Maryland common law rule in Maryland

2026In other words, the Maryland common law test looks to the “totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession[,]” Hill, 418 Md. at 75 , but applies a per se rule of exclusion to statements that were “the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police.” Madrid, 474 Md. at 317 (quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 158 ). 2.

2026“The primary difference between the federal constitutional test and the Maryland common law test is ‘that constitutional voluntariness does not require that all promises, threats, or inducements render a confession involuntary; instead, the federal constitution requires only that courts consider promises, threats, or inducements as part of the totality of the circumstances that courts must look at to determine voluntariness.’” Covel v. State, 258 Md. App. 308 , 326 (2023) (first quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 285-86 (1991); then citing Lee, 418 Md. at 159-60).

2026In other words, the Maryland common law test looks to the “totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession[,]” Hill, 418 Md. at 75 , but applies a per se rule of exclusion to statements that were “the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police.” Madrid, 474 Md. at 317 (quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 158 ). 2.

2026“To be voluntary, a confession must satisfy federal and state constitutional strictures as well as the Maryland common law rule that a confession is involuntary if it is the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police.” Id.

2026“The primary difference between the federal constitutional test and the Maryland common law test is ‘that constitutional voluntariness does not require that all promises, threats, or inducements render a confession involuntary; instead, the federal constitution requires only that courts consider promises, threats, or inducements as part of the totality of the circumstances that courts must look at to determine voluntariness.’” Covel v. State, 258 Md. App. 308 , 326 (2023) (first quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 , 285-86 (1991); then citing Lee, 418 Md. at 159-60).

2023The primary difference between the federal constitutional test and the Maryland common law test is “that constitutional voluntariness does not require that all promises, threats, or inducements render a confession involuntary; instead, the federal constitution requires only that courts consider promises, threats, or inducements as part of the totality of the circumstances that courts must look at to determine voluntariness.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-86 (stating that the Bram standard of condemning any confession obtained by “any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exerti

2026In other words, the Maryland common law test looks to the “totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession[,]” Hill, 418 Md. at 75 , but applies a per se rule of exclusion to statements that were “the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police.” Madrid, 474 Md. at 317 (quoting Lee, 418 Md. at 158 ). 2.

2023The Maryland common law test similarly looks to “the totality of the circumstances affecting the interrogation and confession,” Hill v. State, 418 Md. 62, 75 (2011), but applies a per se rule of exclusion for statements that were “‘the product of an improper threat, promise, or inducement by the police.’” Madrid v. Statex, 474 Md. 273, 317 (2021) (quoting Lee v. State, 418 Md. 136, 158 (2011)).

2026The voluntariness of a defendant’s statement is evaluated under Maryland’s “two- tiered approach” articulated in Hof v. State, 337 Md. 581, 604 (1995).

2026Federal and State Constitutional Standard –Totality of the Circumstances The federal due process analysis, also referred to as the “constitutional voluntariness,” or the “overborne will test,” was described by the United States Supreme Court as an inquiry that examines “whether a defendant’s will was overborne” by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. [Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)].

2017App. 600 , 114 A.3d 256 (2015), respondent and the State both disavow the Court’s reasoning and analysis of the double jeopardy issue.

2017See Roary, 385 Md. 217 , 232 n. 14, 867 A.2d 1095 , 1103 n. 14 (2005). –11– the killing does not arise separate from the assault, cannot be a predicate for second-degree felony murder, we do not address whether trying respondent in a successive prosecution for second-degree felony murder based upon first-degree assault violates his protection embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, or the Maryland common law doctrine of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.7 It goes without saying that we need not address respondent=s motion to dismiss,8 or whether first-degr

2017See Roary, 385 Md. 217 , 232 n. 14, 867 A.2d 1095 , 1103 n. 14 (2005). –11– the killing does not arise separate from the assault, cannot be a predicate for second-degree felony murder, we do not address whether trying respondent in a successive prosecution for second-degree felony murder based upon first-degree assault violates his protection embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, or the Maryland common law doctrine of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.7 It goes without saying that we need not address respondent=s motion to dismiss,8 or whether first-degr

2017See Roary, 385 Md. 217 , 232 n. 14, 867 A.2d 1095 , 1103 n. 14 (2005). –11– the killing does not arise separate from the assault, cannot be a predicate for second-degree felony murder, we do not address whether trying respondent in a successive prosecution for second-degree felony murder based upon first-degree assault violates his protection embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution, or the Maryland common law doctrine of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict.7 It goes without saying that we need not address respondent=s motion to dismiss,8 or whether first-degr

2016See id. at 587 , 936 A.2d 915 (“It was implicit in the Maryland common law rule limiting recovery of damages to the amount sought in the operative pleading that the ad damnum clause of that pleading set forth the amount of damages being sought; otherwise, it would be impossible to determine whether the amount awarded exceeded the amount requested.

2016See id. at 587 , 936 A.2d 915 (“It was implicit in the Maryland common law rule limiting recovery of damages to the amount sought in the operative pleading that the ad damnum clause of that pleading set forth the amount of damages being sought; otherwise, it would be impossible to determine whether the amount awarded exceeded the amount requested.

2011See, e.g., the discussions in Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 285-301 , 686 A.2d 605, 612-620 (1996); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611-623 , 612 A.2d 241, 248-254 (1992); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146 , 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967).

2011See, e.g., the discussions in Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 285-301 , 686 A.2d 605, 612-620 (1996); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611-623 , 612 A.2d 241, 248-254 (1992); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146 , 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967).

2011See, e.g., the discussions in Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 285-301 , 686 A.2d 605, 612-620 (1996); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611-623 , 612 A.2d 241, 248-254 (1992); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146 , 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967).

2011See, e.g., the discussions in Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 285-301 , 686 A.2d 605, 612-620 (1996); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611-623 , 612 A.2d 241, 248-254 (1992); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146 , 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967).

2011Nor are we persuaded by Colon, 885 N.E.2d at 926 , which was expressly overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466 , 935 N.E.2d 26, 34 (2010) (expressly overruling Colon and stating "[w]e hold that failure to timely object to a defect in an indictment constitutes a waiver" and "is limited to a plain-error review on appeal"). [5] We made clear in Ruffin that: Our holding in this case represents a change in a Maryland common law principle and not an overruling of prior cases on the ground that they were erroneously decided.

2011Nor are we persuaded by Colon, 885 N.E.2d at 926 , which was expressly overruled by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466 , 935 N.E.2d 26, 34 (2010) (expressly overruling Colon and stating "[w]e hold that failure to timely object to a defect in an indictment constitutes a waiver" and "is limited to a plain-error review on appeal"). [5] We made clear in Ruffin that: Our holding in this case represents a change in a Maryland common law principle and not an overruling of prior cases on the ground that they were erroneously decided.

2011See, e.g., the discussions in Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 285-301 , 686 A.2d 605, 612-620 (1996); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611-623 , 612 A.2d 241, 248-254 (1992); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146 , 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967).

2011See, e.g., the discussions in Sugarloaf v. Dept. of Environment, 344 Md. 271, 285-301 , 686 A.2d 605, 612-620 (1996); Medical Waste v. Maryland Waste, 327 Md. 596, 611-623 , 612 A.2d 241, 248-254 (1992); Bryniarski v. Montgomery Co., 247 Md. 137, 143-146 , 230 A.2d 289, 294-295 (1967).

2008Nevertheless, a “ ‘common law rule may, within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by legislative enactment or judicial decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people,’ ” Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 413 , 924 A.2d 1072, 1086 (2007), quoting Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323 , 337 n. 10, 493 A.2d 1062 , 1069 n. 10 (1985).

2008Nevertheless, a “ ‘common law rule may, within constitutional constraints, be changed or modified by legislative enactment or judicial decision where it is found to be a vestige of the past, no longer suitable to the circumstances of our people,’ ” Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 413 , 924 A.2d 1072, 1086 (2007), quoting Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323 , 337 n. 10, 493 A.2d 1062 , 1069 n. 10 (1985).

2007See Heat and Power Corp. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 820 Md. 584 , 602, 578 A.2d 1202 (1990).

2006See e.g., United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir.1974); Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir.1967); Smith v. U.S., 709 A.2d 78, 79 (D.C.1998); State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 908 , 478 P.2d 284, 288 (1970); People v. Giamanco, 67 App. Div.2d 1008, 1009, 413 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (1979); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 111-112 , 317 A.2d 258, 262-263 (1974); State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I.1989). [6] See n. 2, supra. [7] Our holding in this case represents a change in a Maryland common law principle and not an overruling of prior cases on the ground th

2006See e.g., United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir.1974); Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir.1967); Smith v. U.S., 709 A.2d 78, 79 (D.C.1998); State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 908 , 478 P.2d 284, 288 (1970); People v. Giamanco, 67 App. Div.2d 1008, 1009, 413 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (1979); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 111-112 , 317 A.2d 258, 262-263 (1974); State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I.1989). [6] See n. 2, supra. [7] Our holding in this case represents a change in a Maryland common law principle and not an overruling of prior cases on the ground th

2006See e.g., United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir.1974); Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir.1967); Smith v. U.S., 709 A.2d 78, 79 (D.C.1998); State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 908 , 478 P.2d 284, 288 (1970); People v. Giamanco, 67 App. Div.2d 1008, 1009, 413 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (1979); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 111-112 , 317 A.2d 258, 262-263 (1974); State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I.1989). [6] See n. 2, supra. [7] Our holding in this case represents a change in a Maryland common law principle and not an overruling of prior cases on the ground th

2006See e.g., United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143 (10th Cir.1974); Friedman v. United States, 381 F.2d 155, 160-61 (8th Cir.1967); Smith v. U.S., 709 A.2d 78, 79 (D.C.1998); State v. Holm, 93 Idaho 904, 908 , 478 P.2d 284, 288 (1970); People v. Giamanco, 67 App. Div.2d 1008, 1009, 413 N.Y.S.2d 746, 747 (1979); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 111-112 , 317 A.2d 258, 262-263 (1974); State v. Desrosiers, 559 A.2d 641, 645 (R.I.1989). [6] See n. 2, supra. [7] Our holding in this case represents a change in a Maryland common law principle and not an overruling of prior cases on the ground th