inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim in California

2023“Nonetheless, we shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.” (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 230 .) On the merits, defendant supports his argument by citing two statements from the late Justice Mosk.

2022(People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 ; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 .) Nevertheless, we “ ‘shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of- counsel claim.’ ” (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 .) 11 A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment—Federal Challenge The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

2016(People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 972, fn. 5 .) Although appellate courts generally address the merits “‘to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim’” (ibid., quoting People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 ), appellant is precluded from relying on his own ineffectiveness.

2015(People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 ; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [since 22 the determination of a state cruel and unusual punishment claim is fact specific it must be raised in the trial court].) “Nevertheless, we shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.” (People v. Norman, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 230 .) A. State Standard Under the California Constitution, “a statutory punishment ma

2021(E.g., People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 .) Although ordinarily we could consider the merits of the claim “ ‘in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim’ ” (People v. Russell 46 (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 ), there is a compelling reason to consider it premature at best.

2021(E.g., People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 .) Although ordinarily we could consider the merits of the claim “ ‘in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim’ ” (People v. Russell 46 (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 ), there is a compelling reason to consider it premature at best.

2015(People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 ; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [since 22 the determination of a state cruel and unusual punishment claim is fact specific it must be raised in the trial court].) “Nevertheless, we shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.” (People v. Norman, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 230 .) A. State Standard Under the California Constitution, “a statutory punishment ma

2013(People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 .) We nevertheless “‘reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.’” (Ibid.) 21 Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution prohibits infliction of “[c]ruel or unusual punishment.” A sentence may violate this prohibition if “‘it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.’” (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 .) The Ei

2015(Italics added.)" (People v. Palafox (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 68, 82 (Palafox).) Although Henderson "has technically forfeited the issue on appeal because he did not raise the objection below [citation], we 'shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional 22 standards, in the interest of judicial economy and to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.' " (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 .) The Eighth Amendment "contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences.' " (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (Ewing).) Th

2014I, § 17.)2 “[A]lthough [defendant] has technically forfeited the issue on appeal because he did not raise the objection below (People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 ), we ‘shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.’ (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229-230 .)” (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 .) We find defendant’s claim meritless, though we recognize that the sentence imposed is longer than his probable lifespan.3 2 A punishment violat

2022(People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 886 ; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 .) Nevertheless, we “ ‘shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of- counsel claim.’ ” (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 .) 11 A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment—Federal Challenge The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

2021(E.g., People v. Kelley (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 568, 583 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 .) Although ordinarily we could consider the merits of the claim “ ‘in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim’ ” (People v. Russell 46 (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 ), there is a compelling reason to consider it premature at best.

2015(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 .) Here, as we have explained, the One Strike law does not apply to counts 1 through 12, and accordingly, it was reasonable for defense counsel to chose not to point out that some of the oral copulations occurred on the same occasion. 11 Although Mendez arguably forfeited his cruel and unusual punishment argument because he did not raise the issue in the trial court (People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247-1248 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 ), we "shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards,

2015(People v. Em (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 964, 971, fn. 5 ; People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 [since 22 the determination of a state cruel and unusual punishment claim is fact specific it must be raised in the trial court].) “Nevertheless, we shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.” (People v. Norman, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 230 .) A. State Standard Under the California Constitution, “a statutory punishment ma

2016(People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 230 ["Nonetheless, we shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards, in the interest of judicial economy to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim"]; see also People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 496 .) We review de novo whether punishment is cruel and unusual, viewing the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.

2015(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 .) Here, as we have explained, the One Strike law does not apply to counts 1 through 12, and accordingly, it was reasonable for defense counsel to chose not to point out that some of the oral copulations occurred on the same occasion. 11 Although Mendez arguably forfeited his cruel and unusual punishment argument because he did not raise the issue in the trial court (People v. Speight (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247-1248 ; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27 ), we "shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional standards,

2015Fixing the penalty for crimes is the province of the Legislature, which is in the best position to evaluate the gravity of different crimes and to make judgments among different penological approaches. [Citations.] Only in the rarest of cases could a court declare that the length of a sentence mandated by the Legislature is unconstitutionally excessive." (Id. at p. 494.)13 12 In Solem v. Helm (1983) 463 U.S. 277 , the United States Supreme Court set out a three-prong test similar to the one adopted in California to address claims of disproportionate sentences: "[A] court's proportionality anal

2013(Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (conc. opn. by Kennedy, J.).) Garcia argues the sentence that the trial court imposed is disproportionate to his individual culpability and thus constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

2015(Lockyer v. Andrade 8 (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 73 (Andrade); People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 .) Under federal law, the precise contours of the disproportionality question are unclear, but disproportionality invalidates a sentence only in the “‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” ( Andrade, supra, at p. 73 .) Under state law, a sentence is cruel or unusual if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 .) “The three techniques often suggested for

2015(Lockyer v. Andrade 8 (2003) 538 U.S. 63, 73 (Andrade); People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 .) Under federal law, the precise contours of the disproportionality question are unclear, but disproportionality invalidates a sentence only in the “‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” ( Andrade, supra, at p. 73 .) Under state law, a sentence is cruel or unusual if “it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 .) “The three techniques often suggested for

2015Sanchez's sentence does not violate the California Constitution A sentence may violate the state constitutional ban on cruel or unusual punishment if " 'it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. ' " (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (Dillon).) In People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1431-1432 (Romero), the court outlined the well-established framework for considering claims of cruel or unusual punishment under the state Constitution: " 'In order to determine whether a partic

2015(Italics added.)" (People v. Palafox (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 68, 82 (Palafox).) Although Henderson "has technically forfeited the issue on appeal because he did not raise the objection below [citation], we 'shall reach the merits under the relevant constitutional 22 standards, in the interest of judicial economy and to prevent the inevitable ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim.' " (People v. Russell (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 981, 993 .) The Eighth Amendment "contains a 'narrow proportionality principle' that 'applies to noncapital sentences.' " (Ewing v. California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20 (Ewing).) Th

2015Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly disproportionate" to the crime.' " (Ewing, at p. 23.) Similarly, "a punishment may violate the California constitutional prohibition 'if, although not cruel or unusual in its method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' " (People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 478 (Dillon).) To make this determination under California law, courts assess " 'the nature of the offense and/or the offender,' " the "punishments prescribed by Califor