri

2013P., without first seeking to recall an appellate court’s mandate, US West Commc’ns, Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 199 Ariz. 101, ¶ 11 , 14 P.3d 292, 295 (2000), Tumacacori did not file such a motion. ¶ 6 Even assuming the trial court had the authority to consider Tumacacori’s motion to amend, we agree with Union Pacific’s contention that the court’s grant of summary judgment was “res judicata as to all theories that [Tumaeacori] asserted in this now-concluded action, or could have asserted.” The doctrine of claim preclusion, 4 or res judicata, bars a claim “when a former judgment on the meri

2007P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, an involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the merits” unless “the court in its order ... otherwise specifies.” A dismissal without prejudice, however, is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar a second action under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 4 See Union Interchange, Inc. v. Van Aalsburg, 102 Ariz. 461, 464 , 432 P.2d 589, 592 (1967) (“A dismissal without prejudice does not go to the merits of the plaintiffs cause and does not bar plaintiff from later filing on the same cause of action.”); cf. Phillips v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 59

2007P., 16 A.R.S., Pt. 1, an involuntary dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the merits” unless “the court in its order ... otherwise specifies.” A dismissal without prejudice, however, is not an adjudication on the merits and does not bar a second action under the doctrine of claim preclusion. 4 See Union Interchange, Inc. v. Van Aalsburg, 102 Ariz. 461, 464 , 432 P.2d 589, 592 (1967) (“A dismissal without prejudice does not go to the merits of the plaintiffs cause and does not bar plaintiff from later filing on the same cause of action.”); cf. Phillips v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 59

2007Comm’n, 179 Ariz. 422, 425 , 880 P.2d 642, 645 (App. 1993); see also In re Gen.

2007Comm’n, 179 Ariz. 422, 425 , 880 P.2d 642, 645 (App. 1993); see also In re Gen.

2006We conclude that prior decisions of this Court and the court of appeals correctly held that the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to bar actions such as Dressler’s. ¶ 16 The purpose of section 25-318 is “to provide a standard for the [equitable] disposition of community and common property in [ ] dissolution proceeding^].” Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457 , 752 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1988).

2006We conclude that prior decisions of this Court and the court of appeals correctly held that the doctrine of claim preclusion does not apply to bar actions such as Dressler’s. ¶ 16 The purpose of section 25-318 is “to provide a standard for the [equitable] disposition of community and common property in [ ] dissolution proceeding^].” Martin v. Martin, 156 Ariz. 452, 457 , 752 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1988).

2006See, e.g., Tarien v. Katz, 216 Cal. 554 , 15 P.2d 493, 495 (1932) (holding that when a final divorce decree failed to dispose of community property, a former spouse’s right to that property can be determined in a subsequent action, not barred by claim pre *283 elusion); Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) (holding that a “partition of community property not disposed of in the prior divorce decree is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata”).

2006See, e.g., Tarien v. Katz, 216 Cal. 554 , 15 P.2d 493, 495 (1932) (holding that when a final divorce decree failed to dispose of community property, a former spouse’s right to that property can be determined in a subsequent action, not barred by claim pre *283 elusion); Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) (holding that a “partition of community property not disposed of in the prior divorce decree is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata”).

2006See, e.g., Tarien v. Katz, 216 Cal. 554 , 15 P.2d 493, 495 (1932) (holding that when a final divorce decree failed to dispose of community property, a former spouse’s right to that property can be determined in a subsequent action, not barred by claim pre *283 elusion); Yeo v. Yeo, 581 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex.Civ.App.1979) (holding that a “partition of community property not disposed of in the prior divorce decree is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata”).