inherently dangerous activity doctrine in Missouri

2024The independent contractor exception has its own longstanding exception, the inherently dangerous activity doctrine, which was recognized in Missouri in Salmon v. Kansas City, 145 S.W. 16 (1912), overruled by Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 6 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. banc 1928), which was overruled by Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Props., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. banc 1991), as modified (June 11, 1991).

2015Respondent relies on language from Matteuzzi, Zueck, and Gillespie which held “[i]t is unfair, therefore, to subject a landowner to what is, in effect, double liability — workers’ compensation coverage and liability under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine.” Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131-32 ; Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 388-89 (Mo. banc 1991) (similarly holding); Gillespie v. St.

1993To the extent that Smith v. Inter-County Telephone Co., 559 S.W.2d 518 (Mo. banc 1977), purports to authorize a cause of action in favor of employees of independent contractors covered by workers’ compensation, it is overruled.

1990The Smith court noted that Mallory was an exception to the general application of the inherently dangerous activity doctrine to members of the public who are injured, id. at 522, and required, as an essential element of submissibility, proof that “the one contracting with the independent contractor negligently failed to ensure that adequate precautions were taken to avoid damage by reason of the inherently dangerous activity” and that the plaintiff’s injury was a direct result of this negligence.

2015Respondent relies on language from Matteuzzi, Zueck, and Gillespie which held “[i]t is unfair, therefore, to subject a landowner to what is, in effect, double liability — workers’ compensation coverage and liability under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine.” Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 131-32 ; Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Properties, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384, 388-89 (Mo. banc 1991) (similarly holding); Gillespie v. St.

1994The Supreme Court followed Zueck in Matteuzzi v. Columbus Partnership, L.P., 866 S.W.2d 128 (Mo. banc 1993), saying again that the inherently dangerous activity doctrine “no longer applies to employees of independent contractors covered by workers’ compensation.” Matteuzzi, 866 S.W.2d at 130 .

2024The independent contractor exception has its own longstanding exception, the inherently dangerous activity doctrine, which was recognized in Missouri in Salmon v. Kansas City, 145 S.W. 16 (1912), overruled by Mallory v. Louisiana Pure Ice & Supply Co., 6 S.W.2d 617 (Mo. banc 1928), which was overruled by Zueck v. Oppenheimer Gateway Props., Inc., 809 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. banc 1991), as modified (June 11, 1991).

1992In Salmon v. Kansas City, 241 Mo. 14 , 145 S.W. 16 (1912), the supreme court held that the inherently dangerous activity exception was not applicable to servants of the independent contractor.

2017Bowles confirms, in fact, that once it is determined that an independent contractor's work is inherently dangerous, the employer is vicariously liable for the independent contractor's negligent performance of its work unless the negligence is "collateral." Id. at 23-24 .

2006See, e.g., Bowles, 41 S.W.3d at 21-22 (carbon monoxide poisoning); Hatch v. V.P.

2005First, Gateway claims that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) because Maldonado did not prove that Gateway was hable under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. 1 Specifically, Gateway claims that Maldonado did not prove that Hartmann Productions was an independent contractor hired by Gateway to perform an inherently dangerous activity. 2 Additionally, Gateway asserts that Maldonado assumed the risks inherent in boxing and he could not recover for risks not inherent in the activity. 3 “Our review of the

2005First, Gateway claims that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") because Maldonado did not prove that Gateway was liable under the inherently dangerous activity doctrine. [1] Specifically, Gateway claims that Maldonado did not prove that Hartmann Productions was an independent contractor hired by Gateway to perform an inherently dangerous activity. [2] Additionally, Gateway asserts that Maldonado assumed the risks inherent in boxing and he could not recover for risks not inherent in the activity. [3] "Our review

1996Co., 889 S.W.2d 144 (Mo.App.1994), interpreted the Missouri Supreme Court in Zueck and Mat-teuzzi as “intending] to abrogate the inherently dangerous activity doctrine in all instances where an independent contractor’s employee is injured and the contractor is liable to the employee under the workers’ compensation law, irrespective of whether the contractor has workers’ compensation insurance.” Id. at 146 (emphasis added).

1996Co., 889 S.W.2d 144 (Mo.App.1994), interpreted the Missouri Supreme Court in Zueck and Mat-teuzzi as “intending] to abrogate the inherently dangerous activity doctrine in all instances where an independent contractor’s employee is injured and the contractor is liable to the employee under the workers’ compensation law, irrespective of whether the contractor has workers’ compensation insurance.” Id. at 146 (emphasis added).