automatic standing rule in Massachusetts

2021See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. at 601 ("we hold today that the automatic standing rule survives in Massachusetts as a matter of State constitutional law").

2016In Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990), we held that art. 14 incorporates the doctrine of automatic standing, even though the United States Supreme Court had previously abandoned the doctrine.

2010While in Commonwealth v. Carter, supra at 412 , we concluded that the defendant, who was charged with possession of cocaine found on a porch, could not challenge the constitutionality of the search of the porch because the defendant had been there only in an attempt to avoid apprehension and had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the porch, our holding reflects an exception to the automatic standing rule in circumstances where the defendant was unlawfully on the property searched and where it would be inappropriate to grant him standing to challenge a search of the property.

2001The automatic standing rule, however, “does not relieve a defendant who unlawfully intruded on someone else’s reasonable expectation of privacy from establishing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy himself.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 424 Mass. 409, 412 (1997).

2010Finally, we reiterate that, in Commonwealth v. Amendola, supra at 600 , we chose to adopt the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), even though the United States Supreme Court abandoned the rule in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980), in part because we believed it unfair to place the defendant in the difficult position at the motion to suppress hearing of needing to explain his relationship to the place searched in order to establish his standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search, when that incriminating information may be used to imp

2009The automatic standing rule in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), was abandoned twenty years later in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).

2012The Commonwealth argues, however, that defendant cannot avail himself of the automatic standing rule because he had no right to be in the apartment with a firearm, citing Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 326-27 (2011), and Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 393 n.8.

2012In Mubdi , the Court explained that there is an exception to the automatic standing rule that applies “in circumstances where the defendant was unlawfully on the property searched and where it would be inappropriate to grant him standing to challenge a search of the property.” 456 Mass. at 398 n.8.

2000See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. at 601 & n.4; Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 243-244 (1991); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238 , 240 n.5 (1992); Commonwealth v. Carter, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 441-442 (1995), S.C., 424 Mass. 409 (1997).

1997See Commonwealth v. Carter, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 439 , 440-441 & nn. 3 & 4 (1995). he Supreme Court abandoned the automatic standing rule in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).

2021The automatic standing rule, set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), provides that "defendants charged with crimes of possession have standing to challenge the search."6 Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 5 We glean this from the motion judge's detailed memorandum of decision denying the motion to suppress.

2012In Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. 592, 601 (1990), the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the automatic standing rule of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), as a matter of state constitutional law under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.

2009In its argument on appeal with respect to automatic standing, the Commonwealth relies primarily on Commonwealth v. Mora, 402 Mass. 262 (1988), which is a pre-Amendola case.

1990See Commonwealth v. Mora, 402 Mass. 262, 266-267 (1988) (automatic standing rule not applicable to facts of the case); Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233 , 240 n.13 (1983) (outcome of expectation of privacy analysis makes decision whether to adopt automatic standing unnecessary); Commonwealth v. Podgurski, 386 Mass. 385 , 391 n.11 (1982) (same).

2000See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. at 601 & n.4; Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 243-244 (1991); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238 , 240 n.5 (1992); Commonwealth v. Carter, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 441-442 (1995), S.C., 424 Mass. 409 (1997).

1993The Frazier case notes that in Commonwealth v. Arriendala the Supreme Judicial Court adopted the automatic standing rule of Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257 (1960), for searches of automobiles and houses, but left “to a case-by-case analysis the question of whether the rule should be extended to other circumstances where possession crimes are an issue.” Frazier, supra at 243 .

2012The Commonwealth argues, however, that defendant cannot avail himself of the automatic standing rule because he had no right to be in the apartment with a firearm, citing Commonwealth v. Lawson, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 326-27 (2011), and Mubdi, 456 Mass. at 393 n.8.

2009See also Commonwealth v. Midi, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 591, 593 (1999) (defendant had standing to contest search and seizure of firearm where possession of firearm was essential element of crime).

2000See Commonwealth v. Amendola, 406 Mass. at 601 & n.4; Commonwealth v. Frazier, 410 Mass. 235, 243-244 (1991); Commonwealth v. Montanez, 410 Mass. 290, 301 (1991); Commonwealth v. Santaliz, 413 Mass. 238 , 240 n.5 (1992); Commonwealth v. Carter, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 441-442 (1995), S.C., 424 Mass. 409 (1997).

2000See note 4, supra. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts rule, which allows a defendant to challenge the unlawful search of another’s person or premises, would not assist Celestino even if asserted, because “the central premise of the automatic standing rule . . . [is] that the crime for which the defendant is convicted must have as an essential element of guilt, possession (either actual or constructive) at the time of the contested [police conduct].” Commonwealth v. Garcia, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 386, 390 (1993).

1990See State v. Owen, 453 So. 2d 1202 (La. 1984); People v. Chernowas, 111 Mich. App. 1 (1981); State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46 (1983); State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479 (1987); State v. Simpson, supra. The Supreme Courts of New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont have all discarded expectation-of-privacy analysis in standing determinations.

1990See State v. Owen, 453 So.2d 1202 (La. 1984); People v. Chernowas, 111 Mich. App. 1 (1981); State v. Settle, 122 N.H. 214 (1982); State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211 (1981); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46 (1983); State v. Wood, 148 Vt. 479 (1987); State v. Simpson, supra .

1990In Commonwealth v. Manning, 406 Mass. 425, 429 (1990), we discussed the theory of “target standing” whereby an individual would gain standing to challenge the search of another, not to protect any reasonable expectation of privacy, but to deter police misconduct.

1990In Commonwealth v. Manning, 406 Mass. 425, 429 (1990), we discussed the theory of "target standing" whereby an individual would gain standing to challenge the search of another, not to protect any reasonable expectation of privacy, but to deter police misconduct.

1988See Commonwealth v. Varney, 391 Mass. 34 , 38 n.3 (1984); Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233 , 240 n.13 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 172 (1982); Podgurski, supra at 391 .

1988See Commonwealth v. Varney, 391 Mass. 34 , 38 n.3 (1984); Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233 , 240 n.13 (1983); Commonwealth v. Hason, 387 Mass. 169, 172 (1982); Podgurski, supra at 391 .