11 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1873–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
KASELAAN & D'ANGELO v. Soffiangreen2 sentences2011It does not require dismissal when multiple actions involving the same or related claims are pending simultaneously.” (Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assoc., Inc. v Soffian, 290 NJ Super 293, 299, 675 A2d 705, 708 [App Div 1996].) Since plaintiffs’ claims as creditors cannot be resolved until the liability of defendants to plaintiffs is determined in the federal court, there is no need, under the entire controversy doctrine, to dismiss the present lawsuit. 2011It does not require dismissal when multiple actions involving the same or related claims are pending simultaneously.” (Kaselaan & D’Angelo Assoc., Inc. v Soffian, 290 NJ Super 293, 299, 675 A2d 705, 708 [App Div 1996].) Since plaintiffs’ claims as creditors cannot be resolved until the liability of defendants to plaintiffs is determined in the federal court, there is no need, under the entire controversy doctrine, to dismiss the present lawsuit. | 1 | 1 |
Olds v. Donnellygreen1 sentence2011“Thus, the entire controversy doctrine encompasses ‘virtually all causes, claims, and defenses relating to a controversy’ between parties engaged in litigation.” {Olds v Donnelly, 150 NJ 424, 431-432, 433, 696 A2d 633, 637-638 [Sup Ct 1997] [citations omitted].) Moreover, the entire controversy doctrine has been held to be a preclusionary principle intended to prevent the fractionalization of litigation, requiring all claims between the parties arising out of, or relating to, the same occurrence to be determined in a single action. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Browngreen1 sentence2011(Brown v Brown, 208 NJ Super 372, 377-378, 506 A2d 29, 31-33 [App Div 1986].) In the case at bar, the New Jersey action will determine whether plaintiffs are indeed creditors of defendants, the basis for the New York lawsuit. | 1 | 1 |
In re the Arbitration between Minkin & Halperingreen1 sentence2004RUMSEY Supreme Court Justice Decision Date: February 09, 2004 Footnotes Footnote 1: Moreover, in Minkin , it was expressly noted that the question of whether the cancellation agreement was induced by coercion was "not a controversy or claim arising out of, nor does it have relation to, the agreement" containing the arbitration clause ( Matter of Minkin , at 228). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Aristide v. City of New York
neutral
2 sentences2025The Court in Aristide v City of New York, 129 Misc 2d 483, 485-86 , 493 NYS2d 247 [Sup Ct 1985] considered whether a notice of claim filed by someone other than an administrator is valid: ... the controversy at bar really resolves itself into only one issue, that is, whether the notice of claim requirement, set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-e, is satisfied if the notice is filed by one who has not yet received letters of administration. 2025The Court in Aristide v City of New York, 129 Misc 2d 483, 485-86 , 493 NYS2d 247 [Sup Ct 1985] considered whether a notice of claim filed by someone other than an administrator is valid: ... the controversy at bar really resolves itself into only one issue, that is, whether the notice of claim requirement, set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-e, is satisfied if the notice is filed by one who has not yet received letters of administration. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Oak Beach v. Town of Babylon
neutral
1 sentence1996We note that a class action against a governmental body is not considered the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy because the doctrine of stare decisis would render the determination of an action binding on the governmental body and would automatically benefit all persons sought to be represented in the class (see, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 499 ; Matter of Martin v Lavine, 39 NY2d 72, 75 ; Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 NY2d 42, 57 ; Conklin v Town of Southampton, 141 AD2d 596, 597 ; Oak Beach v Town of Babylon, 100 AD2d 930 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Conklin v. Town of Southampton
green
1 sentence1996We note that a class action against a governmental body is not considered the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy because the doctrine of stare decisis would render the determination of an action binding on the governmental body and would automatically benefit all persons sought to be represented in the class (see, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 499 ; Matter of Martin v Lavine, 39 NY2d 72, 75 ; Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 NY2d 42, 57 ; Conklin v Town of Southampton, 141 AD2d 596, 597 ; Oak Beach v Town of Babylon, 100 AD2d 930 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Martin v. Lavine
green
1 sentence1996We note that a class action against a governmental body is not considered the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy because the doctrine of stare decisis would render the determination of an action binding on the governmental body and would automatically benefit all persons sought to be represented in the class (see, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 499 ; Matter of Martin v Lavine, 39 NY2d 72, 75 ; Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 NY2d 42, 57 ; Conklin v Town of Southampton, 141 AD2d 596, 597 ; Oak Beach v Town of Babylon, 100 AD2d 930 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Jones v. Berman
green
1 sentence1996We note that a class action against a governmental body is not considered the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy because the doctrine of stare decisis would render the determination of an action binding on the governmental body and would automatically benefit all persons sought to be represented in the class (see, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 499 ; Matter of Martin v Lavine, 39 NY2d 72, 75 ; Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 NY2d 42, 57 ; Conklin v Town of Southampton, 141 AD2d 596, 597 ; Oak Beach v Town of Babylon, 100 AD2d 930 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Rivers v. Katz
green
1 sentence1996We note that a class action against a governmental body is not considered the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of a controversy because the doctrine of stare decisis would render the determination of an action binding on the governmental body and would automatically benefit all persons sought to be represented in the class (see, Rivers v Katz, 67 NY2d 485, 499 ; Matter of Martin v Lavine, 39 NY2d 72, 75 ; Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 NY2d 42, 57 ; Conklin v Town of Southampton, 141 AD2d 596, 597 ; Oak Beach v Town of Babylon, 100 AD2d 930 ). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hearst Corp. v. Clyne
green
1 sentence1992The court further determined that none of the factors which could qualify the instant controversy as an exception to the mootness doctrine existed (see, Matter of Hearst Corp. v Clyne, 50 NY2d 707, 714-715 ) and dismissed the matter. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Randall v. Toll
green
2 sentences1974The former requires a determination not only that there is “ probable cause ” but that “ such employee’s continued presence on the job represents a potential danger to persons or property.” As for subdivision 2, it is obviously inapplicable since there is no suggestion whatever of any “ criminal charge.” It appears to me that the learned opinion of Mr. Justice De Luca in Matter of Randall v. Toll ( 73 Misc 2d 451 ) is particularly, apposite to the controversy at bar. 1974Matter of Randall contains a comprehensive review of the extant United States Supreme Court decisions on this point and the language therein cited from Fuentes v. Shevin ( 407 U. S. 67 ) although concerned with the rights of a creditor rather than a civil service public employee situation, bears repetition: “ In so doing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to a hearing before an individual is deprived of any significant property right except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.' (Boddie | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Fuentes v. Shevin
green
1 sentence1974Matter of Randall contains a comprehensive review of the extant United States Supreme Court decisions on this point and the language therein cited from Fuentes v. Shevin ( 407 U. S. 67 ) although concerned with the rights of a creditor rather than a civil service public employee situation, bears repetition: “ In so doing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to a hearing before an individual is deprived of any significant property right except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.' (Boddie | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Boddie v. Connecticut
green
1 sentence1974Matter of Randall contains a comprehensive review of the extant United States Supreme Court decisions on this point and the language therein cited from Fuentes v. Shevin ( 407 U. S. 67 ) although concerned with the rights of a creditor rather than a civil service public employee situation, bears repetition: “ In so doing, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the right to a hearing before an individual is deprived of any significant property right except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after the event.' (Boddie | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Castiglione v. State
green
1 sentence1962(See Berkliff Undergarment Corp. v. Weissman, 277 App. Div. 964 .) It was held in Castiglione v. State of New York ( 8 Misc 2d 932 ) that an examination before trial of an attorney will not be denied in an instance where privilege is claimed. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Tauza v. . Susquehanna Coal Co.
green
1 sentence1958In the leading* case of Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. ( 220 N. Y. 259 ) decided in 1917, the court held that although the foreign corporation’s agent is in this State, service of process upon him does not render the corporation subject to the court’s jurisdiction if the corporation is not doing business in this State, and that, in order for a foreign corporation to be held to be doing business here, there had to be business which had “ a fair measure of permanence and continuity ” (p. 267). | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Tax Lien Co. v. . Schultze
green
1 sentence1934(Tax Lien Co. v. Schultze, supra, and cases cited.) Parties to an action have a right to limit the issues to be tried to those properly made by the pleadings, but they are not bound so to do and may by mutual consent try other issues. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
In re the Estate of Cohen
green
1 sentence1933When the case was first presented for adjudication, the court successfully withstood such temptation as may have existed in this direction ( 147 Misc. 330 ). | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Ex parte Weston
neutral
1 sentence1873The granting of the writ was in the discretion of the court below If it was improvidently granted, it might have been quashed, upon motion, and this power has been exercised after a return made and argument upon the merits. ( People v. Supervisors of Allegany, 15 Wend., 198 ; People v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 Hill, 9 ; Ex parte Weston, 11 Mass., 417 .) No application was made in the court below to quash or supersede the writ, but the judgment passed upon the questions raised by the return. | 1 | 1873–1873 |
People ex rel. Church v. Supervisors of Allegany
green
1 sentence1873The granting of the writ was in the discretion of the court below If it was improvidently granted, it might have been quashed, upon motion, and this power has been exercised after a return made and argument upon the merits. ( People v. Supervisors of Allegany, 15 Wend., 198 ; People v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 Hill, 9 ; Ex parte Weston, 11 Mass., 417 .) No application was made in the court below to quash or supersede the writ, but the judgment passed upon the questions raised by the return. | 1 | 1873–1873 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.