controversy requirement in Illinois

1994Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443 , 389 N.E.2d 529 . •2 The actual controversy requirement of standing cannot be satisfied where the underlying issues of the case are moot or premature.

1994Block, 75 Ill. 2d 443 , 389 N.E.2d 529 . •2 The actual controversy requirement of standing cannot be satisfied where the underlying issues of the case are moot or premature.

2003Second, the party seeking the declaration must be interested in the controversy and must possess a personal claim, status or right which is capable of being affected. [Citations.] To have standing, one must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining, a direct injury. [Citation.] The actual controversy requirement of standing cannot be satisfied where the underlying issues of the case are moot or premature. [Citation.] An issue is considered moot where events occur which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. [Citations.] When it becomes apparent that an opinio

2003Second, the party seeking the declaration must be interested in the controversy and must possess a personal claim, status or right which is capable of being affected. [Citations.] To have standing, one must have sustained, or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury. [Citation.] The actual controversy requirement of standing cannot be satisfied where the underlying issues of the case are moot or premature. [Citation.] An issue is considered moot where events occur which make it impossible for the court to grant effectual relief. [Citations.] When it becomes apparent that an opinion

2025In the alternative, he argues that, even in the absence of an actual controversy, he has adequately alleged that there are “cognizable interests” at stake making a declaratory judgment action appropriate under this court’s decision in Rohm & Hass Co. v. Cont’l Assurance Co., 58 Ill.

2022“The actual controversy requirement ensures that courts will not pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 48 First, Harmon and Welch argue all of the claims raised in plaintiffs’ complaints are barred because the requested declarations concerning the validity of section 2f-2 or section 2f-13 of the Circuit Courts Act would not overrule the supreme court’s order of recertification and, therefore, would not “aid in the termination of the controversy” and amount to an “advis

2022Id. at 859 .

2021The “actual controversy” requirement ensures that courts will not “ ‘pass judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, render an advisory opinion, or give legal advice as to future events.’ ” Beahringer, 204 Ill. 2d at 374 - 75 (quoting Underground Contractors Ass’n, 66 Ill. 2d at 375 ). ¶ 37 This court’s decision in Illinois Press Ass’n v. Ryan, 195 Ill. 2d 63 (2001), is instructive on the actual controversy requirement as it applies to this case.

2002Messenger , 157 Ill. 2d at 170-71 .

1995(Mori v. Hartz Mountain Development Corp. (1983), 193 N.J.

1995Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 452 ; Harris Bank, 243 Ill.

1994(Clyde Savings & Loan Association v. May Department Stores (1981), 100 Ill.

1993App. 3d 210 , 475 N.E.2d 223 , sheds further light on the proper application of the actual controversy requirement.

1993There the court stated that “the condition of justiciability is satisfied where the mere existence of a claim, assertion or challenge to the plaintiff’s legal interests portends the ripening seeds of litigation and casts doubt, insecurity and uncertainty upon the plaintiff’s rights or status, thereby damaging the plaintiff’s pecuniary or material interests.” (Stone, 131 Ill.

1993App. 3d 209 , 340 N.E.2d 331 .) Pratt has called upon Protective to pay the judgment against Andrews, satisfying the actual controversy requirement.

1991App. 3d 296 , 390 N.E.2d 428 .) The actual controversy requirement is intended to distinguish present justiciable issues from abstract or hypothetical disputes where no present dispute is pending and requires resolution.

1991(Alderman Drugs, Inc. v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1979), 79 Ill.

1985(Illinois Gamefowl Breeders Association v. Block (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 443, 450 , 389 N.E.2d 529 ; Kerr Steamship Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1983), 120 Ill.

1979App. 2d 383 , 233 N.E.2d 85 .) The actual controversy requirement is meant merely to distinguish justiciable issues from abstract or hypothetical disputes and is not intended to prevent the resolution of concrete disputes admitting of a definitive and immediate determination of the rights of the parties.

1979Club of Waukegan v. Drobnick (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 521, 524 , 187 N.E.2d 247 ), thereby preventing courts from passing judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, rendering advisory opinions, or giving legal advice as to future events (Underground Contractors Association v. City of Chicago).

1979Club of Waukegan v. Drobnick (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 521, 524 , 187 N.E.2d 247 ), thereby preventing courts from passing judgment on mere abstract propositions of law, rendering advisory opinions, or giving legal advice as to future events (Underground Contractors Association v. City of Chicago).

1979Following reference to the foregoing cases, the court stated: “From an examination of the authorities (see Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1126 (1973), and cases there collected) it would appear that the general rule that ‘an aggrieved person’ with a real interest in the subject matter of the controversy may challenge a zoning ordinance is applicable to municipal corporations.” (Hickory Hills, 67 Ill. 2d 399, 403 .) The supreme court then held that as Hickory Hills was required to supply sewer and water facilities to the area involved, it was an aggrieved person with a real interest in the controversy.

1976In our two prior reviews of this action, we respectively affirmed the trial court’s orders of July 20,1971, which denied the petition of the defendant Karkomi for a change of venue (Stavros v. Karkomi, 14 Ill.

1951Discussing the meaning of these words, when used in a judgment of dismissal, Judge Butler said in the case of Union Indemnity Co. v. Benton County Lumber Co., 179 Ark. 752 , 18 S. W. (2d) 327 , 330: This term has a well-recognized legal import; it is the converse of the term ‘without prejudice’ and is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been prosecuted to a final adjudication adverse to the plaintiff. . . .” Hence, the order of dismissal entered by the court on October 9,1944, showed a complete adjudication of the controversy and was a bar to the subsequent action by

1951Discussing the meaning of these words, when used in a judgment of dismissal, Judge Butler said in the case of Union Indemnity Co. v. Benton County Lumber Co., 179 Ark. 752 , 18 S. W. (2d) 327 , 330: This term has a well-recognized legal import; it is the converse of the term ‘without prejudice’ and is as conclusive of the rights of the parties as if the suit had been prosecuted to a final adjudication adverse to the plaintiff. . . .” Hence, the order of dismissal entered by the court on October 9,1944, showed a complete adjudication of the controversy and was a bar to the subsequent action by

1929L., Partnership, 928; Tichenor v. Newman, 186 Ill. 264 .) The judicial determination of the controversy at bar does not involve any examination into and adjustment of the partnership accounts or inquiry as to the profits or losses or expenses of the firm, or the adjustment of any claims arising out of the business.

1913This question was set at rest in this State by the decision of this court in Wachter v. Doerr, 210 Ill. 242 .