beneficiary of a constitutional error in California

2023To evaluate prejudice from a federal constitutional error, we apply the Chapman standard, “requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 22 that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).) “Instructional error regarding the elements of the offense requires reversal of the judgment unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 .) The state has the burden to show

2023(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reversal based on state law error required only if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error].) Gonzalez contends the trial court violated his federal rights to due process and a fair trial, such that harmlessness should be assessed under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) (requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained).

2015Thus, to say that [the error] ... did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Id. at pp. 403-404.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], i

2015Thus, to say that [the error] ... did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Id. at pp. 403-404.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], i

2023(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reversal based on state law error required only if it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error].) Gonzalez contends the trial court violated his federal rights to due process and a fair trial, such that harmlessness should be assessed under the standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman) (requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained).

2002(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Mother and minors contend that the failure to give the minimum mandated notice should, at the least, be reviewed using a harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, under which DCFS, as the beneficiary of a constitutional error, must show that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2006In a pre-Chapman opinion, the high court stated the harmless error test this way: “The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” (Fahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 171 , 84 S.Ct. 229 ].) In Chapman , the high court noted that “[t]here is little, if any, difference between our statements in Fahy v. Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional erro

2006In a pre-Chapman opinion, the high court stated the harmless error test this way: “The question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” (Fahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 171 , 84 S.Ct. 229 ].) In Chapman , the high court noted that “[t]here is little, if any, difference between our statements in Fahy v. Connecticut about ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction’ and requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional erro

2022Prejudice from this type of error is assessed under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman), which requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error [(the Attorney General)] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24; People v. Wilkins (2013) 56 Cal.4th 333, 348 (Wilkins); People v. Reese (2017) 2 Cal.5th 660, 671 .) Here, the trial court misinstructed the jury on the premeditation element of first degree murder, and the prosecutor’s arguments based on the erroneous instructional language dramatic

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2015Thus, to say that [the error] ... did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Id. at pp. 403-404.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], i

2015Thus, to say that [the error] ... did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Id. at pp. 403-404.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], i

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2015Thus, to say that [the error] ... did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Id. at pp. 403-404.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], i

2015Thus, to say that [the error] ... did not contribute to the verdict is to make a judgment about the significance of the [error] to reasonable jurors, when measured against the other evidence considered by those jurors independently of the [error].” (Id. at pp. 403-404.) “[T]he appropriate inquiry is ‘not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279 [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], i

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2015(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 994 [ 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 , 25 P.3d 519 ]; People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 32-33 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 , 859 P.2d 673 ].) The Chapman standard of review requires “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Chapman, at p. 24.) Reversal is required if there is a “ ‘reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.’ ” (Chapman, at p. 23; Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 402-403 [ 114 L.Ed.2d

2002Admitting the probation officer's testimony violated federal due process and, consequently, prejudice must be assessed under the "harmless-beyond-a-reasonable doubt" standard. ( People v. Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1161, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 .) To establish the error was harmless, "the beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) In this instance, all of the prosecution's evidence was inadmi

2002Admitting the probation officer's testimony violated federal due process and, consequently, prejudice must be assessed under the "harmless-beyond-a-reasonable doubt" standard. ( People v. Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1161, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 .) To establish the error was harmless, "the beneficiary of a constitutional error [must] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 .) In this instance, all of the prosecution's evidence was inadmi

1993We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 23-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711], fns. omitted.) In Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. ___ [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 ], and Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) ___ U.S. ___ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], the United States Supreme Court provided the following explanation: "The Chapman test i

1993We, therefore, do no more than adhere to the meaning of our Fahy case when we hold, as we now do, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 23-24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711], fns. omitted.) In Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. ___ [ 114 L.Ed.2d 432 , 111 S.Ct. 1884 ], and Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) ___ U.S. ___ [ 124 L.Ed.2d 182 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 ], the United States Supreme Court provided the following explanation: "The Chapman test i

1992The court in Chapman noted that there was little, if any, difference between a rule formulated, as in Napue , in terms of ‘“whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction,” ’ and a rule "’requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” ’ ” The lead opinion in Bagley then stated: “It is therefore clear, as indeed the Government concedes . . . , that this Court’s precedents indicate that the standard of review applica

1992The court in Chapman noted that there was little, if any, difference between a rule formulated, as in Napue, in terms of `"whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction,"' and a rule `"requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'" The lead opinion in Bagley then stated: "It is therefore clear, as indeed the Government concedes..., that this Court's precedents indicate that the standard of review applicable to t

1971(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 .) The burden is on “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id., at p. 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ]; see also In re Whitehorn, 1 Cal.3d 504, 512 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 462 P.2d 361 ]; In re Hill, 71 Cal.2d 997, 1004 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 458 P.2d 449 ].) The People assert in this court the following matters in support of their contentions .that the prosecution’s comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that petitioner was apprehend

1971(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 .) The burden is on “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id., at p. 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ]; see also In re Whitehorn, 1 Cal.3d 504, 512 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 462 P.2d 361 ]; In re Hill, 71 Cal.2d 997, 1004 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 458 P.2d 449 ].) The People assert in this court the following matters in support of their contentions .that the prosecution’s comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that petitioner was apprehend

1971(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 .) The burden is on “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id., at p. 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ]; see also In re Whitehorn, 1 Cal.3d 504, 512 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 462 P.2d 361 ]; In re Hill, 71 Cal.2d 997, 1004 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 458 P.2d 449 ].) The People assert in this court the following matters in support of their contentions .that the prosecution’s comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that petitioner was apprehend

1971(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18 .) The burden is on “the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Id., at p. 24 [ 17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710 ]; see also In re Whitehorn, 1 Cal.3d 504, 512 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 609 , 462 P.2d 361 ]; In re Hill, 71 Cal.2d 997, 1004 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 458 P.2d 449 ].) The People assert in this court the following matters in support of their contentions .that the prosecution’s comments were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that petitioner was apprehend

1968(Cf. Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 490, fn. 8 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 856, 861 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ].) The prosecution’s percipient witness, Charlie Clayborn, testified as follows: On November 24, 1965, he was an undercover police officer of the City of Los Angeles assigned to “Central Narcotics.” At approximately 10:15a.m. on that date, he went to 650 East Flower Street in Venice, California, accompanied by a Charles Robinson.

1968(Cf. Stoner v. California (1964) 376 U.S. 483, 490, fn. 8 [ 11 L.Ed.2d 856, 861 , 84 S.Ct. 889 ].) The prosecution’s percipient witness, Charlie Clayborn, testified as follows: On November 24, 1965, he was an undercover police officer of the City of Los Angeles assigned to “Central Narcotics.” At approximately 10:15a.m. on that date, he went to 650 East Flower Street in Venice, California, accompanied by a Charles Robinson.