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26 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Union Pump Co. v. Allbrittonred2 sentences2024Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2010) (recognizing producing cause in DTPA cases, products liability cases, and worker’s compensation cases as “conceptually no different from the cause in fact inquiry in negligence cases and the producing cause inquiry in other substantive contexts”); see also Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (“[P]roducing cause is the test in strict liability. 2007Robertson, 978 S.W.2d at 126 ; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a “but for” test and a substantial factor test). | 5 | 5 |
Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesmagreen2 sentences2012The Texas Supreme Court recently held in Crump that “[t]he producing cause inquiry in workers’ compensation cases is conceptually no different from the cause in fact inquiry in negligence cases and the producing cause inquiry in other substantive contexts.” Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 223 ; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex. 2007) (holding, in products liability context, that producing cause definition should include “substantial factor” and 5 “but-for” component). 2011While this case was pending on appeal, however, the Texas Supreme Court, in Crump , concluded that “[t]he producing cause inquiry in workers’ compensation cases is conceptually no different from the cause in fact inquiry in negligence cases and the producing cause inquiry in other substantive contexts.” 880 S.W.3d at 223; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex.2007) (holding, in products liability context, that producing cause definition should include “substantial factor” and “but-for” component). | 4 | 4 |
James O. Rogers, William M. Burmeister, Conservative Care, Inc. and Care Affiliates, Inc. v. Victor B. Zanetti, Charles L. Perry and Andrews Kurth, Llpgreen2 sentences2025The cause-in-fact standard thus “requires not only that the act or omission be a substantial factor but also that it be a but-for cause of the injury or occurrence,” and “a cause-in-fact definition that omits the but-for component [is] ‘incomplete.’” Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 403 (Tex. 2017). 2024Rogers v. Zanetti, 518 S.W.3d 394, 403 (Tex. 2017) 11 In the trial court, Forshee argued that, but for the omission of certain language in the contracts, Schnur and Anderson would have been required to include Forshee in the deals going forward or pay damages for breaching the contracts. | 2 | 3 |
Transcontinental Insurance Co. v. Crumpgreen2 sentences2024Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 223 (Tex. 2010) (recognizing producing cause in DTPA cases, products liability cases, and worker’s compensation cases as “conceptually no different from the cause in fact inquiry in negligence cases and the producing cause inquiry in other substantive contexts”); see also Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (“[P]roducing cause is the test in strict liability. 2012The Texas Supreme Court recently held in Crump that “[t]he producing cause inquiry in workers’ compensation cases is conceptually no different from the cause in fact inquiry in negligence cases and the producing cause inquiry in other substantive contexts.” Crump, 330 S.W.3d at 223 ; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32, 46 (Tex. 2007) (holding, in products liability context, that producing cause definition should include “substantial factor” and 5 “but-for” component). | 1 | 4 |
Robertson v. Church of God, Internationalgreen2 sentences2007Robertson, 978 S.W.2d at 126 ; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex.1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a “but for” test and a substantial factor test). 2007Robertson , 978 S.W.2d at 126; Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton , 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995) (noting cause-in-fact consists of a A but for @ test and a substantial factor test). | 1 | 2 |
Debra C. Gunn, M.D., Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A., and Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates P.L.L.C. v. Andre McCoy, as Permanent Guardian of Shannon Miles McCoy, an Incapacitated Persongreen1 sentence2025The defendant’s negligence is the “but for” cause of an injury if, “without the act or omission, the harm would not have occurred.” Pediatrics, 649 S.W.3d at 158 (quoting Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645, 658 (Tex. 2018)). | 1 | 1 |
Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruckgreen1 sentence1994Hycel, Inc. v. Wittstruck, 690 S.W.2d 914, 922 (Tex.App.—Waco 1985, writ dism’d); Charles R. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.
green
2 sentences2009Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 817 , and cannot satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement of proximate cause. 2009Corp., 945 S.W.2d at 817 , and cannot satisfy the cause-in-fact requirement of proximate cause. | 5 | 2009–2009 |
Richardson-Eagle, Inc. v. William M. Mercer, Inc.
green
2 sentences2014Richardson-Eagle, 213 S.W.3d at 474 . 2014Richardson-Eagle, 213 S.W.3d at 474 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013Boys Clubs, 907 S.W.2d at 478 . 2013Boys Clubs, 907 S.W.2d at 478 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Western Investments, Inc. v. Urena
green
1 sentence2023Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Rodriguez-Escobar v. Goss
green
2 sentences2022It would have depended upon a lot of things.” 27 Following our decision in Providence, our Court held that the expert’s testimony did not establish that the physician’s negligence proximately caused the patient’s death. 28 Citing our decision in Bustamante v. Ponte, the court of appeals disregarded the cause-in-fact analysis applied in Providence and Rodriguez-Escobar, instead announcing that it would “apply the substantial factor test,” to the exclusion of requiring but-for causation. 29 In Bustamante, we rejected “a stringent but-for causation test” for an individual actor when the evidence 2022It would have depended upon a lot of things.” 27 Following our decision in Providence, our Court held that the expert’s testimony did not establish that the physician’s negligence proximately caused the patient’s death. 28 Citing our decision in Bustamante v. Ponte, the court of appeals disregarded the cause-in-fact analysis applied in Providence and Rodriguez-Escobar, instead announcing that it would “apply the substantial factor test,” to the exclusion of requiring but-for causation. 29 In Bustamante, we rejected “a stringent but-for causation test” for an individual actor when the evidence | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Marcela and Jose Bustamante, as Next Friends of D.B. v. Enrique N. Ponte, Jr., M.D. and Pediatrix Medical Services, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Rather, when the facts establish that concurrent causation exists for multiple negligent actors—each whose negligence is itself a but-for cause of the injury in question absent the others’ concurrent negligence—then the but-for requirement shifts from the individual level to the aggregate level of defendant tortfeasors. 31 Bustamante concerned a premature infant who had a 90% to 100% chance of developing retinopathy of prematurity, an abnormal blood-vessel growth pattern that can cause diminished vision or blindness. 32 Experts testified that a properly screened and diagnosed infant would have 2022It would have depended upon a lot of things.” 27 Following our decision in Providence, our Court held that the expert’s testimony did not establish that the physician’s negligence proximately caused the patient’s death. 28 Citing our decision in Bustamante v. Ponte, the court of appeals disregarded the cause-in-fact analysis applied in Providence and Rodriguez-Escobar, instead announcing that it would “apply the substantial factor test,” to the exclusion of requiring but-for causation. 29 In Bustamante, we rejected “a stringent but-for causation test” for an individual actor when the evidence | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Bostic v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
green
1 sentence2022Rather, when the facts establish that concurrent causation exists for multiple negligent actors—each whose negligence is itself a but-for cause of the injury in question absent the others’ concurrent negligence—then the but-for requirement shifts from the individual level to the aggregate level of defendant tortfeasors. 31 Bustamante concerned a premature infant who had a 90% to 100% chance of developing retinopathy of prematurity, an abnormal blood-vessel growth pattern that can cause diminished vision or blindness. 32 Experts testified that a properly screened and diagnosed infant would have | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Travis v. City of Mesquite
green
1 sentence2003Id. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. American Statesman
green
2 sentences1995Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1977), included a subtle change from Prosser's formulation of the cause-in-fact inquiry. 1995Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99 (Tex.1977), included a subtle change from Prosser’s formulation of the cause-in-fact inquiry. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.