controversy requirement in Michigan

2018An issue becomes “moot if this Court’s ruling ‘cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy,’ ” Thomas M Cooley Law Sch v Doe 1, 300 Mich App 245, 254 ; 833 NW2d 331 (2013) (citation omitted), or “when a subsequent event renders it impossible for the appellate court to fashion a remedy,” Kieta v Thomas M.

2018An issue becomes “moot if this Court’s ruling ‘cannot for any reason have a practical legal effect on the existing controversy,’ ” Thomas M Cooley Law Sch v Doe 1, 300 Mich App 245, 254 ; 833 NW2d 331 (2013) (citation omitted), or “when a subsequent event renders it impossible for the appellate court to fashion a remedy,” Kieta v Thomas M.

2007The actual controversy requirement of MCR 2.605 “requires that the Court not decide moot questions in the guise of giving declaratory relief,” Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich 380, 470 ; 455 NW2d 1 (1990) (opinion by BOYLE, J.), because moot cases “present[] only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights,” BP 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359 ; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

2007The actual controversy requirement of MCR 2.605 “requires that the Court not decide moot questions in the guise of giving declaratory relief,” Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich 380, 470 ; 455 NW2d 1 (1990) (opinion by BOYLE, J.), because moot cases “present[] only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights,” BP 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359 ; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

2007The actual controversy requirement of MCR 2.605 “requires that the Court not decide moot questions in the guise of giving declaratory relief,” Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich 380, 470 ; 455 NW2d 1 (1990) (opinion by BOYLE, J.), because moot cases “present[] only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights,” BP 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359 ; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

2007The actual controversy requirement of MCR 2.605 “requires that the Court not decide moot questions in the guise of giving declaratory relief,” Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich 380, 470 ; 455 NW2d 1 (1990) (opinion by BOYLE, J.), because moot cases “present[] only abstract questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights,” BP 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359 ; 586 NW2d 117 (1998).

1937Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (3 Sup. Ct. 363), as well as other cases cited by counsel, and they are not at all controlling in the controversy at bar.

1932Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (3 Sup. Ct. 363), as well as other cases cited by counsel, and they are not at all controlling in the controversy at bar.

2005To have standing: “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be ‘fairly... trace [able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not.. . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be

2005To have standing: “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be ‘fairly... trace [able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not.. . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be

1994Importantly, the requirement has been recognized by this Court as "prevent [.ing] a court from deciding hypothetical issues. ” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 589 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).

1994Importantly, the requirement has been recognized by this Court as "prevent [.ing] a court from deciding hypothetical issues. ” Shavers v Attorney General, 402 Mich 554, 589 ; 267 NW2d 72 (1978).

1972Salmanovitz v. Dexter-Davison Markets, Inc. (1969), 17 Mich App 390 , is another decision holding to the same effect and one we find essentially identical to the controversy at bar.

1972Salmanovitz v. Dexter-Davison Markets, Inc. (1969), 17 Mich App 390 , is another decision holding to the same effect and one we find essentially identical to the controversy at bar.

1963We think that the decision of this Court in Township of Royal Oak v. City of Huntington Woods, 313 Mich 137 , indicates the procedure that should he observed with reference to the controversy at bar.

1962It is plain that any distinction or definition which would exclude such a covenant from the classification of the covenants which `touch' or `concern' the land would be based on form and not on substance." An interesting case presenting a situation analogous in some respects to that in the controversy at bar is Stephens Company v. Lisk, 240 NC 289 ( 82 SE2d 99 ).

1962It is plain that any distinction or definition which would exclude such a covenant from the classification of covenants which ‘touch’ or ‘concern’ the land would be based on form and not on substance.” An interesting case presenting a situation analogous in some respects to that in the controversy at bar is Stephens Company v. Lisk, 240 NC 289 ( 82 SE2d 99 ).

1956Atkinson v. United States Operating Co., 129 Minn 232 ( 152 NW 410 , LRA1916E, 241), cited by plaintiff as authority for its contention that Beatty’s discussion, as an officer of the corporations, with plaintiff’s attorney of the controversy at bar and negotiating with respect thereto amounted to a presence and doing business in the State by the corporations, holds, at most, that, to have that effect, the officer of the corporation must have come into the State for that purpose.

1954In Miller v. General Motors Corp., 279 Mich 240 , it was held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in directing the filing of an answer not limited to , mere denials.