prima facie tort claim in New Mexico

2018A judge must also engage in this comparison process to make certain that the plaintiff's prima facie tort claim is not being "used to evade stringent requirements of other established doctrines of law." Schmitz , 1990-NMSC-002 , ¶ 63, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 .

2018A judge must also engage in this comparison process to make certain that the plaintiff's prima facie tort claim is not being "used to evade stringent requirements of other established doctrines of law." Schmitz , 1990-NMSC-002 , ¶ 63, 109 N.M. 386 , 785 P.2d 726 .

1999And viewing the complaint broadly, we agree that it can be interpreted to encompass a claim for prima facie tort; Tarin did allege that Tinley’s actions in cutting off the utilities “were actuated by malice and with the purpose of injuring [Tarin].” See Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 394 , 785 P.2d 726, 734 (1990); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 120 N.M. 343, 348-51 , 901 P.2d 761, 766-69 (Ct.App.1995) (discussing the elements of a prima facie tort claim).

1999And viewing the complaint broadly, we agree that it can be interpreted to encompass a claim for prima facie tort; Tarin did allege that Tinley’s actions in cutting off the utilities “were actuated by malice and with the purpose of injuring [Tarin].” See Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 394 , 785 P.2d 726, 734 (1990); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 120 N.M. 343, 348-51 , 901 P.2d 761, 766-69 (Ct.App.1995) (discussing the elements of a prima facie tort claim).

2018In Andrews v. Stallings , the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' prima facie tort claim because permitting the claim would have allowed the plaintiffs "to circumvent the established defenses to defamation." 1995-NMCA-015 , ¶ 64, 119 N.M. 478 , 892 P.2d 611 ; see also Stock v. Grantham , 1998-NMCA-081 , ¶¶ 38-39, 125 N.M. 564 , 964 P.2d 125 (upholding the dismissal of prima facie tort because "[t]he only function of the claim of prima facie tort in [plaintiff's] complaint is to escape possible restrictions imposed on the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distres

2018In Andrews v. Stallings , the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' prima facie tort claim because permitting the claim would have allowed the plaintiffs "to circumvent the established defenses to defamation." 1995-NMCA-015 , ¶ 64, 119 N.M. 478 , 892 P.2d 611 ; see also Stock v. Grantham , 1998-NMCA-081 , ¶¶ 38-39, 125 N.M. 564 , 964 P.2d 125 (upholding the dismissal of prima facie tort because "[t]he only function of the claim of prima facie tort in [plaintiff's] complaint is to escape possible restrictions imposed on the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distres

2016Mar. 22, 2011) 8 (mem.), which states that “a plaintiff cannot simply base [a prima facie tort] claim on 9 the same allegations that support his other claims” and that “the prima facie tort cause 10 of action is useful only when there are factual allegations that are somehow unique, 11 that do not give rise to another tort or contracts claim, but that demand redress.” They 12 also rely on Healthsource, Inc., 2005-NMCA-097, ¶ 36 , that affirmed a district 13 court’s dismissal of a prima facie tort claim when the plaintiff did “not assert any 14 separate factual basis to support its prima facie

2005Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 394 , 785 P.2d 726, 734 (1990). {35} In Hill v. Cray Research, 864 F. Supp. 1070, 1080 (D.N.M. 1991), the court dismissed the plaintiff's prima facie tort claim because the court determined that a claim for prima facie tort should not lie when the pleaded factual basis is within the scope of an established tort.

2018In Andrews v. Stallings , the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' prima facie tort claim because permitting the claim would have allowed the plaintiffs "to circumvent the established defenses to defamation." 1995-NMCA-015 , ¶ 64, 119 N.M. 478 , 892 P.2d 611 ; see also Stock v. Grantham , 1998-NMCA-081 , ¶¶ 38-39, 125 N.M. 564 , 964 P.2d 125 (upholding the dismissal of prima facie tort because "[t]he only function of the claim of prima facie tort in [plaintiff's] complaint is to escape possible restrictions imposed on the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distres

2018In Andrews v. Stallings , the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' prima facie tort claim because permitting the claim would have allowed the plaintiffs "to circumvent the established defenses to defamation." 1995-NMCA-015 , ¶ 64, 119 N.M. 478 , 892 P.2d 611 ; see also Stock v. Grantham , 1998-NMCA-081 , ¶¶ 38-39, 125 N.M. 564 , 964 P.2d 125 (upholding the dismissal of prima facie tort because "[t]he only function of the claim of prima facie tort in [plaintiff's] complaint is to escape possible restrictions imposed on the torts of intentional infliction of emotional distres

2018Id.

2016Instead, Healthsource was elaborating on a rule found in many New 17 Mexico cases addressing prima facie tort—that “a prima facie tort claim may not be 18 used as a means of avoiding the more stringent requirements of other torts.” Id. ¶ 35; 19 see Stock, 1998-NMCA-081, ¶ 38 (“Prima facie tort should not be used to evade 20 stringent requirements of other established doctrines of law.” (alteration, internal 40 1 quotation marks, and citation omitted)); see also Ribble, 2003-NMCA-093 , ¶ 11 2 (same); Hagebak, 2003-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 24, 27, 29 (same).

2016See, 17 e.g., Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., 2005-NMCA-097, ¶ 35 , 138 N.M. 18 70, 116 P.3d 861 (stating that “prima facie tort should not lie when the pleaded 19 factual basis is within the scope of an established tort” and affirming the rationale that 11 1 “a prima facie tort claim may not be used as a means of avoiding the more stringent 2 requirements of other torts”); Bogle v. Summit Inv.

2016See, 17 e.g., Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., 2005-NMCA-097, ¶ 35 , 138 N.M. 18 70, 116 P.3d 861 (stating that “prima facie tort should not lie when the pleaded 19 factual basis is within the scope of an established tort” and affirming the rationale that 11 1 “a prima facie tort claim may not be used as a means of avoiding the more stringent 2 requirements of other torts”); Bogle v. Summit Inv.

2016See 3 Carreon, 2011 WL 9686895 , at *13 (stating that if there was no breach of contract, 4 the defendant’s “legal position was justified and cannot be the basis of a claim for 5 prima facie tort”); see also Jackson, 1996 WL 500666, at *5 (affirming dismissal of 6 a prima facie tort claim where the defendant “was justified in withholding consent 7 . . . because it had an absolute right to choose the individuals with whom it wished 8 to have contractual relations”). 9 {45} And as to the unique factual allegations requirement, Defendants reiterate that 10 a plaintiff cannot simply base a prima f

2016Co. v. 3 Federal Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921), penned to mark the liability distinction 4 between actions of right that cause harm and actions undertaken solely to cause harm. 5 That notion is evident in Aikens itself, when Holmes addressed the unique state of 6 mind that exists when harm is inflicted “for the sake of the harm as an end in itself, 7 and not merely as a means to some further end legitimately desired.” Aikens, 195 U.S. 8 at 203; see also Marcella v. ARP Films, Inc., 778 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1985) 9 (“[W]hen there are other motives, such as profit, self-interest, or business

2016Custom Grading, Inc. 8 v. Great American Insurance Co., 952 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1269-70 (D.N.M. 2013) 9 (mem.), in which the court dismissed the plaintiff’s prima facie tort claim because 10 “New Mexico law adheres to the economic-loss doctrine,” which “prevents plaintiffs 11 from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement flows only from 12 a contract[.]” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Defendants argue that, 13 by permitting Plaintiff to proceed with his prima facie tort claim, the district court 14 erred in allowing Plaintiff’s claim “to evade both (i) his

2016Co. v. 3 Federal Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921), penned to mark the liability distinction 4 between actions of right that cause harm and actions undertaken solely to cause harm. 5 That notion is evident in Aikens itself, when Holmes addressed the unique state of 6 mind that exists when harm is inflicted “for the sake of the harm as an end in itself, 7 and not merely as a means to some further end legitimately desired.” Aikens, 195 U.S. 8 at 203; see also Marcella v. ARP Films, Inc., 778 F.2d 112, 119 (2d Cir. 1985) 9 (“[W]hen there are other motives, such as profit, self-interest, or business

2016Defendants rely on Dake v. Tuell, 687 9 S.W.2d 191 , 192 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), which held that discharged at-will employees 10 cannot sue for wrongful discharge by “cloaking their claims in the misty shroud of 11 prima facie tort.” Defendants also rely on Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 12 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983), which held that the prima facie tort doctrine cannot 13 be used to circumvent the at-will employment doctrine. 14 {30} Defendants attempt to attach to this argument line a logical progression from 15 Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082 , ¶ 17, 102 N.M. 682 , 699 P.2d 613 , r

2016Instead, Healthsource was elaborating on a rule found in many New 17 Mexico cases addressing prima facie tort—that “a prima facie tort claim may not be 18 used as a means of avoiding the more stringent requirements of other torts.” Id. ¶ 35; 19 see Stock, 1998-NMCA-081, ¶ 38 (“Prima facie tort should not be used to evade 20 stringent requirements of other established doctrines of law.” (alteration, internal 40 1 quotation marks, and citation omitted)); see also Ribble, 2003-NMCA-093 , ¶ 11 2 (same); Hagebak, 2003-NMCA-007, ¶¶ 24, 27, 29 (same).

2016Although pleading 3 identical facts may indicate that a claim is improperly duplicative, as in Healthsource, 4 2005-NMCA-097, ¶ 36 , this Court has also “been willing to recognize a prima facie 5 tort claim, even though the conduct in question bore a resemblance to another cause 6 of action.” Hagebak, 2003-NMCA-007, ¶ 27 . 7 {50} In the present case, although Plaintiff’s prima facie tort claim bore a 8 resemblance to his other claims in that virtually all of the claims in his complaint 9 were based on the same set of facts, Plaintiff’s prima facie tort claim, as it turned out, 10 was not used

2016Defendants rely on Dake v. Tuell, 687 9 S.W.2d 191 , 192 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), which held that discharged at-will employees 10 cannot sue for wrongful discharge by “cloaking their claims in the misty shroud of 11 prima facie tort.” Defendants also rely on Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 12 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983), which held that the prima facie tort doctrine cannot 13 be used to circumvent the at-will employment doctrine. 14 {30} Defendants attempt to attach to this argument line a logical progression from 15 Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082 , ¶ 17, 102 N.M. 682 , 699 P.2d 613 , r

2016Co., 2005-NMCA-024, ¶¶ 21-24 , 3 137 N.M. 80 , 107 P.3d 520 (reversing a prima facie tort judgment because, although 4 the plaintiff was unable to establish a claim under intentional interference with 5 contract, intentional interference with contract was the appropriate claim to bring, and 6 thus “existing causes of action provided reasonable avenues to a remedy for the 7 asserted wrongful conduct”); Ribble, 2003-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 11-12 (recognizing the 8 requirement that “prima facie tort should not be used to evade stringent requirements 9 of other established doctrines of law[,]” but determinin

2016Co., 2005-NMCA-024, ¶¶ 21-24 , 3 137 N.M. 80 , 107 P.3d 520 (reversing a prima facie tort judgment because, although 4 the plaintiff was unable to establish a claim under intentional interference with 5 contract, intentional interference with contract was the appropriate claim to bring, and 6 thus “existing causes of action provided reasonable avenues to a remedy for the 7 asserted wrongful conduct”); Ribble, 2003-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 11-12 (recognizing the 8 requirement that “prima facie tort should not be used to evade stringent requirements 9 of other established doctrines of law[,]” but determinin

2009See id. at 396 , 785 P.2d at 736 ; Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 2005-NMCA-097 , ¶¶ 35-37, 138 N.M. 70 , 116 P.3d 861 . {34} In Aetna Finance Co. v. Gaither, 118 N.M. 246, 249 , 880 P.2d 857, 860 (1994), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court refusal to submit a claim of prima facie tort to the jury.

2009See id. at 396 , 785 P.2d at 736 ; Healthsource, Inc. v. X-Ray Assocs. of N.M., P.C., 2005-NMCA-097 , ¶¶ 35-37, 138 N.M. 70 , 116 P.3d 861 . {34} In Aetna Finance Co. v. Gaither, 118 N.M. 246, 249 , 880 P.2d 857, 860 (1994), our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court refusal to submit a claim of prima facie tort to the jury.

1999See generally Kitchell, 1998-NMSC-051, ¶ 15 , 126 N.M. 525 , 972 P.2d 344 (stating that prima facie tort is a limited remedy); Lexington, 1997-NMSC-043, ¶ 11 , 123 N.M. 774 , 945 P.2d 992 (emphasizing the importance of limiting the cause of action); Silverman, 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 35 , 125 N.M. 500 , 964 P.2d 61 (articulating the elements necessary for a prima facie tort claim); Beavers, 120 N.M. at 348 , 901 P.2d at 766 (noting that not every intentionally caused harm gives rise to a cause of action in prima facie tort).

1999See generally Kitchell, 1998-NMSC-051, ¶ 15 , 126 N.M. 525 , 972 P.2d 344 (stating that prima facie tort is a limited remedy); Lexington, 1997-NMSC-043, ¶ 11 , 123 N.M. 774 , 945 P.2d 992 (emphasizing the importance of limiting the cause of action); Silverman, 1998-NMCA-107, ¶ 35 , 125 N.M. 500 , 964 P.2d 61 (articulating the elements necessary for a prima facie tort claim); Beavers, 120 N.M. at 348 , 901 P.2d at 766 (noting that not every intentionally caused harm gives rise to a cause of action in prima facie tort).