upon hearing in Illinois

1979In Consolidated Coal Co. v. Schmisseur, 135 Ill. 371 , the court, in discussing the enforcement of negative covenants in courts of equity, said it was well settled that equity would entertain bills for injunctions to prevent their breach although the breach would cause no substantial injury or although the damages might be recoverable in an action at law. ‘This is upon the principle that the owner of land selling or leasing it may insert in his deed or contract just such conditions and covenants as he pleases touching the mode of enjoyment and use of the land.

1913Louis v. Schmisseur, 135 Ill. 371 , says: “It seems to be well settled that where there is an express negative covenant courts of equity will entertain bills for injunction to prevent their breach, although the same will occasion no substantial injury or though the damages, if any, be recoverable at law.” But he adds: “This is upon the principle that the owner of land selling or leasing it may insert in his deed or contract just such conditions and covenants as he pleases touching the mode of enjoyment and use of the land. ’ ’ It does not seem necessary to extend this opinion by a discussion o

1902Where there is no wrong intention, and where no party is thereby prejudiced, and especially where the item is easily separable from the residue of the indebtedness, the mistake is said in Culver v. Schroth, 153 Ill. 437 -446, not to be sufficient of itself to vitiate the statement and defeat the lien.” Third—Appellee assigns a cross-error, alleging that the Appellate Court erred in disallowing the solicitor’s fee, which was embraced in the amount found to be due by the circuit court.

1901Where there is no wrong intention, and where no party is thereby prejudiced, and especially where the item is easily separable from the residue of the indebtedness, the mistake is said, in Culver v. Schroth, 153 Ill. 437 -446, not to be sufficient of itself to vitiate the statement and defeat the lien.

2011The Supreme Court of Wisconsin interestingly described its view of the situation as follows: “The immediate reaction of the members of the court upon hearing the facts of the case was that the presence of the circuit court judge’s mother on the jury raises red flags of danger of juror bias and of a circuit court judge having to rule on matters involving a member of his or her family.” Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶4 , 764 N.W.2d 737 .

2011The Supreme Court of Wisconsin interestingly described its view of the situation as follows: “The immediate reaction of the members of the court upon hearing the facts of the case was that the presence of the circuit court judge’s mother on the jury raises red flags of danger of juror bias and of a circuit court judge having to rule on matters involving a member of his or her family.” Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶4 , 764 N.W.2d 737 .

2009In Medina, 221 Ill. 2d at 409 , the court held that upon defense counsel’s tender of a lesser-included-offense instruction, the trial court should inquire of counsel whether he or she discussed the possible consequences of the tender with the defendant.

2009Such a discussion is necessary because when a lesser-included-offense instruction is offered, a defendant “is exposing himself to potential criminal liability, which he otherwise might avoid, and is in essence stipulating that the evidence is such that a jury could rationally convict him of the lesser-included offense.” Medina, 221 Ill. 2d at 409 .

1983In Commissioners of Sny Island Levee Drainage District v. Dewell (1912), 256 Ill. 126 , a sufficient application for a subdrainage district was presented to the commissioners, and after the commissioners passed upon the application and filed their report recommending the establishment of the subdistrict, certain landowners were properly permitted to -withdraw their signatures, where the statute provided that the court upon hearing should pass upon the sufficiency of the application.

1979Ward v. Moran (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 552 , 301 N.E.2d 300 .) Although the rule does not expressly prohibit the appellate court’s reduction of a sentence to one of probation, the legislature’s action attempting to expand the appellate court’s power beyond that given by the rule is more clearly a violation of the Stamos doctrine than would be the case if the legislation involved a power of the court upon which no rule had been enacted.

1979Ward v. Moran (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 552 , 301 N.E.2d 300 .) Although the rule does not expressly prohibit the appellate court’s reduction of a sentence to one of probation, the legislature’s action attempting to expand the appellate court’s power beyond that given by the rule is more clearly a violation of the Stamos doctrine than would be the case if the legislation involved a power of the court upon which no rule had been enacted.

1979No notice need be given to any person from whom a receipt in full is exhibited to the court or who enters his appearance in writing and waives notice.” Under statutory provisions of this character the final settlement of an estate cannot be made without giving the notice required by statute (Reizer v. Mertz (1906), 223 Ill. 555 , 79 N.E. 283 ; In re Estate of Lane (1955), 4 Ill.

1979No notice need be given to any person from whom a receipt in full is exhibited to the court or who enters his appearance in writing and waives notice.” Under statutory provisions of this character the final settlement of an estate cannot be made without giving the notice required by statute (Reizer v. Mertz (1906), 223 Ill. 555 , 79 N.E. 283 ; In re Estate of Lane (1955), 4 Ill.

1979No notice need be given to any person from whom a receipt in full is exhibited to the court or who enters his appearance in writing and waives notice.” Under statutory provisions of this character the final settlement of an estate cannot be made without giving the notice required by statute (Reizer v. Mertz (1906), 223 Ill. 555 , 79 N.E. 283 ; In re Estate of Lane (1955), 4 Ill.

1950Whether or not he was performing the duties of his office during those periods, and whether he was physically and mentally able to do so, are material questions of fact that should be made available to plaintiffs before trial and to the court upon hearing of the merits of the case for the purpose of enabling the court to determine the ultimate issue; and since the complaint asked for discovery of facts and relief, they were entitled to a hearing on the discovery issue alone before being required to go to trial on the entire case (Brandenburg v. Buda Co., 299 Ill. 133 ), even though the hearing

1947Almost the same question was raised in People v. Starks, 395 Ill. 567 , at this term of court, in which it was held that if plaintiff in error elected to have an erroneous sentence under the 1941 law set aside, and be resentenced, it was the duty of the court to pass sentence according to law, which in this case is from one to twenty years.

1943Unless there is an express agreement that a member shall be bound by future by-laws varying or modifying his contract, he is not so bound.” In Peterson v. Gibson, 191 Ill. 365 , we held that a provision in the constitution of a mutual aid association that the constitution could be amended or changed by vote of the members could not be construed to authorize an amendment or change which should act retrospectively and impair the obligation of the contract entered into, between the association and the member, unless there was an express agreement to be bound by future bylaws, which affected the m

1942(People v. Wood, 306 Ill. 224 .) Through the inaction of defendant the court had no opportunity to exercise a discretion and there was therefore no ruling of the court upon which error could be assigned.

1928In the familiar phrase of Lord Denman, "You have the right to the benefit you anticipate from the character, credit and substance of the party with whom you contract." ( Mueller v. Northwestern University , 195 Ill. 236 .) In 32 Corpus Juris, 1091, the rule with reference to the assignment of insurance policies is stated, as follows: "Being a voluntary contract, the parties may make it on such terms and incorporate such provisions and conditions as they see fit to adopt, and the contract as made measures their rights, provided, of course, the agreement does not violate any principle of the com

1919In the case of Allen v. Henn, 197 Ill. 486 , the court held: “The certificate of evidence, found in the record, does not state that the evidence, set forth in the certificate, was all the evidence presented to and heard by the court upon the hearing below.

1913(Kammann v. City of Chicago, 222 Ill. 63 .) The alleged fact that Noah Cass received the damages awarded for opening the road not being included in the return as a matter of record, could not have been considered by the court upon the hearing.

1913For the considerations that are above given and which are to a large extent identical with those advanced by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Hardy v. Allegan Circuit Judge, supra, and by this court in Rabinovich v. Reith, 120 Ill.

1913For the considerations that are above given and which are to a large extent identical with those advanced by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Hardy v. Allegan Circuit Judge, supra, and by this court in Rabinovich v. Reith, 120 Ill.

1909This is upon the principle that the owner of land selling or leasing it may insert in his deed or contract just such conditions or covenants as he may see fit touching the use or enjoyment of the land, and in case of the breach thereof he is not to be defeated by the opinions of any number of persons that he is not substantially injured thereby.” See also Star Brewery Co. v. Primas, 163 Ill. 652, 658 , where it is said that “the owner of land selling or leasing it may insist upon just such covenants as he pleases touching the use and mode of enjoyment of the land,” and the breach of such negat

1908Upon the trial of that question the appellant introduced in evidence an ordinance requiring certain railway companies to elevate their tracks at North Fortieth court, and then insisted there was a conflict between the improvement ordinance and the track elevation ordinance, as was done in City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 234 Ill. 321 , and by reason of such claimed conflict contended that the improvement ordinance was void.

1901McGinnis v. Fernandez, 135 Ill. 69 ; Leach v. Ritzke, 86 Ill.

1901McGinnis v. Fernandez, 135 Ill. 69 ; Leach v. Ritzke, 86 Ill.

1895In Rohn v. Harris, 130 Ill. 525 , the possession which was sought to be set up by way of limitation was taken and held under a conveyance from the life tenant, and it was held that the title of the reversioner was not barred.

1888The opinion will be found in 12 Ill.

1873In Russell v. Cottom, 31 Penn. 525 , it was held that the owner of domestic animals was not always liable in trespass for injuries done by them, but the liability rested on the person having the custody and control.

1854Although the question was not presented in the case of Scott v. Hancock, 13 Mass. 162 , the reasoning of Jackson, J., tended strongly to this view of the subject.