case is within rule in Pennsylvania

1958It is urged that the case is within the rule laid down in Robertson v. Hay, 91 Pa. 242 , and Hutchison v. Gill, Ibid 253, and followed by us in Fort Pitt Real Estate Co. v. Schaefer, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , that where a party executes a bond and mortgage and gives therewith a certificate of no defense and places these instruments in the hands of an agent for the purpose of raising money, he cannot defend against a purchaser of the mortgage for value without notice.

1931It is urged that the case is within the rule laid down in Robertson v. Hay, 91 Pa. 242 , and Hutchison v. Gill, Ibid 253, and followed by us in Fort Pitt Real Estate Co. v. Schaefer, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , that where a party executes a bond and mortgage and gives therewith a certificate of no defense and places these instruments in the hands of an agent for the purpose of raising money, he cannot defend against a purchaser of the mortgage for value without notice.

1958It is urged that the case is within the rule laid down in Robertson v. Hay, 91 Pa. 242 , and Hutchison v. Gill, Ibid 253, and followed by us in Fort Pitt Real Estate Co. v. Schaefer, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , that where a party executes a bond and mortgage and gives therewith a certificate of no defense and places these instruments in the hands of an agent for the purpose of raising money, he cannot defend against a purchaser of the mortgage for value without notice.

1931It is urged that the case is within the rule laid down in Robertson v. Hay, 91 Pa. 242 , and Hutchison v. Gill, Ibid 253, and followed by us in Fort Pitt Real Estate Co. v. Schaefer, 96 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , that where a party executes a bond and mortgage and gives therewith a certificate of no defense and places these instruments in the hands of an agent for the purpose of raising money, he cannot defend against a purchaser of the mortgage for value without notice.

1929Co., 244 Pa. 582 , and that the question of the good faith of the insured in making the answers to questions material to the risk was for the jury. *421 As stated by Judge Keller, speaking for this court, in Soroko v. Woodmen of the World, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 328, 332 ; “It has long been the law of this State that evidence is admissible to prove that an applicant for insurance made truthful answers to the questions contained in the application, and that the agent of the company erroneously reduced them to writing ...... and this applies to answers which are warranties no less than mere represe

1917Co., 244 Pa. 582 , where the applicant was a foreigner and there was no evidence that she either did or could read the policy or the application.

2008We conclude that this case is within the exception to the general rule preventing admission of evidence of earnings from a business to prove impaired earning capacity.’ 272 Pa. Super, at 226-27, 414 A.2d at 1090-91.” 347 Pa. Super, at 18, 500 A.2d at 134 .

2008In determining that the plaintiff’s business fell within the parameters of Bell v. Yellow Cab Co., 399 Pa. 332 , 160 A.2d 437 (1960), the Superior Court noted: “Miss Serhan’s business was veiy small in scope.

2008In determining that the plaintiff’s business fell within the parameters of Bell v. Yellow Cab Co., 399 Pa. 332 , 160 A.2d 437 (1960), the Superior Court noted: “Miss Serhan’s business was veiy small in scope.

1988The Supreme Court held that “[N]othing more need be said than that, as they were unliquidated, the case is within the rule that the action is itself a sufficient demand.” 263 Pa. 146, 150 , 106 A. 203, 204 .

1988The Supreme Court held that “[N]othing more need be said than that, as they were unliquidated, the case is within the rule that the action is itself a sufficient demand.” 263 Pa. 146, 150 , 106 A. 203, 204 .

1985We conclude that this case is within the exception to the general rule preventing admission of evidence of earnigns from a business to prove impaired earning capacity.” 272 Pa.Super. at 226-27 , 414 A.2d at 1090-91 .

1985We conclude that this case is within the exception to the general rule preventing admission of evidence of earnigns from a business to prove impaired earning capacity.” 272 Pa.Super. at 226-27 , 414 A.2d at 1090-91 .

1978If that were the issue, I should agree with the majority that this case is within the rule of Commonwealth v. Conti, 236 Pa.Super. 488 , 345 A.2d 238 (1975).

1978If that were the issue, I should agree with the majority that this case is within the rule of Commonwealth v. Conti, 236 Pa.Super. 488 , 345 A.2d 238 (1975).

1954As early as Com. v. Bates, 1 Pa. Superior Ct. 223 , (1896), it was decided that where an indictment is found after the statute of limitations has run, it is incumbent on the Commonwealth to show that the case is within the exception.

1929Co., 244 Pa. 582 , and that the question of the good faith of the insured in making the answers to questions material to the risk was for the jury. *421 As stated by Judge Keller, speaking for this court, in Soroko v. Woodmen of the World, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 328, 332 ; “It has long been the law of this State that evidence is admissible to prove that an applicant for insurance made truthful answers to the questions contained in the application, and that the agent of the company erroneously reduced them to writing ...... and this applies to answers which are warranties no less than mere represe

1928The case is within the rule of Shoffler v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 290 Pa. 480, 483 , where Mr. Justice Kephart stated: “Under our Workmen’s Compensation Act, the fact of employment is not the sole basis for compensation.

1927Not one of them even suggested that the collapse was the result of either of these alleged defects.” Under these circumstances the case is within the principle of such cases as Mardo v. Valley Smokeless Coal *540 Co., 279 Pa. 209 ; Direnzo v. Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works, 265 Pa. 561 ; Laing v. Remington Arms Co., 264 Pa. 130 ; Sack v. Ralston, 220 Pa. 216 , which hold that an unexplained falling of an object is not sufficient to render the defendant owner liable for negligence.

1927If in point of fact the fall of the shed was due to the decayed condition of the lumber described by the four witnesses who examined it after the fall, then, having in mind the testimony of the other witnesses, the case comes down to one of a “latent defect” and is governed by such decisions as Philadelphia Ritz Carlton Co. v. Phila., 282 Pa. 301 ; Travers v. Delaware County, 280 Pa. 335 ; Sheets v. Sunbury & Northumberland Electric Ry Co., 237 Pa. 153 , particularly the last named case.

1927Not one of them even suggested that the collapse was the result of either of these alleged defects.” Under these circumstances the case is within the principle of such cases as Mardo v. Valley Smokeless Coal *540 Co., 279 Pa. 209 ; Direnzo v. Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works, 265 Pa. 561 ; Laing v. Remington Arms Co., 264 Pa. 130 ; Sack v. Ralston, 220 Pa. 216 , which hold that an unexplained falling of an object is not sufficient to render the defendant owner liable for negligence.

1927Not one of them even suggested that the collapse was the result of either of these alleged defects.” Under these circumstances the case is within the principle of such cases as Mardo v. Valley Smokeless Coal *540 Co., 279 Pa. 209 ; Direnzo v. Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works, 265 Pa. 561 ; Laing v. Remington Arms Co., 264 Pa. 130 ; Sack v. Ralston, 220 Pa. 216 , which hold that an unexplained falling of an object is not sufficient to render the defendant owner liable for negligence.

1927Not one of them even suggested that the collapse was the result of either of these alleged defects.” Under these circumstances the case is within the principle of such cases as Mardo v. Valley Smokeless Coal *540 Co., 279 Pa. 209 ; Direnzo v. Pittsburgh Bridge & Iron Works, 265 Pa. 561 ; Laing v. Remington Arms Co., 264 Pa. 130 ; Sack v. Ralston, 220 Pa. 216 , which hold that an unexplained falling of an object is not sufficient to render the defendant owner liable for negligence.

1927If in point of fact the fall of the shed was due to the decayed condition of the lumber described by the four witnesses who examined it after the fall, then, having in mind the testimony of the other witnesses, the case comes down to one of a “latent defect” and is governed by such decisions as Philadelphia Ritz Carlton Co. v. Phila., 282 Pa. 301 ; Travers v. Delaware County, 280 Pa. 335 ; Sheets v. Sunbury & Northumberland Electric Ry Co., 237 Pa. 153 , particularly the last named case.

1927If in point of fact the fall of the shed was due to the decayed condition of the lumber described by the four witnesses who examined it after the fall, then, having in mind the testimony of the other witnesses, the case comes down to one of a “latent defect” and is governed by such decisions as Philadelphia Ritz Carlton Co. v. Phila., 282 Pa. 301 ; Travers v. Delaware County, 280 Pa. 335 ; Sheets v. Sunbury & Northumberland Electric Ry Co., 237 Pa. 153 , particularly the last named case.

1926The case is within the rule thus stated in Lovekin v. Fairbanks, 282 Pa. 100 , 103: “......we have held steadily to the position that an accord and satisfaction cannot arise by reason of the payment of less than is due, unless it clearly appears not only that this was the intention of the payor, but also that the payee expressly agreed to it, or was bound to know of the intention at the time of acceptance; in effect, that ‘his taking of the check would be tortious except on the assumption of a taking in full satisfaction’: 3 Williston on Contracts 3181.

1923The case is within the rule therefore that where merchandise is delivered which is not of the quality expressly or impliedly warranted, the vendee may reject the consignment thereby rescinding the contract, or may retain and seek to reduce the price by proving the inferior quality of the goods: Elzea v. Brown, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 403 ; Elk Textile Co. v. *96 Cohn, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 478 ; Cohn v. Post, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .

1923The case is within the rule therefore that where merchandise is delivered which is not of the quality expressly or impliedly warranted, the vendee may reject the consignment thereby rescinding the contract, or may retain and seek to reduce the price by proving the inferior quality of the goods: Elzea v. Brown, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 403 ; Elk Textile Co. v. *96 Cohn, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 478 ; Cohn v. Post, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .

1923The case is within the rule therefore that where merchandise is delivered which is not of the quality expressly or impliedly warranted, the vendee may reject the consignment thereby rescinding the contract, or may retain and seek to reduce the price by proving the inferior quality of the goods: Elzea v. Brown, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 403 ; Elk Textile Co. v. *96 Cohn, 75 Pa. Superior Ct. 478 ; Cohn v. Post, 78 Pa. Superior Ct. 409 .

1913We agree with his conclusion that the case is within the principle of the decision in Smith v. East End Electric Light Company, 198 Pa. 19 ; Aument v. Telephone Company, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 610 , and Lanning v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 229 Pa. 575 .

1913We agree with his conclusion that the case is within the principle of the decision in Smith v. East End Electric Light Company, 198 Pa. 19 ; Aument v. Telephone Company, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 610 , and Lanning v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 229 Pa. 575 .

1913We agree with his conclusion that the case is within the principle of the decision in Smith v. East End Electric Light Company, 198 Pa. 19 ; Aument v. Telephone Company, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 610 , and Lanning v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 229 Pa. 575 .

1912If the case is within the principle, the proportion of contribution and other details are within the discretion of the taxing power:” Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. 352 .

1909Co., 216 Pa. 355 .

1907The case is within the doctrine of Com. v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357 and Com. v. Guja, 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 58 and was properly submitted to the jury under the evidence.