occasion rule in California

2015(See Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 860 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Next, Shelby’s conduct in deciding to waive his privilege only after opening statements and after the close of discovery smacks of the conduct condemned in A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 554 , in which the court stated: “[T]he enactment of the Discovery Act of 1957 was intended to take the ‘game element’ out of trial preparation and do away with surprise at trial. [Citation.] The accomplishment of this purpose compels the court to prevent a litigant claiming his constitutional privilege

2015(See Brokopp v. Ford Motor Co. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 841, 860 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].) Next, Shelby’s conduct in deciding to waive his privilege only after opening statements and after the close of discovery smacks of the conduct condemned in A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 554 , in which the court stated: “[T]he 60 enactment of the Discovery Act of 1957 was intended to take the ‘game element’ out of trial preparation and do away with surprise at trial. [Citation.] The accomplishment of this purpose compels the court to prevent a litigant claiming his constitutional privil

1967Co., 170 Cal.App.2d 387, 392 [ 338 P.2d 984 ].) Personal liability of the indemnitee does not preclude indemnification, since his legal responsibility for the injury is the very occasion for the claim of indemnity.

1967Co., 170 Cal.App.2d 387, 392 [ 338 P.2d 984 ].) Personal liability of the indemnitee does not preclude indemnification, since his legal responsibility for the injury is the very occasion for the claim of indemnity.

2021People v. Percelle (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 164, 182 (Percelle) [no reasonable basis to distinguish between the defendant’s first attempted fraud and his second attempted fraud an hour later].) Here, the trial court evidently understood the distinction between the separate occasion inquiry for consecutive sentencing purposes and the continuous course of conduct inquiries for unanimity instruction purposes.

2014The elements of such a cause of action are: “‘“(1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1153 (Korea Supply).) To satisfy the plaintiff’s

2013(See Lundquist v. Reusser, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1206, fn. 12 [“ ‘Conditionally privileged occasions are created in order to permit the publisher of the defamation to protect the interest which is entitled to protection. . . . [W]here the primary purpose is another 9 purpose, e.g., a desire to injure the defamed person, this is an abuse of the occasion and no privilege comes into being.’ ”].)4 The state-of-mind Pelz attributes to Weaver is not supported by the undisputed facts and the reasonable inferences drawn from these undisputed facts.

2004In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ], we noted that in light of Evidence Code section 913, to put a witness on the stand for the purpose of having the witness invoke the privilege against self-incrimination “would only invite the jury to make an improper inference.” In Mincey , we reiterated this reasoning, holding that having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury’s presence would be “in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913.

2004In People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 440 , 808 P.2d 1197 ], we noted that in light of Evidence Code section 913, to put a witness on the stand for the purpose of having the witness invoke the privilege against self-incrimination “would only invite the jury to make an improper inference.” In Mincey , we reiterated this reasoning, holding that having the witness exercise her privilege in the jury’s presence would be “in direct violation of Evidence Code section 913.

1993No such limitation has ever been placed on the application of an enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.55. 9 (People v. Alvarez (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 121, 127 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 ].) As the court observed in Alvarez , Penal Code section 12022.5 and section 12022.55 are at first glance somewhat similar, but yet focus upon fundamentally different conduct. ( 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 128 .) Section 12022.5 provides a sentence enhancement (of three, four or five years) for a person who, in the terms of the statute, “personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission o

1993No such limitation has ever been placed on the application of an enhancement imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.55. 9 (People v. Alvarez (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 121, 127 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 463 ].) As the court observed in Alvarez , Penal Code section 12022.5 and section 12022.55 are at first glance somewhat similar, but yet focus upon fundamentally different conduct. ( 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 128 .) Section 12022.5 provides a sentence enhancement (of three, four or five years) for a person who, in the terms of the statute, “personally uses a firearm in the commission or attempted commission o

1988The single occasion rule of In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [ 130 Cal. Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] bars imposition of sentence for more than one weapons enhancement, whether for being armed or a use, in any given "melee." In Culbreth a bare majority of the Supreme Court determined there could be only one sentence enhancement for use of a firearm where multiple crimes are "all part of a single melee [and] [t]here was but one occasion, one intent, one objective, one indivisible transaction." [11] ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 335 , italics added.) Although the issue has not been the subject of any in-dept

1988The single occasion rule of In re Culbreth (1976) 17 Cal.3d 330 [ 130 Cal. Rptr. 719 , 551 P.2d 23 ] bars imposition of sentence for more than one weapons enhancement, whether for being armed or a use, in any given "melee." In Culbreth a bare majority of the Supreme Court determined there could be only one sentence enhancement for use of a firearm where multiple crimes are "all part of a single melee [and] [t]here was but one occasion, one intent, one objective, one indivisible transaction." [11] ( 17 Cal.3d at p. 335 , italics added.) Although the issue has not been the subject of any in-dept

1986(People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d 897, 913, fn. 9 .) 3 One Court of Appeal has even held after Culbreth that multiple sentence enhancements may be imposed so long as the sentences are ordered to run concurrently.

1980See also Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 418 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 552 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]; cf. Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.

1980See also Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 418 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 552 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]; cf. Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.

1980See also Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 418 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 552 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]; cf. Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.

1980See also Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 418 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 552 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]; cf. Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.

1980See also Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 418 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 552 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]; cf. Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.

1980See also Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 418 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 449 , 398 P.2d 785 ]; MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co. (1959) 52 Cal.2d 536, 552 [ 343 P.2d 36 ]; cf. Agarwal v. Johnson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 932, 944-945 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 603 P.2d 58 ]; Sanborn v. Chronicle Pub.

1975(See In re Marks, 71 Cal.2d 31, 38-40 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 453 P.2d 441 ].) In other words, the infringement of constitutional rights there authorized is based upon the justification that otherwise the rehabilitative purpose of the narcotic addiction treatment program might be completely frustrated.

1975(See In re Marks, 71 Cal.2d 31, 38-40 [ 77 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 453 P.2d 441 ].) In other words, the infringement of constitutional rights there authorized is based upon the justification that otherwise the rehabilitative purpose of the narcotic addiction treatment program might be completely frustrated.

1966In People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 668 [ 234 P.2d 632 ], we clearly intimated that on a proper occasion it is error to fail to define for the jury the acts which, if intended by the defendant, will transform an entry into a burglary.

1966In People v. Chavez (1951) 37 Cal.2d 656, 668 [ 234 P.2d 632 ], we clearly intimated that on a proper occasion it is error to fail to define for the jury the acts which, if intended by the defendant, will transform an entry into a burglary.

1922(Spear v. United, Railroads, 16 Cal. App. 637, 659 [ 117 Pac. 956 ].) It is contended that the court erred in giving the fifteenth instruction, which reads as follows: “15.

1922(Spear v. United, Railroads, 16 Cal. App. 637, 659 [ 117 Pac. 956 ].) It is contended that the court erred in giving the fifteenth instruction, which reads as follows: “15.