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26 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 2009–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Domagalagreen2 sentences2021Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). ¶ 35 Combining both the standard for a second-stage dismissal with the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant at this stage must make (1) a substantial showing that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and (2) a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 2020People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . ¶ 27 Here, in dismissing the petition, the court found that defendant failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated, which is the second-stage dismissal standard. | 4 | 9 |
People v. Wheelergreen2 sentences2026Furthermore, “if a court must assess a defendant’s credibility to determine his culpable negligence, ‘[s]uch an assessment is not intended for a second-stage dismissal hearing’ and must wait for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.” People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 182392, ¶ 56 (quoting Wheeler, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 310 ). 2022We further found that: “when a *** court determines whether or not a defendant was culpably negligent, [it] must assess the defendant’s credibility. [Citation.] Such an assessment is not intended for a second-stage dismissal hearing, where [the] court is foreclosed from fact-finding and all well-pleaded facts are taken as true. [Citation.] Assessments of credibility are better suited to a third-stage evidentiary hearing, which does not occur until after the State’s answer, which never occurred in this case.” Id. at 310 . ¶ 35 We therefore remanded for further proceedings under the Act without | 3 | 8 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2022The court’s written dismissal order correctly states that “[a]ll well-pleaded facts that are not positively rebutted by the trial record are to be taken as true at a second stage dismissal hearing,” citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998). 2019App. 3d 303, 308 (2009) (citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380-81 (1998)). ¶ 32 At a second-stage dismissal hearing, a trial court is foreclosed from engaging in any fact finding because all well-pleaded facts must be taken as true at the second stage. | 3 | 8 |
Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLPgreen2 sentences2020People v. Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 25 (citing Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011)). ¶ 48 III. 2018People v. Tolefree , 2011 IL App (1st) 100689 , ¶ 25, 355 Ill.Dec. 584 , 960 N.E.2d 27 (citing Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 Ill. | 3 | 4 |
People v. Enisgreen2 sentences2021See Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . ¶ 36 “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, namely, that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial -7- unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376-77 (2000). ¶ 37 Although the Strickland test is a two-prong test, our analysis may proceed in any order. 2020See Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 . ¶ 62 “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, namely, that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 376 (2000). ¶ 63 Although the Strickland test is a two-prong test, our analysis may proceed in any order. | 3 | 3 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2021Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). ¶ 35 Combining both the standard for a second-stage dismissal with the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant at this stage must make (1) a substantial showing that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and (2) a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 2020Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). ¶ 61 Combining both the standard for a second-stage dismissal with the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant at this stage must make (1) a substantial showing that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and (2) a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. | 3 | 3 |
People v. Tolefreegreen2 sentences2020People v. Tolefree, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689, ¶ 25 (citing Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 408 Ill. App. 3d 564, 578 (2011)). ¶ 48 III. 2018People v. Tolefree , 2011 IL App (1st) 100689 , ¶ 25, 355 Ill.Dec. 584 , 960 N.E.2d 27 (citing Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2026Furthermore, “if a court must assess a defendant’s credibility to determine his culpable negligence, ‘[s]uch an assessment is not intended for a second-stage dismissal hearing’ and must wait for a third-stage evidentiary hearing.” People v. Jones, 2021 IL App (1st) 182392, ¶ 56 (quoting Wheeler, 392 Ill. App. 3d at 310 ). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Knappgreen1 sentence2020See 2019 IL App (2d) 160162, ¶ 38 (citing People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 36 , and People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 397 (1998)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Richmondgreen1 sentence2011A successful motion to suppress had at least a reasonable probability of changing the outcome of this case because, without defendant’s statements, the State would have been without direct evidence that defendant knew that Perez had a gun–the lynchpin of the State’s entire case. interrogation was recorded is a circumstance to be considered in determining the weight to be given to the defendant’s statement (citing People v. Richmond, 341 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Pendleton
green
2 sentences2014People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (1st) 102181, ¶ 33 . -9- 2014 IL App (2d) 120810 ¶ 25 At the second-stage dismissal hearing, “the defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . 2014People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (1st) 102181, ¶ 33 . -9- 2014 IL App (2d) 120810 ¶ 25 At the second-stage dismissal hearing, “the defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . | 5 | 2014–2018 |
People v. Harper
green
2 sentences2014People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (1st) 102181, ¶ 33 . -9- 2014 IL App (2d) 120810 ¶ 25 At the second-stage dismissal hearing, “the defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . 2014People v. Harper, 2013 IL App (1st) 102181, ¶ 33 . -9- 2014 IL App (2d) 120810 ¶ 25 At the second-stage dismissal hearing, “the defendant bears the burden of making a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 473 . | 4 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Wheeler
neutral
2 sentences2018"If the State moves to dismiss, the trial court may hold a dismissal hearing, which is still part of the second stage." People v. Wheeler , 392 Ill. App. 3d 303 , 308, 332 Ill.Dec. 194 , 912 N.E.2d 681 (2009) (citing People v. Coleman , 183 Ill. 2d 366 , 380-81, 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998) ). ¶ 32 At a second-stage dismissal hearing, a trial court is foreclosed from engaging in any fact finding because all well-pleaded facts must be taken as true at the second stage. 2010As a result, the court held that "[s]uch an assessment is not intended for a second-stage dismissal hearing, where a trial court is foreclosed from fact-finding and all well-pleaded facts are taken as true." Wheeler, 392 Ill.App.3d at 310, 332 Ill.Dec. 194 , 912 N.E.2d 681 , citing People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 380-81 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). | 2 | 2010–2018 |
People v. Rodriguez
green
1 sentence2020“De novo consideration in the case at bar means that we perform the same analysis that the trial judge would have performed if we had been sitting during the second-stage dismissal hearing. [Citations.]” People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st) 160030, ¶ 45 . -9- 1-17-1899 ¶ 26 The issue in this appeal is not whether defendant has made a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were violated because the trial court allowed an impartial juror to decide his case—although that issue may arise later. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Hodges
green
1 sentence2020Specifically, petitioner argues that the appellate court erroneously relied on two decisions that involved a second-stage dismissal in its analysis of his claims, thereby showing that his petition “was unfairly held to second-stage postconviction standards despite being dismissed at the first stage.” Petitioner asks this court to reaffirm our prior precedent, particularly our decision in People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (2009), holding that at the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the pleadings should be liberally construed and the threshold for advancing to the second stage is low. ¶ | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Tolefree
neutral
2 sentences2018People v. Tolefree , 2011 IL App (1st) 100689 , ¶ 25, 355 Ill.Dec. 584 , 960 N.E.2d 27 (citing Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 Ill. 2018People v. Tolefree , 2011 IL App (1st) 100689 , ¶ 25, 355 Ill.Dec. 584 , 960 N.E.2d 27 (citing Khan v. BDO Seidman, LLP , 408 Ill. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Snow
green
1 sentence2018Wheeler , 392 Ill. App. 3d at 308 , 332 Ill.Dec. 194 , 912 N.E.2d 681 (citing Coleman , 183 Ill. 2d at 380 -81 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 ). ¶ 33 If the petition proceeds, it advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. "[W]hen a petitioner's claims are based upon matters outside the record, the Postconviction Act does not intend such claims [to] be adjudicated on the pleadings." People v. Snow , 2012 IL App (4th) 110415 , ¶ 15, 358 Ill.Dec. 117 , 964 N.E.2d 1139 ; see also 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2016) ; Pendleton , 223 Ill. 2d at 472 -73 , 308 Ill.Dec. 434 , 861 N.E.2d 999 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Snow
green
1 sentence2018Wheeler , 392 Ill. App. 3d at 308 , 332 Ill.Dec. 194 , 912 N.E.2d 681 (citing Coleman , 183 Ill. 2d at 380 -81 , 233 Ill.Dec. 789 , 701 N.E.2d 1063 ). ¶ 33 If the petition proceeds, it advances to a third-stage evidentiary hearing. "[W]hen a petitioner's claims are based upon matters outside the record, the Postconviction Act does not intend such claims [to] be adjudicated on the pleadings." People v. Snow , 2012 IL App (4th) 110415 , ¶ 15, 358 Ill.Dec. 117 , 964 N.E.2d 1139 ; see also 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2016) ; Pendleton , 223 Ill. 2d at 472 -73 , 308 Ill.Dec. 434 , 861 N.E.2d 999 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Orange
green
1 sentence2011App. 3d 626, 636 (2010); cf. People v. Orange, 168 Ill. 2d 138 (1995) (the case upon which the State relies, where the court affirmed a second- stage dismissal where defense counsel, in a deposition, explained his strategic reasons for declining to pursue a motion to suppress). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.