prima facie tort doctrine in Missouri

2018In Restatement terms per Porter , prima facie tort demands not just "harm" (any loss or detriment; compare MAI "damage"), but "injury," which means harm "to a legally protected interest of the plaintiff" and limits recovery "to those cases in which the plaintiff's harm is of such a nature and seriousness that legal redress is appropriate." Comment e; see also Porter , 611 S.W.2d at 271 , describing such "injury" as "necessary" to a prima-facie-tort claim and as restricting liability "to the invasion of a legally protected interest." Do insurance companies have a "legally protected interest" in

1987The elements were originally set out fairly recently in Porter v. Crawford and Company, 611 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.App.1980), which first recognized the existence of the prima facie tort doctrine in Missouri.

2009See Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 193 (employment at will doctrine would not be subverted by cloaking a claim for wrongful discharge under the guise of the prima facie tort doctrine); Hanrahan v. Nashua Corp., 752 S.W.2d 878, 883-84 (Mo.App.

1986In most other cases, the application of the doctrine has been rejected by our appellate courts. 9 This Court has considered the doctrine of prima facie tort only in Dake v. Tuell, 687 S.W.2d 191 (Mo. banc 1985), where the opinion spoke of the “misty shroud of pri-ma facie tort.” We held that, in the absence of a showing of statutory or contract right, an employee cannot maintain an action for wrongful discharge on a prima facie tort theory.

1987Bandag, 662 S.W.2d at 554 .

1987See Bandag, 662 S.W.2d at 551-54 .

2022As such, the prima facie tort doctrine cannot be utilized when a recognized tort is otherwise available.” 951 S.W.2d at 668 .

2000As such, the prima facie tort doctrine cannot be utilized when a recognized tort is otherwise available.” 951 S.W.2d at 668 .

1985The court of appeals recognized that "judicial invasion of management decisions and impingement upon agreed terms of employment emerge, when as here, the prima facie tort doctrine is resorted to by a discharged employee to impose liability against an employer where the employment is terminable at will." 661 S.W.2d at 671 .

1984One more note should be made, with particular reference to Lundberg , in that this court expressed “a legitimate concern has been whether the prima facie tort doctrine would be shaped into a well-defined tort category with clearly etched boundaries or whether it would be an abstraction presaging a cause of action under the facade of a tort for every situation where none previously existed.” Lundberg, 661 S.W.2d at 670 .

2022Nazeri, 860 S.W.2d at 315 (citations omitted).

1995Instead, it is a particular and limited theory of recovery with specific elements, as any other tort.” Id.

2000“This court has also held that a valid business reason for actions taken by a defendant, provides justification sufficient to defeat a prima facie tort claim.” Id.

1990Id. at 833 . 6 Among other things, the courts had made it clear that “a valid business reason” for defendant’s conduct would defeat a prima facie tort claim.

2024LPP Mortg., Ltd. v. Marcin, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 50, 53-54 (Mo. App. W.D. 2007).

2022Id. at 449-50; see also Hertz Corp., 196 S.W.3d at 549 (citing Thomas, and stating “prima facie tort cannot be used when a recognized, nominate tort is otherwise available” and “[t]he doctrine of prima facie tort cannot be utilized to avoid an inability to prove one element of a nominate tort that is otherwise applicable under the facts”).

2015E.D. 2012), or a prima facie tort claim, see Thomas v. Special Olympics Mo., Inc., 31 S.W.3d 442, 449 (Mo.App.W.D. 2000).

2009E.D.1988)(employee did not state a claim for wrongful discharge under the theories of tortious interference with business expectancies and fraud absent valid contract, constitutional provision, statute, or regulation based on statute); Neighbors v. Kirksville Coll, of Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo.App.

2009See Dake, 687 S.W.2d at 193 (employment at will doctrine would not be subverted by cloaking a claim for wrongful discharge under the guise of the prima facie tort doctrine); Hanrahan v. Nashua Corp., 752 S.W.2d 878, 883-84 (Mo.App.

1998A judicial admission “acts as a substitute for evidence and obviates the need to present evidence on the matter.” Fust v. Francois, 913 S.W.2d 38, 46 (Mo.App.

1998A judicial admission "acts as a substitute for evidence and obviates the need to present evidence on the matter." Fust v. Francois, 913 S.W.2d 38, 46 (Mo.App.

1993See ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 383-84 (Mo. banc 1993).

1988Centerre Bank of Kansas City v. Distributors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 42, 54 (Mo.App.1985).

1987Boyer v. Carondelet Savings & Loan Ass’n., 633 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Mo.App.1982).

1987Stegeman v. First Missouri Bank of Gasconade County, 722 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Mo.App.1987).

1987See also, Dowd v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation, 685 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Mo.App.1984).

1985More recently in Feder v. Fortunoff, Inc., 123 Misc.2d 857 , 474 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup.Ct.1984), the court dismissed a prima facie tort claim brought by an individual whose credit card had been repossessed.

1985More recently in Feder v. Fortunoff, Inc., 123 Misc.2d 857 , 474 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup.Ct.1984), the court dismissed a prima facie tort claim brought by an individual whose credit card had been repossessed.