Hospital motion in Pennsylvania

1988Appellant relies upon Maffei v. Department of Transportation, 53 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 182 , 416 A.2d 1167 (1980), which held that a motorists duty to submit to a blood test cannot lawfully be burdened with the requirement that he or she sign a hospital waiver of liability form.

1988Appellant relies upon Maffei v. Department of Transportation, 53 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 182 , 416 A.2d 1167 (1980), which held that a motorists duty to submit to a blood test cannot lawfully be burdened with the requirement that he or she sign a hospital waiver of liability form.

2023The trial court observed that there are no published appellate cases analyzing MCARE, section 311(a), but relied on a court of common pleas decision in Venosh v. Henzes, 31 Pa. D. & C. 5th 411 , 2013 WL 9593953 (Lackawanna Cty. 2013), aff’d, 105 A.3d 788 (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum).9 Applying Venosh, the trial court determined that section ____________________________________________ 9 In Venosh, the court of common pleas discerned three elements to a claim of privilege under section 311(a): (1) the document was “solely prepared or created for the purpose of compliance with” MCA

2023Id.

2021Id. at 1092 .

2018Luke's Hospital , 573 Pa. 90 , 821 A.2d 1215 (2003), for example, we imposed a duty associated with a hospital's drug-testing procedures because it was foreseeable that returning false positives to an employer who retained the hospital to test its employees would lead to adverse consequences for the tested employees.

2018Luke's Hospital , 573 Pa. 90 , 821 A.2d 1215 (2003), for example, we imposed a duty associated with a hospital's drug-testing procedures because it was foreseeable that returning false positives to an employer who retained the hospital to test its employees would lead to adverse consequences for the tested employees.

2018A collateral order is defined as “an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” ____________________________________________ 2 Neither Appellants nor Hospital claim the orders are appealable as interlocutory by right or interlocutory by permission. -7- J-A05028-18 Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). “[W]e construe the collateral order doctrine narrowly . . . to avoid ‘piecemeal determinations and t

2016Id.

2015See HSBC Bank, NA v. Donaghy, 101 A.3d 129 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived on appeal); McManamon v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 736 , 921 A.2d 497 (2007) (explaining party must make timely and specific objection at appropriate stage of proceedings to preserve issue for appellate review; Superior Court will not consider claim which was not called to trial court’s attention at time when any error committed could have been corrected). -9- J-A17037-15 Judgment Entered.

2015See HSBC Bank, NA v. Donaghy, 101 A.3d 129 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived on appeal); McManamon v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 736 , 921 A.2d 497 (2007) (explaining party must make timely and specific objection at appropriate stage of proceedings to preserve issue for appellate review; Superior Court will not consider claim which was not called to trial court’s attention at time when any error committed could have been corrected). -9- J-A17037-15 Judgment Entered.

2015See HSBC Bank, NA v. Donaghy, 101 A.3d 129 (Pa.Super. 2014) (stating issues not raised in Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived on appeal); McManamon v. Washko, 906 A.2d 1259 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 736 , 921 A.2d 497 (2007) (explaining party must make timely and specific objection at appropriate stage of proceedings to preserve issue for appellate review; Superior Court will not consider claim which was not called to trial court’s attention at time when any error committed could have been corrected). -9- J-A17037-15 Judgment Entered.

2013Id. at 366 .

2012These parties also cite 42 Pa.C.S. § 6155(a), which gives a “health care facility having custody of the charts or records ... standing to apply to the court ... before which the action or proceeding is pending for a protective order denying, restricting or otherwise limiting access to and use of the copies or original charts and records.” Next, quoting the In re June 1979 case, the Health System and the Hospital explain that “[ajlthough the patients’ medical records are the property of the hospital, the personal nature of the information they contain results in an obligation on the part of the

2010Based upon the fact that the medical professional corporation at issue was a comprehensive health care provider *976 with the “responsibility for ai'ranging and coordinating the total health care of its patients” and “was involved in daily decisions affecting its patients’ medical care,” we concluded that it was appropriate to impose corporate liability on that entity, consistent with Thompson . ¶ 20 On the other hand, in Sutherland v. Monongahela Valley Hospital, 856 A.2d 55 (Pa.Super.2004), we refused to impose corporate liability upon a physician’s out-patient office.

2000In support of this contention, Millili directs our attention to Abate v. Department of Transportation, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 416 A.2d 1159 (1980), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Guarino, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 339 A.2d 861 (1975).

2000In support of this contention, Millili directs our attention to Abate v. Department of Transportation, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 416 A.2d 1159 (1980), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Guarino, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 339 A.2d 861 (1975).

2000In support of this contention, Millili directs our attention to Abate v. Department of Transportation, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 416 A.2d 1159 (1980), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Guarino, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 339 A.2d 861 (1975).

2000In support of this contention, Millili directs our attention to Abate v. Department of Transportation, 53 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 416 A.2d 1159 (1980), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Guarino, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 104 , 339 A.2d 861 (1975).

1999See also Saad v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 700 A.2d 604 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997); Zikria v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 447 Pa.Super. 80 , 668 A.2d 173 (1995).

1999See also Saad v. Sacred Heart Hospital, 700 A.2d 604 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997); Zikria v. Western Pennsylvania Hospital, 447 Pa.Super. 80 , 668 A.2d 173 (1995).

1999In Krishak , an officer asked Krishak to submit to testing, and Krishak’s initial response was "I don’t know.” Krishak, 496 A.2d at 1358 .

1999Vincent also contends that as a result of our Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper v. Delaware Valley Medical Center, et al., 539 Pa. 620 , 654 A.2d 547 (1995), courts cannot order injunctive relief that would require hospitals to grant doctors access to hospital facilities, and the only relief available for a physician who alleges that he or she has been improperly denied access to the hospital is a claim for monetary damages.

1999Vincent also contends that as a result of our Supreme Court’s decision in Cooper v. Delaware Valley Medical Center, et al., 539 Pa. 620 , 654 A.2d 547 (1995), courts cannot order injunctive relief that would require hospitals to grant doctors access to hospital facilities, and the only relief available for a physician who alleges that he or she has been improperly denied access to the hospital is a claim for monetary damages.