judicially declared rule in California

2023(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 860 .) This is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure’ that an accused, before admitting a prior conviction allegation, must be advised of the precise increase in the prison term that might be imposed, the effect on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged a habitual criminal. ([In re Yurko] at p. 864.)” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164 , 170–171.) Because “ ‘advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated,’ ” “ ‘the error is waived absent a timely objection.’ ” (People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 C

2022The Attorney General concedes that the court misstated the consequences of those admissions but argues that “a fair reading of the record reveals that appellant’s admissions were still made knowingly and voluntarily.” In In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 , the court held, “as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure,” that an accused, before admitting a prior conviction allegation, must be advised of “the precise increase” in the prison term that might be imposed, the effect on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged an habitual criminal.

2023(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 860 .) This is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure’ that an accused, before admitting a prior conviction allegation, must be advised of the precise increase in the prison term that might be imposed, the effect on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged a habitual criminal. ([In re Yurko] at p. 864.)” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164 , 170–171.) Because “ ‘advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated,’ ” “ ‘the error is waived absent a timely objection.’ ” (People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 C

2022Rather, the rule compelling such advisement is ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ ” (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1022 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 Cal.4th 177, 183 .) “[W]hen the only error is a failure to advise of the consequences of the plea, the error is waived if not raised at or before sentencing.” ( Walker, supra, at p. 1023 , disapproved on another ground in Villalobos, supra, at p. 183 .) Where the error is not waived, however, “ ‘[a] trial court’s failure to comply with this judicial rule of criminal procedure requires

1986As is well known, such suppression is “a judicially declared rule of evidence” (People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442 [ 282 P.2d 905 , 50 A.L.R.2d 513 ]), and a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally” (United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ]).

1986As is well known, such suppression is “a judicially declared rule of evidence” (People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442 [ 282 P.2d 905 , 50 A.L.R.2d 513 ]), and a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally” (United States v. Calandra (1974) 414 U.S. 338, 348 [ 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 , 94 S.Ct. 613 ]).

2016Rather, it is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (Ibid.; see People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 495 [“ ‘Unlike an uninformed waiver of the specified constitutional rights which renders a plea or admission involuntary . . . , an uninformed waiver based on the failure of the court to advise an accused of the consequences of an admission constitutes error which requires that the admission be set aside only if the error is prejudicial to the accused.’ ”].) Wrice continues: “Consequently, when the only error is a failure to advise of the penal consequences, the error is waived i

2014(See Corley v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 72, 76 [noting suspension of driver's license under Vehicle Code section 13352 is a direct consequence of guilty plea requiring advisement]; People v. Dakin (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [same].) However, "the rule compelling an admonishment of the consequences of an admission which may subject the defendant to severe sanctions is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 .)]" (People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 495 ; see Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 605

1999Citing In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 , 112 Cal. Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 , in the decision of In re Ronald E., supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 321 , 137 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 562 P.2d 684 , the California Supreme Court held: "We announced a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure requiring a court to admonish an accused as to the consequences of an admission which may subject him to severe sanctions.

1999Citing In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 , 112 Cal. Rptr. 513 , 519 P.2d 561 , in the decision of In re Ronald E., supra, 19 Cal.3d at page 321 , 137 Cal.Rptr. 781 , 562 P.2d 684 , the California Supreme Court held: "We announced a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure requiring a court to admonish an accused as to the consequences of an admission which may subject him to severe sanctions.

2006Both humanitarian and practical considerations call for a judicially declared immunity." ( Tarantino, at p. 469, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61 .) Thus, the court interpreted section 1367 et seq. as reflecting an intent to compel a defendant to submit to a competency examination, *181 but only on the implicit understanding that any statements he or she made would not be used for any purpose at the subsequent guilt phase of trial.

2006(See Tarantino, supra, 48 Cal. App.3d at p. 469 , 122 Cal.Rptr. 61 ["As to the right against self-incrimination, we find no violation in compelling a defendant to submit to examination by court-appointed psychiatrists under section 1367 et seq., at least under a judicially declared immunity reasonably to be implied from the code provisions " (italics added)].) [4] To the extent the immunity rests on a broader state conception of the privilege against self-incrimination (see Cal. Const., art.

2016We think, rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system." Vickers held "that as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure [citation] a probationer is entitled to the representation of retained or appointed counsel at formal proceedings for the revocation of probation, or following such summary revocation in appropriate cases." ( Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 461-462, italics added, 3 fn. omitted.) Vickers

2016We think, rather, that the decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion by the state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and parole system." Vickers held "that as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure [citation] a probationer is entitled to the representation of retained or appointed counsel at formal proceedings for the revocation of probation, or following such summary revocation in appropriate cases." ( Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 461-462, italics added, 3 fn. omitted.) Vickers

2002Both humanitarian and practical considerations call for a judicially declared immunity.’ (Id. at p. 469.) *497 “We cited Tarantino v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 465 , with approval in Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ], and then formally adopted its judicially declared rule of immunity in People v. Arcega[, supra,] 32 Cal.3d 504 . . .

2002Both humanitarian and practical considerations call for a judicially declared immunity.’ (Id. at p. 469.) *497 “We cited Tarantino v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d 465 , with approval in Daly v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 132, 146 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 14 , 560 P.2d 1193 ], and then formally adopted its judicially declared rule of immunity in People v. Arcega[, supra,] 32 Cal.3d 504 . . .

2023(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 860 .) This is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure’ that an accused, before admitting a prior conviction allegation, must be advised of the precise increase in the prison term that might be imposed, the effect on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged a habitual criminal. ([In re Yurko] at p. 864.)” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164 , 170–171.) Because “ ‘advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated,’ ” “ ‘the error is waived absent a timely objection.’ ” (People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 C

2021Rather, it is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [Citations.]” (People v. Wrice, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 , italics added; Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 170–171, 179; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175 .) “Consequently, when the only error is a failure to advise of the penal consequences, the error is waived if not raised at or before sentencing. [Citation.] Such policies ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice. [Citation.] ‘The purpose of 27Defendant’s appellate contention only addresses his admissions to the prior convictions alleged as strikes

2006As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 522 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 651 P.2d 338 , "the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 , 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ["the rule of immunity `is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination'"

2006As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 522 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 651 P.2d 338 , "the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 , 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ["the rule of immunity `is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination'"

2021Rather, it is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [Citations.] Consequently, when the only error is a failure to advise of the penal consequences, the error is waived if not raised at or before sentencing.’” (People v. Jones (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 853, 858 , quoting People v. Wrice (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 767 , 770–771; accord, Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 170–171; In re Yurko, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 865 .) C.

2021Rather, it is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [Citations.]” (People v. Wrice, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 770 , italics added; Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 170–171, 179; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1175 .) “Consequently, when the only error is a failure to advise of the penal consequences, the error is waived if not raised at or before sentencing. [Citation.] Such policies ensure the fair and orderly administration of justice. [Citation.] ‘The purpose of 27Defendant’s appellate contention only addresses his admissions to the prior convictions alleged as strikes

2024Rather the rule compelling such advisement is ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1022.) Thus, “ ‘an uninformed waiver based on the failure of the court to advise an accused on the consequences of an admission constitutes error which requires that the admission be set aside only if the error is prejudicial to the accused’ ” and “the error is waived absent a timely objection.” (Id. at pp. 1022–1023; see Villalobos, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 181–182 [error waived absent a timely objection].) 4.

2023(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 860 .) This is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure’ that an accused, before admitting a prior conviction allegation, must be advised of the precise increase in the prison term that might be imposed, the effect on parole eligibility, and the possibility of being adjudged a habitual criminal. ([In re Yurko] at p. 864.)” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164 , 170–171.) Because “ ‘advisement as to the consequences of a plea is not constitutionally mandated,’ ” “ ‘the error is waived absent a timely objection.’ ” (People v. Villalobos (2012) 54 C

2006As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 522 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 651 P.2d 338 , "the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 , 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ["the rule of immunity `is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination'"

2006As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 522 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 651 P.2d 338 , "the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 , 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ["the rule of immunity `is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination'"

2014(See Corley v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 72, 76 [noting suspension of driver's license under Vehicle Code section 13352 is a direct consequence of guilty plea requiring advisement]; People v. Dakin (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033 [same].) However, "the rule compelling an admonishment of the consequences of an admission which may subject the defendant to severe sanctions is a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure. [(In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 864 .)]" (People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 495 ; see Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 605

2013(In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352 .) “When a criminal defendant chooses to plead guilty (or . . . no contest), both the United States Supreme Court and this court have required that the defendant be advised on the record that, by pleading, the defendant forfeits the constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine the People’s witnesses, and to be free from compelled self-incrimination. [Citations.] In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his

2014(Sanchez, at p. 30.) Apart from the Boykin-Tahl advisements, which are constitutionally mandated, courts in California are also compelled to give Boykin-Tahl-like advisements in all guilty 8 plea and submission cases as “a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” (People v. Barella (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 266 .).

2013Rather, the rule compelling such advisement is “a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Barella (1999) 20 Cal.4th 261, 266 .) A “slow plea” is “ ‘an agreed-upon disposition of a criminal case via any one of a number of contrived procedures which does not require the defendant to admit guilt but results in a finding of guilt on an anticipated charge and, usually, for a promised punishment.’ Perhaps the clearest example of a slow plea is a bargained-for submission on the transcript of a preliminary hearing in which the only evidence is the victim’s credible t

2026In Aranda, decided in 1965, our high court announced a judicially declared rule of fairness that where one defendant has made a confession that implicates another defendant, they can be tried together only “if all parts of the extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants can be and are effectively deleted without prejudice to the declarant.” (Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 530 .) The trial court must exclude the confession “if effective deletions are not possible.” (Ibid.) A few years later, in 1968, the United States Supreme Court held that admission of a confession by one defendant

1989In Aranda , the court adopted a judicially declared rule of practice intended to implement the command of section 1098 that jointly charged defendants "must be tried jointly, unless the court order separate trials." Aranda held: "When the prosecution proposes to introduce into evidence an extrajudicial statement of one defendant that implicates a codefendant, the trial court must adopt one of the following procedures: (1) It can permit a joint trial if all parts of the extrajudicial statements implicating any codefendants can be and are effectively deleted without prejudice to the declarant...

2006(Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 42 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533 ] [contrasting the compelled nature of competency proceedings with mental retardation proceedings under section 1376]; Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 504 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 ] [defendant may not refuse to participate in court-ordered competency evaluations because the judicially declared rule of immunity provides necessary assurance an accused will not be convicted nor his or her sentence enhanced on the basis of statements]; People v. Harris (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 943, 949 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 747

2006(Centeno v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 30, 42 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 533 ] [contrasting the compelled nature of competency proceedings with mental retardation proceedings under section 1376]; Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 504 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673 ] [defendant may not refuse to participate in court-ordered competency evaluations because the judicially declared rule of immunity provides necessary assurance an accused will not be convicted nor his or her sentence enhanced on the basis of statements]; People v. Harris (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 943, 949 [ 237 Cal.Rptr. 747

2025(People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1031 .) Advisement is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1022.) 5 We agree the trial court erred by not advising Victorian that she would have to register as an arsonist for life. “[A] restrictive lifelong consequence or obligation is a direct consequence of the plea, and . . . a court must advise of the lifetime element.” (People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483 (Zaidi).) But to prevail, Victorian must show she was prejudiced by the error. ( McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 377– 378 & fn. 8; Zaidi, at

2013(In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 352 .) “When a criminal defendant chooses to plead guilty (or . . . no contest), both the United States Supreme Court and this court have required that the defendant be advised on the record that, by pleading, the defendant forfeits the constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine the People’s witnesses, and to be free from compelled self-incrimination. [Citations.] In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his

2018In People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 722 P.2d 173 ( Collins ), our Supreme Court adopted the Luce rule as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, noting that other states had followed suit. 9 ( Collins , at p. 385 & fn. 5, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 722 P.2d 173 .) Although the district court in Luce actually ruled on the defendant's motion to exclude his prior convictions before he decided not to testify ( Luce , supra , 469 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 105 S.Ct. 460 ), some state courts *881 have inferred that a trial court's decision to defer ruling on the admissibility

2018In People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378 (Collins), our Supreme Court adopted the Luce rule as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, noting that other states had followed suit.9 (Collins, at p. 385 & fn. 5.) Although the district court in Luce actually ruled on the defendant’s motion to exclude his prior convictions before he decided not to testify ( Luce, supra, 469 U.S. at pp. 39–40), some state courts have inferred that a trial court’s decision to defer ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment until after the defendant testifies “does not impermissibly

2006As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 522 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 651 P.2d 338 , "the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 , 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ["the rule of immunity `is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination'"

2006As this court observed in People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 522 , 186 Cal.Rptr. 94 , 651 P.2d 338 , "the basis for the Tarantino decision was the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination." (See, e.g., People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 802-803 , 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98 , 126 P.3d 938 [judicially declared immunity and Fifth Amendment coextensive]; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 960 , 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 2 , 29 P.3d 103 ["the rule of immunity `is necessary to ensure that an accused is not convicted by use of his own statements made at a court-compelled examination'"

2022(Boykin v. Alabama[, supra,] 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ]; [ Tahl, supra,] 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his plea. [Citations.] If the consequence is only collateral, no advisement is required.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , 633–634.) It is well settled that “the ‘possible future use of a current conviction is not 42 a direct consequence of the conviction.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.)

2022(Boykin v. Alabama[, supra,] 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ]; [ Tahl, supra,] 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his plea. [Citations.] If the consequence is only collateral, no advisement is required.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , 633–634.) It is well settled that “the ‘possible future use of a current conviction is not 42 a direct consequence of the conviction.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.)

2022(Boykin v. Alabama[, supra,] 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ]; [ Tahl, supra,] 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his plea. [Citations.] If the consequence is only collateral, no advisement is required.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , 633–634.) It is well settled that “the ‘possible future use of a current conviction is not 42 a direct consequence of the conviction.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.)

2021(Boykin v. 42 Alabama[, supra,] 395 U.S. 238 [ 89 S.Ct. 1709 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274 ]; [ Tahl, supra,] 1 Cal.3d 122 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 577 , 460 P.2d 449 ].) In addition, this court has required, as a judicially declared rule of state criminal procedure, that a pleading defendant also be advised of the direct consequences of his plea. [Citations.] If the consequence is only collateral, no advisement is required.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557 , 633–634.) It is well settled that “the ‘possible future use of a current conviction is not a direct consequence of the conviction.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.)

2002"Although we agree that the risk of conviction on a false pre-offense statement alone is less than the risk of such a conviction upon a false confession or admission, we find the risk of an unjust result sufficient to justify our broader rule." ( Beagle, at p. 455, fn. 5, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 492 P.2d 1 .) *922 We imposed a similarly stringent standard of proof for determining the admissibility of confessions. ( People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 .) Although federal law permitted use of a confession if voluntariness could be shown by a preponderance of the

2002"Although we agree that the risk of conviction on a false pre-offense statement alone is less than the risk of such a conviction upon a false confession or admission, we find the risk of an unjust result sufficient to justify our broader rule." ( Beagle, at p. 455, fn. 5, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 492 P.2d 1 .) *922 We imposed a similarly stringent standard of proof for determining the admissibility of confessions. ( People v. Jimenez (1978) 21 Cal.3d 595 , 147 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 580 P.2d 672 .) Although federal law permitted use of a confession if voluntariness could be shown by a preponderance of the

2025(People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1031 .) Advisement is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1022.) 5 We agree the trial court erred by not advising Victorian that she would have to register as an arsonist for life. “[A] restrictive lifelong consequence or obligation is a direct consequence of the plea, and . . . a court must advise of the lifetime element.” (People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483 (Zaidi).) But to prevail, Victorian must show she was prejudiced by the error. ( McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 377– 378 & fn. 8; Zaidi, at

2025(People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1031 .) Advisement is “ ‘a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.’ ” (Walker, at p. 1022.) 5 We agree the trial court erred by not advising Victorian that she would have to register as an arsonist for life. “[A] restrictive lifelong consequence or obligation is a direct consequence of the plea, and . . . a court must advise of the lifetime element.” (People v. Zaidi (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1483 (Zaidi).) But to prevail, Victorian must show she was prejudiced by the error. ( McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 377– 378 & fn. 8; Zaidi, at

2007In People v. Humiston (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 460, 473 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 515 , the court explicitly conflated interrogational immunity with the exclusionary rule, declaring, "Use immunity is a judicially declared rule of evidence based on the privilege against self-incrimination." (Italics added.) The court cited People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ( Coleman ), as well as Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 806-807 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ( Ramona R.).

2007In People v. Humiston (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 460, 473 , 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 515 , the court explicitly conflated interrogational immunity with the exclusionary rule, declaring, "Use immunity is a judicially declared rule of evidence based on the privilege against self-incrimination." (Italics added.) The court cited People v. Coleman (1975) 13 Cal.3d 867 , 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ( Coleman ), as well as Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 802, 806-807 , 210 Cal.Rptr. 204 , 693 P.2d 789 ( Ramona R.).

2007We adopt the foregoing as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure." ( Gainer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 852 , 139 Cal.Rptr. 861 , 566 P.2d 997 .) Having reviewed the Gainer rule governing supplemental jury instructions, we turn to Whaley's claim of instructional error.

2007We adopt the foregoing as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure.” {Gainer, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 852 , fn. omitted.) Having reviewed the Gainer rule governing supplemental jury instructions, we turn to Whaley’s claim of instructional error.

1981They cite, inter alia, People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ], where our Supreme Court announced as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, that “a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities may not defend ... persons accused of crime.” (Id., at pp. 186-187; and see People v. Municipal Court (Wolfe) (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 714, 719 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 235 ].) They cite as well in support of the contention that at least the “appearance of impropriety” forbidden by People v. Rhodes, supra, 12 Cal.3d 180 , exists in the case at bench, those provisions

1981They cite, inter alia, People v. Rhodes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 180 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 235 , 524 P.2d 363 ], where our Supreme Court announced as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, that “a city attorney with prosecutorial responsibilities may not defend ... persons accused of crime.” (Id., at pp. 186-187; and see People v. Municipal Court (Wolfe) (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 714, 719 [ 138 Cal.Rptr. 235 ].) They cite as well in support of the contention that at least the “appearance of impropriety” forbidden by People v. Rhodes, supra, 12 Cal.3d 180 , exists in the case at bench, those provisions

2026(Carver v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 498, 503-504 .) The court reasoned that to allow the defendant to recover attorney’s fees “would superimpose a judicially declared principle of reciprocity on the statute’s fee provision” that would frustrate the legislative intent.

2018To allow [defendant] to recover fees for work on Cartwright Act issues simply because the statutory claims have some arguable benefit to other aspects of the case would superimpose a judicially declared principle of reciprocity on the statute's fee provision, a result unintended by the Legislature, and would thereby frustrate the legislative intent to 'encourage improved enforcement of public policy.' " ( Carver, at p. 504, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 .) Cassim , supra , 33 Cal.4th 780 , 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 374 , 94 P.3d 513 and Carver , supra , 119 Cal.App.4th 498 , 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 467 are inapposite as nei

2018In People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 722 P.2d 173 ( Collins ), our Supreme Court adopted the Luce rule as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, noting that other states had followed suit. 9 ( Collins , at p. 385 & fn. 5, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 722 P.2d 173 .) Although the district court in Luce actually ruled on the defendant's motion to exclude his prior convictions before he decided not to testify ( Luce , supra , 469 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 105 S.Ct. 460 ), some state courts *881 have inferred that a trial court's decision to defer ruling on the admissibility

2018In People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378 , 228 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 722 P.2d 173 ( Collins ), our Supreme Court adopted the Luce rule as a judicially declared rule of criminal procedure, noting that other states had followed suit. 9 ( Collins , at p. 385 & fn. 5, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899 , 722 P.2d 173 .) Although the district court in Luce actually ruled on the defendant's motion to exclude his prior convictions before he decided not to testify ( Luce , supra , 469 U.S. at pp. 39-40, 105 S.Ct. 460 ), some state courts *881 have inferred that a trial court's decision to defer ruling on the admissibility