moral certainty standard in New York

1992Both direct and circumstantial evidence being present, the moral certainty standard is inapplicable (see, People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 380 ).

1990Contrary to defendant’s argument, the proof was not wholly circumstantial and thus the moral certainty standard does not apply (see, People v Barnes, 50 NY2d 375, 380 ).

2007However, unlike the heightened moral certainty standard reserved exclusively for the trier of fact in cases based upon circumstantial evidence (see People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62 [2001]), the appropriate question on appellate review is whether the evidence before the jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the People (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Rossey, 89 NY2d 970, 971-972 [1997]; People v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, 620-622 [1995]; People v Wong, 8

2007However, unlike the heightened moral certainty standard reserved exclusively for the trier of fact in cases based upon circumstantial evidence (see People v Hines, 97 NY2d 56, 62 [2001]), the appropriate question on appellate review is whether the evidence before the jury, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v Rossey, 89 NY2d 970, 971-972 [1997]; People v Norman, 85 NY2d 609, 620-622 [1995]; People v Wo

2024Mr. Baque's lawyer led by arguing that the Appellate Division had to apply the moral certainty standard and directed the court to a prior Second Department case so holding, People v Clavell , 176 AD3d 844 , 849—850 (2019).

2024Mr. Baque's lawyer led by arguing that the Appellate Division had to apply the moral certainty standard and directed the court to a prior Second Department case so holding, People v Clavell , 176 AD3d 844, 849—850 (2019).

2005The People’s case depended entirely upon circumstantial evidence (see People v Griffin, 121 AD2d 927, 927-928 [1986]; cf. People v Richardson, 186 AD2d 373 , 373-374 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 846 [1993]), and therefore the court should have instructed the jury on the moral certainty standard of proof (see People v Mickewitz, 236 AD2d 793 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 861 [1997]; see also People v Sanchez, 61 NY2d 1022, 1023 [1984]).

2005Because the evidence of guilt is not overwhelming, the error is not harmless (see Mickewitz, 236 AD2d at 793 ).

2005The People’s case depended entirely upon circumstantial evidence (see People v Griffin, 121 AD2d 927, 927-928 [1986]; cf. People v Richardson, 186 AD2d 373 , 373-374 [1992], lv denied 81 NY2d 846 [1993]), and therefore the court should have instructed the jury on the moral certainty standard of proof (see People v Mickewitz, 236 AD2d 793 [1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 861 [1997]; see also People v Sanchez, 61 NY2d 1022, 1023 [1984]).

2005Also, on the larceny by false promise counts, while the moral certainty standard of proof governs the trier of fact (see Penal Law § 155.05 [2] [d]), that standard “is not the appropriate standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of the People’s proof’ (People v Houghtaling, supra at 882 ).

2002However, appellate review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence is the same for circumstantial and noncircumstantial cases (see, People v Grassi, 92 NY2d 695, 697 ).

2002A court reviewing legal sufficiency of the trial evidence must instead determine whether any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the fact finder on the basis of the evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the People” (People v Williams, 84 NY2d 925, 926 ).

2000A moral certainty instruction is not required merely because the proof with respect to any particular element — here, intent — is wholly circumstantial (see, People v Johnson, 65 NY2d 556 , 561, rearg denied 66 NY2d 759 ; People v Miller, 255 AD2d 460 , lv denied 94 NY2d 826 ).

1999An appellate court does not distinguish between direct or circumstantial evidence (see, People v Rossey, 89 NY2d 970, 971-972 ; People v Cabey, 85 NY2d 417, 421 ) when examining the trial evidence for legal sufficiency or performing a weight of the evidence review.

1998That instruction, however, was improper because it is not applicable in Grand Jury proceedings (see, People v Colon, 188 AD2d 708 ; People v Vallone, 140 AD2d 729, 730 ).

1998That instruction, however, was improper because it is not applicable in Grand Jury proceedings (see, People v Colon, 188 AD2d 708 ; People v Vallone, 140 AD2d 729, 730 ).

1997Because the People’s case depended entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the court erred in permitting the jury to decide whether to apply the moral certainty standard of proof, i.e., "[t]he circumstantial facts proved must exclude to a moral certainty every hypothesis but guilt” (1 CJI[NY] 9.05, at 475; see, People v Silva, 69 NY2d 858, 859 ; People v Ford, 66 NY2d 428, 442 ).

1997Because defendant’s admission constitutes direct evidence of guilt (see, People v Corey, 233 AD2d 773 , lv denied 89 NY2d 984 ; see also, People v Rosner, 67 NY2d 290, 295 ), County Court properly denied defendant’s request for a moral certainty instruction, which is required in cases where the evidence is exclusively circumstantial (see, People v Daddona, 81 NY2d. 990, 992; People v Smeraldo, 242 AD2d 886 ; People v Robbins, 229 AD2d 1008 ).

1997Because defendant’s admission constitutes direct evidence of guilt (see, People v Corey, 233 AD2d 773 , lv denied 89 NY2d 984 ; see also, People v Rosner, 67 NY2d 290, 295 ), County Court properly denied defendant’s request for a moral certainty instruction, which is required in cases where the evidence is exclusively circumstantial (see, People v Daddona, 81 NY2d. 990, 992; People v Smeraldo, 242 AD2d 886 ; People v Robbins, 229 AD2d 1008 ).

1997Because defendant’s admission constitutes direct evidence of guilt (see, People v Corey, 233 AD2d 773 , lv denied 89 NY2d 984 ; see also, People v Rosner, 67 NY2d 290, 295 ), County Court properly denied defendant’s request for a moral certainty instruction, which is required in cases where the evidence is exclusively circumstantial (see, People v Daddona, 81 NY2d. 990, 992; People v Smeraldo, 242 AD2d 886 ; People v Robbins, 229 AD2d 1008 ).

1995Memorandum: Defendant failed to preserve for our review his contentions (1) that he was denied a fair trial by the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence (see, CPL 470.05 [2]); (2) that his conviction of criminal posses- sion of a controlled substance in the fifth degree (Penal Law § 220.06) is not supported by legally sufficient evidence because the People failed to establish his knowledge of the weight of the cocaine as required by People v Ryan ( 82 NY2d 497 ) (see, People v Gray, 86 NY2d 10 ; People v Gaines, 216 AD2d 858 ); and (3) that the trial court erred in failing to give a circumst

1995On the contrary, Ryan was cited interchangeably with the latter class of cases (see, 69 NY2d, at 114, citing People v Ryan, supra; People v Borrero, 26 NY2d 430 ; People v Cleague, supra; People v Bearden, 290 NY 478 ; People v Newman, 80 Misc 2d 975 , affd 85 Misc 2d 761 ), thereby confirming that this Court has not previously viewed Penal Law § 155.05 (2) (d) as requiring a unique level of sufficiency review.

1995On the contrary, Ryan was cited interchangeably with the latter class of cases ( see , 69 NY2d, at 114, citing People v Ryan , supra ; People v Borrero , 26 N.Y.2d 430 ; People v Cleague , supra ; People v Bearden , 290 N.Y. 478 ; People v Newman , 80 Misc 2d 975 , affd 85 Misc 2d 761 ), thereby confirming that this Court has not previously viewed Penal Law § 155.05 (2) (d) as requiring a unique level of sufficiency review.

1995On the contrary, Ryan was cited interchangeably with the latter class of cases (see, 69 NY2d, at 114, citing People v Ryan, supra; People v Borrero, 26 NY2d 430 ; People v Cleague, supra; People v Bearden, 290 NY 478 ; People v Newman, 80 Misc 2d 975 , affd 85 Misc 2d 761 ), thereby confirming that this Court has not previously viewed Penal Law § 155.05 (2) (d) as requiring a unique level of sufficiency review.

1995On the contrary, Ryan was cited interchangeably with the latter class of cases ( see , 69 NY2d, at 114, citing People v Ryan , supra ; People v Borrero , 26 N.Y.2d 430 ; People v Cleague , supra ; People v Bearden , 290 N.Y. 478 ; People v Newman , 80 Misc 2d 975 , affd 85 Misc 2d 761 ), thereby confirming that this Court has not previously viewed Penal Law § 155.05 (2) (d) as requiring a unique level of sufficiency review.

1995On the contrary, Ryan was cited interchangeably with the latter class of cases (see, 69 NY2d, at 114, citing People v Ryan, supra; People v Borrero, 26 NY2d 430 ; People v Cleague, supra; People v Bearden, 290 NY 478 ; People v Newman, 80 Misc 2d 975 , affd 85 Misc 2d 761 ), thereby confirming that this Court has not previously viewed Penal Law § 155.05 (2) (d) as requiring a unique level of sufficiency review.

1995On the contrary, Ryan was cited interchangeably with the latter class of cases ( see , 69 NY2d, at 114, citing People v Ryan , supra ; People v Borrero , 26 N.Y.2d 430 ; People v Cleague , supra ; People v Bearden , 290 N.Y. 478 ; People v Newman , 80 Misc 2d 975 , affd 85 Misc 2d 761 ), thereby confirming that this Court has not previously viewed Penal Law § 155.05 (2) (d) as requiring a unique level of sufficiency review.