Houston motion in Texas

2013For waiver to exist under either subsection, however, a governmental employee must be the one operating or using the motor-driven equipment or tangible personal property. 6 See DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex.1995) (“Consistent with subsection 1, we construe subsection 2 of section 101.021 to predicate the governmental unit’s respon-deat superior liability upon the liability of its employee.”); LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep.

2013For waiver to exist under either subsection, however, a governmental employee must be the one operating or using the motor-driven equipment or tangible personal property.6 See DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 654 (Tex. 1995) (“Consistent with subsection 1, we construe subsection 2 of section 101.021 to predicate the governmental unit’s respondeat superior liability upon the liability of its employee.”); LeLeaux v. Hamshire-Fannett Indep.

2007City of Houston v. Allco, Inc. , 206 S.W.3d 113, 114 (Tex. 2006).

2007City of Houston v. Allco, Inc., 206 S.W.3d 113, 114 (Tex.2006).

2004City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., No. 14-03-00022, 2004 WL 63561 at * 4 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 15, 2004, no pet. h.).

2004City of Houston v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. , No. 14-03-00022, 2004 WL 63561 at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 15, 2004, no pet. h.).

2008See Wilson , 800 S.W.2d at 837 ; Webb v. Oberkampf Supply of Lubbock, Inc. , 831 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no pet.) ("Actual notice to a defendant without proper service is not sufficient to convey jurisdiction upon the court to render a default judgment against him.

2008A judgment is rendered when the decision is announced orally in open court or by a memorandum filed with the clerk.24 A general appearance which waives defects in 21 For example, McAllen cites the testimony of Houston’s counsel at the hearing on Houston’s motion to se t aside the judgment that “[Houston’s trial counsel] calculated the answer date as December 4th , wh e n , in fact, it turned out that he [Bednar] was served on November 2nd, Your Honor.” 22 See Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 837 ; Webb v. Oberkampf Supply of Lubbock, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 6 1 , 6 5 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 1992, no pet.) (“Actual

2026In light of Houston’s defense and closing argument, his attorneys could have reasonably concluded that “[a]s a response to the defense argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was proper.” Sanders v. State, 191 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d); see id. at 275 (noting that State’s argument was that evidence did not support conclusion that victim lied); see also Canada v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (noting that response to opposing counsel’s argument is proper jury argument).

2026In light of Houston’s defense and closing argument, his attorneys could have reasonably concluded that “[a]s a response to the defense argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was proper.” Sanders v. State, 191 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d); see id. at 275 (noting that State’s argument was that evidence did not support conclusion that victim lied); see also Canada v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (noting that response to opposing counsel’s argument is proper jury argument).

2026Further, they could have determined that the prosecutor’s arguments “were a reasonable deduction from the evidence on the credibility issues in the case.” See Sanders, 191 S.W.3d at 275-76 ; see also Loar v. State, 627 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Crim.

2026In light of Houston’s defense and closing argument, his attorneys could have reasonably concluded that “[a]s a response to the defense argument, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was proper.” Sanders v. State, 191 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. ref’d); see id. at 275 (noting that State’s argument was that evidence did not support conclusion that victim lied); see also Canada v. State, 547 S.W.3d 4, 23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2017, no pet.) (noting that response to opposing counsel’s argument is proper jury argument).

2025Cf. Roark & Hardee, violates Houston’s right to pass local laws that are within the preempted field but otherwise consistent with state law), (2) the Act constitutes an improper amendment (by imposing field preemption), and (3) the Act exceeds the Legislature’s authority because Legislature lacks the power to limit by statute the power of home-rule cities to adopt local laws that do not conflict with existing state law. 5 These challenges include Houston’s claim that the Act is unconstitutionally vague and unconstitutionally delegates power to the courts and San Antonio and El Paso’s claim tha

2021See Hoffman v. Mena, No. 03-19-00409-CV, 2021 WL 2460637 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A party may not rely on its own interrogatory responses to raise a fact issue in order to defeat summary judgment, even if the other party puts them into evidence.”) (quoting Zarzosa v. Flynn, 266 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.)); Garcia v. Nat’l Eligibility Express, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (responding party may not rely on own 15 The work orders Crook attached to her motion—assuming they refer to the manhole at

2021See Hoffman v. Mena, No. 03-19-00409-CV, 2021 WL 2460637 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin June 17, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A party may not rely on its own interrogatory responses to raise a fact issue in order to defeat summary judgment, even if the other party puts them into evidence.”) (quoting Zarzosa v. Flynn, 266 S.W.3d 614, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2008, no pet.)); Garcia v. Nat’l Eligibility Express, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (responding party may not rely on own 15 The work orders Crook attached to her motion—assuming they refer to the manhole at

2016See Taylor, 885 S.W.2d at 158 ; Huerta, 933 S.W.2d at 650 .

2013The court reasoned that allowing an interlocutory appeal in this circumstance— where the trial court denied the City of Houston’s plea to the jurisdiction, the City of Houston failed to take advantage of its ability to challenge that ruling via interlocutory appeal, the City of Houston subsequently filed an amended plea raising the same immunity argument, and the trial court also denied the amended plea— “would effectively eliminate the requirement that appeals from interlocutory orders must be filed within twenty days after the challenged order is signed.” Id. at 667; see also Bally Total Fit

2011Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. 101.106[?]” A plea to the jurisdiction based on sovereign or governmental immunity challenges a trial court’s jurisdiction. 4 See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-26 (Tex.2004).

2011“It is well-settled that Rule 38.3 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure does not allow an appellant to include in a reply brief a new issue in response to a matter pointed out in appellee’s brief but not raised by the appellant's original brief.” In re TCW Global Project Fund II, Ltd. , 274 S.W.3d 166, 171 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, orig. proceeding); see also Tex. R.

2011See Ervin v. State , 331 S.W.3d 49 , 52–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 , 894–913 (Tex. Crim.

2011See Ervin v. State , 331 S.W.3d 49 , 52–56 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 , 894–913 (Tex. Crim.

2008See id. at 442-43, 445-47 .

2008See Wilson , 800 S.W.2d at 837 ; Webb v. Oberkampf Supply of Lubbock, Inc. , 831 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no pet.) ("Actual notice to a defendant without proper service is not sufficient to convey jurisdiction upon the court to render a default judgment against him.

2008See id.