pre-divorce standard in New York

2014Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of whether the defendant is entitled to an award of maintenance, based upon factors including the respective imputed income of the defendant, as recalculated, and the plaintiff, the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the defendant’s needs with the plaintiffs ability to pay (see Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408 [1972]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 88 AD3d 775 [2011]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691 [2009]).

2014Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of whether the defendant is entitled to an award of maintenance, based upon factors including the respective imputed income of the defendant, as recalculated, and the plaintiff, the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the defendant’s needs with the plaintiffs ability to pay (see Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408 [1972]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 88 AD3d 775 [2011]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691 [2009]).

2014Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of whether the defendant is entitled to an award of maintenance, based upon factors including the respective imputed income of the defendant, as recalculated, and the plaintiff, the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the defendant’s needs with the plaintiffs ability to pay (see Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408 [1972]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 88 AD3d 775 [2011]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691 [2009]).

2014Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of whether the defendant is entitled to an award of maintenance, based upon factors including the respective imputed income of the defendant, as recalculated, and the plaintiff, the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the defendant’s needs with the plaintiffs ability to pay (see Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408 [1972]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 88 AD3d 775 [2011]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691 [2009]).

2014Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of whether the defendant is entitled to an award of maintenance, based upon factors including the respective imputed income of the defendant, as recalculated, and the plaintiff, the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the defendant’s needs with the plaintiffs ability to pay (see Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408 [1972]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 88 AD3d 775 [2011]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691 [2009]).

2014Accordingly, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Westchester County, for a determination of whether the defendant is entitled to an award of maintenance, based upon factors including the respective imputed income of the defendant, as recalculated, and the plaintiff, the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living, and the financial resources of each, considered separately, balancing the defendant’s needs with the plaintiffs ability to pay (see Kover v Kover, 29 NY2d 408 [1972]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 88 AD3d 775 [2011]; Litvak v Litvak, 63 AD3d 691 [2009]).

2014It is well settled that the determination of maintenance is within the sound discretion of Supreme Court upon consideration of the relevant factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a) and the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living (see Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 50-51 [1995]; Morrow v Morrow, 19 AD3d 253 [1st Dept 2005]).

2014It is well settled that the determination of maintenance is within the sound discretion of Supreme Court upon consideration of the relevant factors enumerated in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a) and the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living (see Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 50-51 [1995]; Morrow v Morrow, 19 AD3d 253 [1st Dept 2005]).

2012The Supreme Court had before it sufficient evidence regarding, among other things, the length of the marriage, the pre-divorce standard of living of the parties, the age and health of the parties, the present and future earning capacity of the parties, and the ability of the defendant to become self-supporting, for the court to determine the defendant’s request for maintenance (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; Bladt v Bladt, 72 AD3d at 718 ; Raynor v Raynor, 68 AD3d 835, 837 [2009]).

2010While “[t]he amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and every case must be determined on its unique facts” (Xikis v Xikis, 43 AD3d 1040, 1042 [2007]), factoring in, among other things, the disparity in the parties’ financial circumstances, the pre-divorce standard of living, the age and skills of the parties, and the duration of the marriage, we find it appropriate to award her the sum of $750 a month as maintenance for a period of 60 months (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Bladt v Bladt, 72 AD3d 717 [2010]).

2015Here, upon considering the relevant factors, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff maintenance in the sum of $1,450 per week until her death or remarriage (see Domestic *803 Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; DiPalma v DiPalma, 112 AD3d 663 [2013]; Rabinovich v Shevchenko, 93 AD3d 774 [2012]).

2015Here, upon considering the relevant factors, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in awarding the plaintiff maintenance in the sum of $1,450 per week until her death or remarriage (see Domestic *803 Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; DiPalma v DiPalma, 112 AD3d 663 [2013]; Rabinovich v Shevchenko, 93 AD3d 774 [2012]).

2015The court providently exercised its discretion in denying the husband an award of maintenance after citing the relevant *542 statutory factors and considering the parties’ pre-divorce standard of living (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a]; Alexander v Alexander, 116 AD3d 472, 473 [1st Dept 2014], appeal dismissed 24 NY3d 1050 [2014]).

2010The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in excess of $50,000 (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]), as the documentation which the defendant’s attorney submitted was devoid of any information which identified the services rendered, and thereby precluded the granting of such an award (cf. Pudalov v Pudalov, 308 AD2d 524 [2003]; Wong v Wong, 300 AD2d 473 [2002]; Darvas v Darvas, 242 AD2d 554 [1997]).

2010The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in excess of $50,000 (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]), as the documentation which the defendant’s attorney submitted was devoid of any information which identified the services rendered, and thereby precluded the granting of such an award (cf. Pudalov v Pudalov, 308 AD2d 524 [2003]; Wong v Wong, 300 AD2d 473 [2002]; Darvas v Darvas, 242 AD2d 554 [1997]).

2010The Supreme Court properly denied the defendant’s application for an award of an attorney’s fee in excess of $50,000 (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]), as the documentation which the defendant’s attorney submitted was devoid of any information which identified the services rendered, and thereby precluded the granting of such an award (cf. Pudalov v Pudalov, 308 AD2d 524 [2003]; Wong v Wong, 300 AD2d 473 [2002]; Darvas v Darvas, 242 AD2d 554 [1997]).

2009The maintenance award in the sum of $10,000 per month for the two years immediately following the judgment of divorce, the sum of $7,500 per month for the next three years, and the sum of $5,000 per month for three years after that, will permit the defendant to maintain the pre-divorce standard of living while allowing her a reasonably sufficient time to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a] [4]; Summer v Summer, 85 NY2d 1014 [1995]; Ruane v Ruane, 55 AD3d 586 [2008]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 712-713 [2007]; Palestra v Palestra, 300 AD2d 288, 289 [2002]).

2009Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the court properly denied his request for a credit for his separate property contribution of the down payment on the parties’ marital residence (see Romano v Romano, 40 AD3d 837 [2007]; Scartozzi v Scartozzi, 32 AD3d 1008 [2006]).

2009Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the court properly denied his request for a credit for his separate property contribution of the down payment on the parties’ marital residence (see Romano v Romano, 40 AD3d 837 [2007]; Scartozzi v Scartozzi, 32 AD3d 1008 [2006]).

2009The maintenance award in the sum of $10,000 per month for the two years immediately following the judgment of divorce, the sum of $7,500 per month for the next three years, and the sum of $5,000 per month for three years after that, will permit the defendant to maintain the pre-divorce standard of living while allowing her a reasonably sufficient time to become self-supporting (see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6] [a] [4]; Summer v Summer, 85 NY2d 1014 [1995]; Ruane v Ruane, 55 AD3d 586 [2008]; Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 712-713 [2007]; Palestra v Palestra, 300 AD2d 288, 289 [2002]).