fundamental-constitutional-rights violation in Mississippi

2020Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Stovall v. State, 873 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (¶7) (Miss.

2015“To find an exception to the successive-writ bar, ‘there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim’ of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Id. (quoting Stovall v. State, 873 So.2d 1056, 1058 (¶7) (Miss.Ct.App.2004)).

2022As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Fluker v. State, 170 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶11) (Miss. 2015), “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” “[T]here must at least appear to be some basis 10 for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols v. State, 265 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶10) (Miss.

2020However, “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars[,] . . . there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols, 265 So. 3d at 1241 (¶10) (citation omitted).

2021Further, “there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Evans v. State, 115 So. 3d 879, 881 (¶3) (Miss.

2021Rather, “there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Hays v. State, 282 So. 3d 714 , 719 (¶17) (Miss.

2020See Mays v. State, 228 So. 3d 946, 948 (¶5) (Miss.

2018Furthermore, "to find an exception to the successive-writ bar, 'there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim' a fundamental constitutional rights violation." Mays v. State , 228 So.3d 946 , 948 (¶ 5) (Miss.

2022Ct. App. 2020). “[T]o survive the UPCCRA’s procedural bars, there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845, 853 (¶21) (Miss.

2021Although misinformation could be the basis of an ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claim, “there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Moore v. State, 248 So. 3d 845, 853 (¶21) (Miss.

2017Ct. App. 2008) (noting that since affidavits were “hearsay and contained no first[]hand knowledge of any fact,” they “carried no weight”). ¶21. “[T]o survive the UPCCRA’s procedural bars, ‘there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim’ of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Ducksworth v. State, 134 So. 3d 792, 795 (¶5) (Miss.

2017Ct. App. 2008) (noting that since affidavits were "hearsay and contained no first[ ]hand knowledge of any fact," they "carried no weight"). ¶ 21. "[T]o survive the UPCCRA's procedural bars, 'there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim' of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation." Ducksworth v. State , 134 So.3d 792 , 795 (¶ 5) (Miss.

2020Figueroa, as the PCR movant, “bears the burden of demonstrating that he has met an exception.” McComb v. State, 135 So. 3d 928, 932 (¶13) (Miss.

2020Harris, as the PCR movant, “bears the burden of demonstrating that he has met an exception.” McComb, 135 So. 3d at 932 (¶13). ¶19.

2022As the Mississippi Supreme Court recognized in Fluker v. State, 170 So. 3d 471, 475 (¶11) (Miss. 2015), “merely asserting a constitutional-right violation is insufficient to overcome the procedural bars.” “[T]here must at least appear to be some basis 10 for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Nichols v. State, 265 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶10) (Miss.

2021Rather, “there must at least appear to be some basis for the truth of the claim of a fundamental-constitutional-rights violation.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted); see also Hays v. State, 282 So. 3d 714 , 719 (¶17) (Miss.

2020Ivy v. State, 731 So. 2d 601, 602 (¶4) (Miss. 1999) (“[P]etitions alleging an illegal sentence are not subject to the time bar”); Hayes v. State, No. 2018-CP-00152-COA, 2019 WL 5884526 , at *3 (¶13) (Miss.

2017See Jones v. State, 174 So.3d 902, 907 (¶ 12) (Miss.

2016But for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to be excepted from the time-bar under the fundamental constitutional rights exception, it must concern either: “(1) the right against double jeopardy; (2) the right to be free from an illegal sentence; (3) the right to due process at sentencing; [or] (4) the right not to be subject to ex post facto laws.” Salter v. State, 184 So.3d 944, 950 (¶ 22) (Miss.Ct.App.2015).