uniform operation of laws clause in Utah

2020Thus, a statute violates the Uniform Operation of Laws clause when it “works a discriminatory hardship on an identifiable group of persons who were singled out for treatment different from that to which other identifiable groups were made subject,” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 36 , 233 P.3d 476 (quotation simplified), and that disparity is “unreasonable in relation to the purpose of the (continued…) 20180899-CA 7 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis does and that Ellis was deprived of his right to the uniform operation of law, Ellis still would be required to show prejudice under our normal standard

2020Thus, a statute violates the Uniform Operation of Laws clause when it “works a discriminatory hardship on an identifiable group of persons who were singled out for treatment different from that to which other identifiable groups were made subject,” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 36 , 233 P.3d 476 (quotation simplified), and that disparity is “unreasonable in relation to the purpose of the (continued…) 20180899-CA 7 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis does and that Ellis was deprived of his right to the uniform operation of law, Ellis still would be required to show prejudice under our normal standard

2021Rashid has not asserted that the decision of the prosecutor to charge him and not Manager was based on his race, religion, national origin, sex, or any other impermissible category, and thus we assume, for purposes of our analysis, that the (continued…) 20190682-CA 14 2021 UT App 17 State v. Rashid See also Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1008 (Russon, J., concurring in part) (stating that a “prosecutor has the discretion in regard to an alleged criminal act to file felony charges, or misdemeanor charges, or no charges whatsoever” and “can even do so in relation to a single criminal act involving more than

2021Compare State v. Robinson, 2011 UT 30, ¶ 17 , 254 P.3d 183 (“To determine whether a statute violates the uniform operation of laws, we apply a three-step analysis: (1) whether the statute creates any classifications; (2) whether the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated; and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether (continued…) 20190682-CA 13 2021 UT App 17 State v. Rashid that the statute is unconstitutional “[b]ecause the statute permits police, prosecutors, and judges to have arbitrary discretion in determining who can and cannot be charged.” Rashi

2020While we applaud Ellis's creativity in endeavoring to get around the once-controversial Menzies decision on this rationale, we are, indeed, skeptical that the Uniform Operation of Laws clause has any applicability in this context. 20180899-CA 8 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis this ordinarily requires a defendant to show that, absent the [error], there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Ahmed, 2019 UT App 65, ¶ 17 , 441 P.3d 777 (quotation simplified).

2020While we applaud Ellis's creativity in endeavoring to get around the once-controversial Menzies decision on this rationale, we are, indeed, skeptical that the Uniform Operation of Laws clause has any applicability in this context. 20180899-CA 8 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis this ordinarily requires a defendant to show that, absent the [error], there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Ahmed, 2019 UT App 65, ¶ 17 , 441 P.3d 777 (quotation simplified).

2020Thus, a statute violates the Uniform Operation of Laws clause when it “works a discriminatory hardship on an identifiable group of persons who were singled out for treatment different from that to which other identifiable groups were made subject,” State v. Drej, 2010 UT 35, ¶ 36 , 233 P.3d 476 (quotation simplified), and that disparity is “unreasonable in relation to the purpose of the (continued…) 20180899-CA 7 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis does and that Ellis was deprived of his right to the uniform operation of law, Ellis still would be required to show prejudice under our normal standard

2020While we applaud Ellis's creativity in endeavoring to get around the once-controversial Menzies decision on this rationale, we are, indeed, skeptical that the Uniform Operation of Laws clause has any applicability in this context. 20180899-CA 8 2020 UT App 119 State v. Ellis this ordinarily requires a defendant to show that, absent the [error], there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.” State v. Ahmed, 2019 UT App 65, ¶ 17 , 441 P.3d 777 (quotation simplified).

2020In cases of constitutional error, “an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 8 State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 56 , 299 P.3d 892 (quotation simplified). ¶16 Here, Ellis argues that he should be allowed to establish prejudice by showing that “but for the expended peremptory strike it is reasonably likely that the juror challenged for cause would have sat and . . . the challenged juror would have been actually biased had she sat.” But this is not the

2020In cases of constitutional error, “an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 8 State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 56 , 299 P.3d 892 (quotation simplified). ¶16 Here, Ellis argues that he should be allowed to establish prejudice by showing that “but for the expended peremptory strike it is reasonably likely that the juror challenged for cause would have sat and . . . the challenged juror would have been actually biased had she sat.” But this is not the

2015We disagree. ¶ 43 The uniform operation of laws provision of our Constitution requires us to address three questions: (1) ―what, if any, classification is created under the statute,‖ (2) ―whether the classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate treatment,‖ and (3) whether ―the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.‖69 ¶ 44 Examining Utah‘s statute in light of these criteria, we conclude that it does not violate the uniform operation of laws clause because it creates no impermissible classifications and it treats all similarly situated defendants

2015We disagree. ¶ 43 The uniform operation of laws provision of our Constitution requires us to address three questions: (1) ―what, if any, classification is created under the statute,‖ (2) ―whether the classification imposes on similarly situated persons disparate treatment,‖ and (3) whether ―the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity.‖69 ¶ 44 Examining Utah‘s statute in light of these criteria, we conclude that it does not violate the uniform operation of laws clause because it creates no impermissible classifications and it treats all similarly situated defendants

2014Safe to Learn, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 31 , 94 P.3d 217 .

2014Safe to Learn, 2004 UT 32, ¶ 31 , 94 P.3d 217 .

2013Additionally, courts can call the at- 16 CITE AS: 2013 UT 46 JUSTICE DURHAM, dissenting tention of the legislature to statutes in need of clarification or modernization.

2011Id.

2004UDOT argues that Intermountain's complaint fails because (1) the uniform operation of laws clause is not a self-executing constitutional provision, and (2) even if the complaint properly stated a claim, monetary damages are not available as a remedy under the framework set forth in Spackman v. Board of Education, 2000 UT 87 , 16 P.8d 588.

2000Plaintiffs argue this despite McCorvey v. State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), where we held that the damage cap did not violate article I, section 11, nor the due process clause or the uniform operation of laws clause in the Utah Constitution. ¶83 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in construing that state's open courts provision, which is almost identical to Utah's, held in Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577 , 65 P. 1066 (1901), that the legislature may modify the remedy and former procedure and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of the right without violating the open

2000Plaintiffs argue this despite McCorvey v. State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), where we held that the damage cap did not violate article I, section 11, nor the due process clause or the uniform operation of laws clause in the Utah Constitution. ¶ 83 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in construing that state's open courts provision, which is almost identical to Utah's, held in Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577 , 65 P. 1066 (1901), that the legislature may modify the remedy and former procedure and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of the right without violating the ope

2000Plaintiffs argue this despite McCorvey v. State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), where we held that the damage cap did not violate article I, section 11, nor the due process clause or the uniform operation of laws clause in the Utah Constitution. ¶83 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in construing that state's open courts provision, which is almost identical to Utah's, held in Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577 , 65 P. 1066 (1901), that the legislature may modify the remedy and former procedure and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of the right without violating the open

2000Plaintiffs argue this despite McCorvey v. State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), where we held that the damage cap did not violate article I, section 11, nor the due process clause or the uniform operation of laws clause in the Utah Constitution. ¶ 83 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in construing that state's open courts provision, which is almost identical to Utah's, held in Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577 , 65 P. 1066 (1901), that the legislature may modify the remedy and former procedure and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of the right without violating the ope

2000Plaintiffs argue this despite McCorvey v. State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), where we held that the damage cap did not violate article I, section 11, nor the due process clause or the uniform operation of laws clause in the Utah Constitution. ¶83 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in construing that state's open courts provision, which is almost identical to Utah's, held in Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577 , 65 P. 1066 (1901), that the legislature may modify the remedy and former procedure and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of the right without violating the open

2000Plaintiffs argue this despite McCorvey v. State Department of Transportation, 868 P.2d 41 (Utah 1993), where we held that the damage cap did not violate article I, section 11, nor the due process clause or the uniform operation of laws clause in the Utah Constitution. ¶ 83 The Supreme Court of Oregon, in construing that state's open courts provision, which is almost identical to Utah's, held in Mattson v. Astoria, 39 Or. 577 , 65 P. 1066 (1901), that the legislature may modify the remedy and former procedure and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of the right without violating the ope

1997A fundamental principle of the uniform operation of laws clause is that “the law should treat persons who are similarly situated in a similar fashion, and persons who are dissimilarly situated should be treated dis-similarly.” Bishop, 717 P.2d at 266 .

1997A fundamental principle of the uniform operation of laws clause is that "the law should treat persons who are similarly situated in a similar fashion, and persons who are dissimilarly situated should be treated dissimilarly." Bishop, 717 P.2d at 266 .

1996We have already addressed these arguments in Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996), also issued today, and have determined that these subsections are constitutional as applied to prisoners’ negligence actions against prison physicians.

1996We have already addressed these arguments in Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996), also issued today, and have determined that these subsections are constitutional as applied to prisoners' negligence actions against prison physicians.

1993Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 351-52 . .