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25 Massachusetts opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Weaver v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002Section 4 of Chapter 258 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose . . .” Section 1 defines the term “executive officer of a public employer” as “[ 1] the secretary of an executive office of the Commonwealth, or (2) in the case of an agency not within the executive office, the attorney general...” Presentment o 2002Section 4 of Chapter 258 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose . . .” Section 1 defines the term “executive officer of a public employer” as “[ 1] the secretary of an executive office of the Commonwealth, or (2) in the case of an agency not within the executive office, the attorney general...” Presentment o | 8 | 9 |
Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Districtgreen2 sentences2015The purpose of the presentment requirement is to “ensure[ ] that the responsible public official receives *1011 notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 (1985). 2000L. c. 258, § 4, that “[a] civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose.” The purpose of presentment under the Tort Claims Act is to “ensure[] that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so [the] official can investigate to determine whether . . . [the] claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle v | 8 | 8 |
McGrath v. STANLEY CARVERgreen2 sentences2009McGrath v. Stanely, 397 Mass. 775, 781 (1986); Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 287 (1985). 2000McGrath v. Stanley, 397 Mass. 775, 779 (1985), citing Note, Notice of Claim Provisions: An Equal Protection Perspective, 60 Conn. L. | 3 | 3 |
Berube v. City of Northamptongreen2 sentences1994Accord Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 637 (1992). 1994Accord Berube v. Northampton, 413 Mass. 635, 637 (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Pruner v. CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT IN COUNTY OF NORFOLKgreen2 sentences1987Pruner v. Clerk of the Superior Court in the County of Norfolk, 382 Mass. 309, 315-316 (1981). 1984See Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47-48 (1982) (notice not sent to official designated by statute until after two-year limitation period had run); Pruner v. Clerk of the Superior Ct., 382 Mass. 309, 316 (1981) (unexplained failure to comply with § 4). | 2 | 2 |
Gilmore v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2015The purpose of the presentment requirement is to “ensure[ ] that the responsible public official receives *1011 notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718 (1994), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 (1985). 1997Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 284 (1985).” Gilmore v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 718, 721 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
Richardson v. Daileygreen1 sentence2015Its purpose is to “ensure[] that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that the official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Richardson v. Dailey, 424 Mass. 258, 261 (1997), quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass. App. Ct. 277, 283 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Shapiro v. City of Worcestergreen1 sentence2015L. c. 258, § 4, “[a] civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages [under the act] unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer . . . .” “This strict presentment requirement is a statutory prerequisite for recovery under the [a]ct.” Shapiro v. Worcester, 464 Mass. 261, 267 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Harry Stoller & Co. v. City of Lowellgreen1 sentence2013Harry Stoller & Co. v. Lowell, 412 Mass. 139, 141 (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Spring v. Geriatric Authority of Holyokegreen1 sentence2009McGrath v. Stanely, 397 Mass. 775, 781 (1986); Spring v. Geriatric Auth. of Holyoke, 394 Mass. 274, 287 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol Countygreen1 sentence2005L. c. 258, § 4, inserted by St. 1978, c. 512, § 15, provides, “A civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose, and such claim shall have been finally denied by such executive officer in writing and sent by certified or registered mail, or as otherwise provided by this section.” Compare Baptiste v. Sheriff of Bristol County, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 119, 127 ( | 1 | 1 |
Brum v. Town of Dartmouthgreen1 sentence2001See id. | 1 | 1 |
Tambolleo v. Town of West Boylstongreen1 sentence2000Tambolleo v. Town of West Boylston, 34 Mass.App.Ct. 526, 533 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Laubinger v. Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence1998See Laubinger v. Department of Revenue, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 598, 601-02 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
Wightman v. Town of Methuengreen2 sentences1996General Laws c. 258, §4, provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant shall have first presented his claim in writing to the executive officer of such public employer within two years after the date upon which the cause of action arose . . .” Presentment must be made “in strict compliance with the statute.” Wightman v. Methuen, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 279, 281 (1988), quoting Weaver v. Commonwealth, 387 Mass. 43, 47 (1982). 1996“Presentment ensures that the responsible public official receives notice of the claim so that that official can investigate to determine whether or not a claim is valid, preclude payment of inflated or nonmeritorious claims, settle valid claims expeditiously, and take steps to ensure that similar claims will not be brought in the future.” Wightman v. Methuen, supra at 281, quoting Lodge v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 21 Mass.App.Ct. 277, 283 (1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vasys v. Metropolitan District Commission
green
2 sentences1990Vasys, supra at 57 . 4 The motion also stated, as an additional ground, that counts three and four should be dismissed because they sought punitive damages against the town. 5 General Laws c. 258, § 4, “provides that a civil action shall not be instituted against a public employer on a claim for damages under this chapter unless the claimant first presents the claim in writing to the executive officer of the public employer within two years after the date on which the cause of action arose. 1984Commn., 387 Mass. 51 (1982). 2 Judgment was entered pursuant to Mass.R.Civ.P. 54(b), 365 Mass. 821 (1974), thus making the action immediately appealable. 3 In full, G. | 2 | 1984–1990 |
DeRoche v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination
green
1 sentence2022The City argues that Brown repudiated the Court’s analysis in DeRoche v. Massachusetts Comm’n Against Discrimination, 447 Mass. 1 (2006), which held that prejudgment interest could be applied to a back pay award by the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination under G.L. c. 151B, § 5. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Brown v. Office of the Commissioner of Probation
green
1 sentence2022In Brown v. Office of Commissioner of Probation, 475 Mass. 675 (2016), the Court held that sovereign immunity bars post-judgment interest from running on an award of punitive damages, costs and attorneys fees against a public employer for violation of G.L. c. 151B. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hernandez v. City of Boston
green
1 sentence1986No civil action shall be brought more than three years after the date upon which such cause of action accrued.” 4 The full text of the judge’s order is: “After argument and briefing, it appears to the Court that the principle which rules out tolling of the statutory [period] (M.G.L.A. c. 258, § 4), George v. Saugus, 394 Mass. 40 (1985); Hernandez v. Boston, 394 Mass. 45 (1985); and Fearon v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 50 (1985), does not apply to an incompetent, and that the Motion ought therefore to be Denied. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
George v. Town of Saugus
green
1 sentence1986No civil action shall be brought more than three years after the date upon which such cause of action accrued.” 4 The full text of the judge’s order is: “After argument and briefing, it appears to the Court that the principle which rules out tolling of the statutory [period] (M.G.L.A. c. 258, § 4), George v. Saugus, 394 Mass. 40 (1985); Hernandez v. Boston, 394 Mass. 45 (1985); and Fearon v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 50 (1985), does not apply to an incompetent, and that the Motion ought therefore to be Denied. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Fearon v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1986No civil action shall be brought more than three years after the date upon which such cause of action accrued.” 4 The full text of the judge’s order is: “After argument and briefing, it appears to the Court that the principle which rules out tolling of the statutory [period] (M.G.L.A. c. 258, § 4), George v. Saugus, 394 Mass. 40 (1985); Hernandez v. Boston, 394 Mass. 45 (1985); and Fearon v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 50 (1985), does not apply to an incompetent, and that the Motion ought therefore to be Denied. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.