casual and brief inquiry in Indiana

2016He admits that Officer Helmer did not need reasonable suspicion to stop him initially because it was a consensual conversation in a public place, see State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (stating that a consensual encounter in which a police officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen that does not involve an arrest or stop does not implicate the Fourth Amendment), but he contends that when he decided to end his initial conversation with Officer Helmer by leaving the pat down, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him from leaving.

2016He admits that Officer Helmer did not need reasonable suspicion to stop him initially because it was a consensual conversation in a public ■ place, see State v. Calmes, 894 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ind.Ct.App.2008) (stating that, a consensual encounter in which a police officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen that does not involve an arrest or stop does not implicate the Fourth Amendment), but he contends that when he decided to end his initial conversation with Officer Helmer by leaving the pat down, the officer .did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him from leaving.

2012We agree with the State that there was no requirement for reasonable suspicion for the police to approach Woodson and his companion because, at least initially, the encounter was simply “a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen, which involves neither an arrest nor a stop.” See Powell, 912 N.E.2d at 859 .

2012We agree with the State that there was no requirement for reasonable suspicion for the police to approach Woodson and his companion because, at least initially, the encounter was simply “a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen, which involves neither an arrest nor a stop.” See Powell, 912 N.E.2d at 859 .

2018Rather than arguing Officer Blackburn had reasonable suspicion to detain Woolston, however, the State argues that if this Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1091 | December 31, 2018 Page 7 of 21 court were to find the stop had concluded, the subsequent conversation between Officer Blackburn and Woolston was consensual. [12] “A consensual encounter that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment occurs when an officer approaches an individual to make a casual and brief inquiry and the individual remains free to leave.” Woodson v. State, 960 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012

2016Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1511-CR-2036 | August 24, 2016 Page 4 of 14 [9] An encounter between an officer and a private citizen is consensual when the officer limits his approach to “a casual and brief inquiry and the individual remains free to leave.” Woodson v. State, 960 N.E.2d 224, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

2018Id.

2018Id.

2018To determine whether a consensual encounter occurred, we ask whether a reasonable person would have believed he or she could disregard the police and “go about his or her business.” Rutledge v. State, 28 N.E.3d 281, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

2016The test for whether an individual remains free to leave is “what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizens’ shoes.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). [10] Here, two armed and uniformed officers approached and questioned Pinner, who was sitting alone in a theatre lobby.3 They did not make small talk or pass the time of day with him.

2016The test for whether an individual remains free to leave is “what a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he been in the citizens’ shoes.” Crabtree v. State, 762 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). [10] Here, two armed and uniformed officers approached and questioned Pinner, who was sitting alone in a theatre lobby. 3 They did not make small talk or pass the time- of day with him.-- The officers approached Pinner with an official purpose and asked questions for which the answers could have criminal implications.

2007In essence there is no "seizure" within the meaning of the Indiana Constitution "[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; Johnson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that police intrusion cannot withstand scrutiny under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when an individual no longer remains free to leave the officer's presence and there is no indication of reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity afoot); see also Brendlin v. California, ___

2007In essence there is no “seizure” within the meaning of the Indiana Constitution “[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; Johnson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that police intrusion cannot withstand scrutiny under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when an individual no longer remains free to leave the officer’s presence and there is no indication of reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity afoot); see also Brendlin v. California, — U

2007Id. (some citations omitted). “[T]o pass constitutional muster, reasonable suspicion must be comprised of more than an officer’s general ‘hunches’ or unparticularized suspicions.” Stalling v. State, 713 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). “[T]he third level of investigation occurs when a law enforcement officer makes a casual and brief inquiry of a citizen which involves neither an arrest nor a stop.

2007In essence there is no “seizure” within the meaning of the Indiana Constitution “[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; Johnson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that police intrusion cannot withstand scrutiny under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when an individual no longer remains free to leave the officer’s presence and there is no indication of reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity afoot); see also Brendlin v. California, — U

2007In essence there is no “seizure” within the meaning of the Indiana Constitution “[a]s long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ; Johnson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (concluding that police intrusion cannot withstand scrutiny under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution when an individual no longer remains free to leave the officer’s presence and there is no indication of reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity afoot); see also Brendlin v. California, — U

2006Id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 484 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.").

2006Id.; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 484 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991) ("[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.").