type of instructional error in California

2024We have applied the harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt test set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , a test that applies to trial errors that violate a defendant’s federal constitutional rights, to this type of instructional error.

2023This is precisely the type of instructional error that our Supreme Court identified and found unacceptable in Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155 .” (Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 805 .) The court determined the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 ), and vacated Loza’s conviction for first degree murder.

2022Because the trial court gave both correct and incorrect instructions on the applicable law to the jury on the requirements for a finding of premeditation, it committed a type of instructional error known as “alternative-theory error.” (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 9 .) Here, the legally inadequate theory was that a decision to act, rather than a decision to kill, could support a first degree murder conviction.

2019This type of instructional error, where the jury is instructed with one correct theory of guilt and one incorrect theory of guilty, is known as "alternative-theory error." (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7, fn. 3 (Aledamat).) Relying on People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116 , Stringer contends we must find the alternative-theory error prejudicial unless there is "a basis in the record to find that the verdict was actually based on a valid ground." (Guiton, at p. 1129, italics added.) The People, by contrast, urge us to apply the traditional prejudice standard governing errors of state

2024(People v. Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 697 .) Under Watson, a court determines whether there is a “reasonable probability that a more favorable verdict would have been returned had the jury been properly instructed following the substitution.” (Ibid.) When applying this test, California courts “consider whether the case is a close one and compare the time the jury 5 spent deliberating before and after the substitution of the alternate juror.” (People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 537 .) The closeness of a case may involve consideration of the case’s complexity.

2023(Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 692, fn. 3 ; Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) 406 U.S. 404, 406 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 184 ].) Thus, at the time Collins was decided, the stricter Chapman harmless error standard,10 which asks whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, was not applicable to this type of instructional error.

2022Prejudice from this type of error is assessed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman), which requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error [(the Attorney General)] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24; People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348 (Wilkins); People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671 .) Here, the trial court misinstructed the jury on the premeditation element of first degree murder, and the prosecutor’s arguments based on the erroneous instructional language dramatic

2021(People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 289 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53-54, fn. 19 .) Reversal is required “only when . . . it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” ( Watson, supra, at p. 836 .) “ ‘ “ ‘[A] “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 351 ).) As given, CALCRIM No. 2383 require

2018(See *161 People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 438, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 ["jury instructions in a state criminal trial omitting the requirement of proof of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt are erroneous under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause"].) Pursuant to Chapman , instructional error requires reversal unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict. ( Harris , at p. 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) *320 Where the parties disagree is whether we evaluate the particular type of instructional error h

2018(See *161 People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407 , 438, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 ["jury instructions in a state criminal trial omitting the requirement of proof of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt are erroneous under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause"].) Pursuant to Chapman , instructional error requires reversal unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the verdict. ( Harris , at p. 424, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 200 , 886 P.2d 1193 .) *320 Where the parties disagree is whether we evaluate the particular type of instructional error h

2025(See People v. Merritt (2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 824 ; People v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 409 ; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7 .) 60 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) “[W]e review alternative-theory errors under the Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . . . standard governing federal constitutional errors. [Citations.] Under that standard, we ‘must reverse the conviction unless, after examining the entire cause, including the evidence, and considering all relevant circumstances, [we] determine[ ] the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (Stringer, supra,

2023In People v. ZarateCastillo (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1165-1169 (ZarateCastillo), the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s error in instructing the jury (with an instruction 16 materially identical to CALCRIM No. 252 given here) that sexual penetration of a child 10 years old or younger and forcible sexual penetration were general intent crimes was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” (presumably referencing, without citing, the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)).

2023(Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 692, fn. 3 ; Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) 406 U.S. 404, 406 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 184 ].) Thus, at the time Collins was decided, the stricter Chapman harmless error standard,10 which asks whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, was not applicable to this type of instructional error.

2023(Collins, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 692, fn. 3 ; Apodaca v. Oregon (1972) 406 U.S. 404, 406 [ 32 L.Ed.2d 184 ].) Thus, at the time Collins was decided, the stricter Chapman harmless error standard,10 which asks whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, was not applicable to this type of instructional error.

2021(People v. Lucas (2014) 60 Cal.4th 153, 289 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53-54, fn. 19 .) Reversal is required “only when . . . it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” ( Watson, supra, at p. 836 .) “ ‘ “ ‘[A] “probability” in this context does not mean more likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 351 ).) As given, CALCRIM No. 2383 require

2016As explained in People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 ] (Perez), '[w]hen one of the theories presented to a jury is legally inadequate, such as a theory which " 'fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime' " [citation], the jury cannot reasonably be expected to divine its legal inadequacy.

2016As explained in People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1233 [ 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423 , 113 P.3d 100 ] (Perez), '[w]hen one of the theories presented to a jury is legally inadequate, such as a theory which " 'fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime' " [citation], the jury cannot reasonably be expected to divine its legal inadequacy.

2014(Citing Larsen, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 ["A distinction is drawn 'between instructional error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense and that which affects only an aspect of an element.' (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1315 [(Cummings)]"].) In Cummings, the Supreme 28 Court was drawing a distinction between a type of instructional error that is reversible per se (i.e. instructional error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense) and instructional error that is subject to the Chapman standard of prejudice (error a

2014(Citing Larsen, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 ["A distinction is drawn 'between instructional error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense and that which affects only an aspect of an element.' (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1315 [(Cummings)]"].) In Cummings, the Supreme 28 Court was drawing a distinction between a type of instructional error that is reversible per se (i.e. instructional error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense) and instructional error that is subject to the Chapman standard of prejudice (error a

2014(Citing Larsen, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 829 ["A distinction is drawn 'between instructional error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense and that which affects only an aspect of an element.' (People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1315 [(Cummings)]"].) In Cummings, the Supreme 28 Court was drawing a distinction between a type of instructional error that is reversible per se (i.e. instructional error that entirely precludes jury consideration of an element of an offense) and instructional error that is subject to the Chapman standard of prejudice (error a

1999It is settled that this type of instructional error does not require reversal unless it is affirmatively shown that defendant was prejudiced thereby and that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error, the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to the defendant. {People v. Nunez, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 662 ; People v. Russell (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 660, 664 [ 139 P.2d 661 ]; People v. Soules (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 298, 313 [ 106 P.2d 639 ].) First, we can declare without hesitation that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s erroneous decision to accede to th

1999It is settled that this type of instructional error does not require reversal unless it is affirmatively shown that defendant was prejudiced thereby and that there is a reasonable probability that, absent the error, the jury would have returned a verdict more favorable to the defendant. {People v. Nunez, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 662 ; People v. Russell (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 660, 664 [ 139 P.2d 661 ]; People v. Soules (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 298, 313 [ 106 P.2d 639 ].) First, we can declare without hesitation that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court’s erroneous decision to accede to th