Hospital motion in Texas

2018The Texas Supreme Court disagreed and explained that “the Hospital’s immunity c[ould] be waived only for its own use of Cowan’s walker and suspenders, and not by Cowan’s use of them.” Id. at 246 .

2018Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tex. 2012); see also Cowan, 128 S.W.3d at 246 (“[T]he Hospital’s immunity can be waived only for its own use of Cowan’s walker and suspenders, and not by Cowan[’]s use of them.”).

2024When the remaining issues are fully briefed and straightforward, as the issues in this case are, we often address them in the first instance. 2 But 2 See, e.g., Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tex. 2018) (“Although the court of appeals did not address the report’s sufficiency as to breach and causation, the parties argued those issues here, and we will address them in the interest of judicial economy.”); Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487 , 495 (Tex. 2017) (“The parties have briefed and argued the issue here, so in the interest of judicial economy we will addre

2018Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 97 (Tex. 2012); see also Cowan, 128 S.W.3d at 246 (“[T]he Hospital’s immunity can be waived only for its own use of Cowan’s walker and suspenders, and not by Cowan[’]s use of them.”).

2003Code Ann . § 101.021(2) (emphasis added). 16: As correctly noted by the majority, no evidence was presented to the trial court at the hearing on the Hospital’s plea to the jurisdiction. 17: Dallas County MHMR v. Bossley , 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.) (“Section 101.021(2) requires that for immunity to be waived, personal injury or death must be proximately caused by the condition or use of tangible property.”) (emphasis added), cert. denied , 525 U.S. 1017 (1998); Michael v. Travis County Hous.

2003Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 101.021(2) (emphasis added). [7] As correctly noted by the majority, no evidence was presented to the trial court at the hearing on the Hospital's plea to the jurisdiction. [8] Dallas County MHMR v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex.) ("Section 101.021(2) requires that for immunity to be waived, personal injury or death must be proximately caused by the condition or use of tangible property.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 541 , 142 L.Ed.2d 450 (1998); Michael v. Travis County Hous.

2009Tex. A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 583, 585 (Tex.2005) (providing knife to drama student who injured fellow student was not use by faculty advisors of tangible personal property); San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244, 245-46 (Tex.2004) (explaining that the Hospital’s immunity was not waived for confined patient’s use of his own personal property to commit suicide).

2009Tex. A & M Univ. v. Bishop, 156 S.W.3d 580, 583, 585 (Tex. 2005) (providing knife to drama student who injured fellow student was not use by faculty advisors of tangible personal property); San Antonio State Hosp. v. Cowan, 128 S.W.3d 244, 245-46 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that the Hospital's immunity was not waived for confined patient's use of his own personal property to commit suicide).

2012See City of Laredo v. Nuno, 94 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (holding that section 101.057(2) applied to claims against a police officer in part because the officer’s conduct was referable to an intentional decision to seize a vehicle illegally).

2012See City of Laredo v. Nuno, 94 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (holding that section 101.057(2) applied to claims against a police officer in part because the officer’s conduct was referable to an intentional decision to seize a vehicle illegally).

2010Rather, he argues, the order is one denying “the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim (or claim enforcing the Note)” and “[n]o statute authorizes the appeal from such an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment on a breach of contract claim . . . .” “The [TGAA] specifically provides that an application under [it] is heard in the same manner and on the same notice as a motion in a civil case.” Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar , 124 S.W.3d 422, 430 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied); see Tex. Civ.

2010Rather, he argues, the order is one denying “the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim (or claim enforcing the Note)” and “[n]o statute authorizes the appeal from such an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment on a breach of contract claim....” “The [TGAA] specifically provides that an application under [it] is heard in the same manner and on the same notice as a motion in a civil case.” Crossmark, Inc. v. Hazar, 124 S.W.3d 422, 480 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied); see Tex. Civ.

2003Auth. , 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause). 18: Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite , 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992) (op. on reh’g); Mo. Pac.

2003Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause). [9] Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992) (op. on reh'g); Mo. Pac.

2003Auth. , 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause). 18: Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite , 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992) (op. on reh’g); Mo. Pac.

2003Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause). [9] Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992) (op. on reh'g); Mo. Pac.

2003Auth. , 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause). 18: Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite , 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992) (op. on reh’g); Mo. Pac.

2003Auth., 995 S.W.2d 909, 912-15 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (noting causation standard under section 101.021(2) is proximate cause, not direct cause, immediate cause, or sole cause). [9] Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (citing Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex.1992) (op. on reh'g); Mo. Pac.

2019Id.

2019Id.

2009In discussing the extent to which a hospital could file a lien against its patient’s tort chose in action, the Court said, “[w]e agree that a recovery of medical expenses in [the full undiscounted amount] would be a windfall; as the hospital had no claim for these amounts against the patients, they in turn had no claim for them against [the wrong doer].” Id. at 412 .

2009In discussing the extent to which a hospital could file a lien against its patient’s tort chose in action, the Court said, “[w]e agree that a recovery of medical expenses in [the full undiscounted amount] would be a windfall; as the hospital had no claim for these amounts against the patients, they in turn had no claim for them against [the wrongdoer].” Id. at 412.

2025See Reliance Ins. v. Hibdon, 333 S.W.3d 364, 378 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (summary-judgment movant is not entitled to use reply to raise new and independent summary-judgment grounds). 15 The Hospital urges that Texas courts have routinely held that DTPA claims cannot arise from actions that are permissible under a contract.

2013Hibdon, 333 S.W.3d at 370 . 14 for and included in PHCS’s adjusted re-pricing of the Hospital’s claim submitted to Concert, which Concert admittedly did not pay in full.

2022P’ship, 401 S.W.3d at 44 ; Certified EMS, Inc., 392 S.W.3d at 632 .

2014An expert report must meet three elements: (1) “it must fairly summarize the applicable standard of care”; (2) “it must explain how a physician or health care provider failed to meet that standard”; and (3) “it must establish the causal relationship between the failure and the harm alleged.” 12 If a report satisfies these elements as to any theory of liability against a defendant, the plaintiff may proceed on the suit against that defendant. 13 11 See Potts, 392 S.W.3d at 630 (stating that one purpose of the expert report is to inform the defendant of the specific conduct that the plaintiff ha

2017See Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40 ; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52-53 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 .

2016EXPERT REPORT REQUIREMENT and Standard of Review When presented with a motion to dismiss a healthcare liability claim, the trial court must determine whether the expert report “ ‘represents a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory definition of an expert report.’ ” Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex.2002) (quoting Am.

2017See Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539-40 ; Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52-53 ; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 880 .

2014Because we have held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling Hospital’s objections to Van Wyk’s report, we need not address this issue. 21 Conclusion Having overruled Hospital’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Hospital’s motion to dismiss. 19 These statements are in addition to Van Wyk’s statements that suggest that Hospital by failing to follow proper preoperative procedures and proper procedure documentation, at the least, created a situation under which Medicare fraud may have occurred. 20 See Jelinek, 328 S.W.3d at 539 . 21 See Tex. R.

2024When the remaining issues are fully briefed and straightforward, as the issues in this case are, we often address them in the first instance. 2 But 2 See, e.g., Baty v. Futrell, 543 S.W.3d 689, 697 (Tex. 2018) (“Although the court of appeals did not address the report’s sufficiency as to breach and causation, the parties argued those issues here, and we will address them in the interest of judicial economy.”); Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g, Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487 , 495 (Tex. 2017) (“The parties have briefed and argued the issue here, so in the interest of judicial economy we will addre

2019SUMMARY JUDGMENT In her second and third issues, Franklin argues that the trial court erred in granting the Hospital’s motion for summary judgment because (1) the Hospital failed to demonstrate why Franklin’s explanation for the delay in service was insufficient and (2) the trial court erroneously considered the Texas Supreme Court’s Hurricane Harvey emergency order’s effect as tolling the limitations period rather than considering it as an explanation for the delay of service. 2 Standard of Review Because summary judgment is a question of law, a trial court’s summary judgment decision is revi

2019See Cornejo v. Hilgers, 446 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. denied) (holding that trial court must grant motion to dismiss if report is not sufficiently specific to provide basis for trial court to conclude that claims have merit).