Ireland rule in California

2007(Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 539 .) We reasoned that “[t]his kind of bootstrapping” was not permissible because “[t]o allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.” (Ibid.) Two years later, we clarified that an Ireland inquiry “must extend to an investigation of the purpose of the [underlying] conduct” that resulted in a homicide and that the felony-murder rule coul

2007(Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 539 .) We reasoned that “[t]his kind of bootstrapping” was not permissible because “[t]o allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault—a category which includes the great majority of all homicides.” (Ibid.) Two years later, we clarified that an Ireland inquiry “must extend to an investigation of the purpose of the [underlying] conduct” that resulted in a homicide and that the felony-murder rule coul

2009The majority concluded that the crime of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house "does not `merge' with a resulting homicide so as to preclude application of the felony-murder doctrine." ( Hansen, supra, at p. 304 .) We noted that this court "has not extended the Ireland doctrine beyond the context of assault, even under circumstances in which the underlying felony plausibly could be characterized as `an integral part of' and `included in fact within' the resulting homicide." ( Id. at p. 312.) We discussed in detail Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177 , and People v. Taylor, supra, 11 C

2009The majority concluded that the crime of discharging a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house "does not `merge' with a resulting homicide so as to preclude application of the felony-murder doctrine." ( Hansen, supra, at p. 304 .) We noted that this court "has not extended the Ireland doctrine beyond the context of assault, even under circumstances in which the underlying felony plausibly could be characterized as `an integral part of' and `included in fact within' the resulting homicide." ( Id. at p. 312.) We discussed in detail Mattison, supra, 4 Cal.3d 177 , and People v. Taylor, supra, 11 C

2023An ‘assaultive’ felony is one that involves a threat of immediate violent injury.” (Id. at p. 1200.) Chun was significant because, previously, and before defendant’s original appeal, our Supreme Court had explained that “[s]ubsequent decisions have applied the Ireland rule to other felonies involving assault or assault with a deadly weapon. [Citations.] [¶] Our court . . . has not extended the Ireland doctrine beyond the context of assault, even under circumstances in which the underlying felony plausibly could be characterized as ‘an integral part of’ and ‘included in fact within’ the resulti

2023An ‘assaultive’ felony is one that involves a threat of immediate violent injury.” (Id. at p. 1200.) Chun was significant because, previously, and before defendant’s original appeal, our Supreme Court had explained that “[s]ubsequent decisions have applied the Ireland rule to other felonies involving assault or assault with a deadly weapon. [Citations.] [¶] Our court . . . has not extended the Ireland doctrine beyond the context of assault, even under circumstances in which the underlying felony plausibly could be characterized as ‘an integral part of’ and ‘included in fact within’ the resulti

2004Thus, the critical fact in Hansen was that `most homicides do not result from violations of [Penal Code] section 246.'" In this case, the majority repeats the catechism once again: "[T]he Ireland rule was intended to avoid elevating every felonious assault that ends in death to second degree murder, a result that would `usurp most of the law of homicide, relieve the prosecution in the great majority of homicide cases of the burden of having to prove malice in order to obtain a murder conviction, and thereby frustrate the Legislature's intent to punish certain felonious assaults resulting in de

2004Thus, the critical fact in Hansen was that `most homicides do not result from violations of [Penal Code] section 246.'" In this case, the majority repeats the catechism once again: "[T]he Ireland rule was intended to avoid elevating every felonious assault that ends in death to second degree murder, a result that would `usurp most of the law of homicide, relieve the prosecution in the great majority of homicide cases of the burden of having to prove malice in order to obtain a murder conviction, and thereby frustrate the Legislature's intent to punish certain felonious assaults resulting in de

1970Whether or not, under the Ireland doctrine, the violation of section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code merged into the homicide so that defendant’s conviction cannot stand unless the record contains substan *60 tial evidence of actual malice, express or implied, is not easy to answer, for neither Ireland nor People v. Wilson, 1 Cal.3d 431 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ] nor People v. Sears, 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ], Ireland’s progeny, are explicit with respect to the rationale of the doctrine of merger as it is to be applied in California.

1970Whether or not, under the Ireland doctrine, the violation of section 11501 of the Health and Safety Code merged into the homicide so that defendant’s conviction cannot stand unless the record contains substan *60 tial evidence of actual malice, express or implied, is not easy to answer, for neither Ireland nor People v. Wilson, 1 Cal.3d 431 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ] nor People v. Sears, 2 Cal.3d 180 [ 84 Cal.Rptr. 711 , 465 P.2d 847 ], Ireland’s progeny, are explicit with respect to the rationale of the doctrine of merger as it is to be applied in California.

2007Code, § 246 ) was an integral part of the homicide and, under the prosecution's evidence, an offense included in fact within the homicide. ( Hansen, supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 307 .) The high court agreed with Taylor's definition of the scope of the Ireland rule, but declined to adopt the "collateral and independent felonious design" *Page 190 language as the critical test of merger in all cases. ( Hansen, supra , 9 Cal.4th at pp. 314-315 .) Rather, the court focused "upon the principles and rationale underlying the foregoing language in Taylor , namely, that with respect to certain inherently da

2007Code, § 246 ) was an integral part of the homicide and, under the prosecution's evidence, an offense included in fact within the homicide. ( Hansen, supra , 9 Cal.4th at p. 307 .) The high court agreed with Taylor's definition of the scope of the Ireland rule, but declined to adopt the "collateral and independent felonious design" *Page 190 language as the critical test of merger in all cases. ( Hansen, supra , 9 Cal.4th at pp. 314-315 .) Rather, the court focused "upon the principles and rationale underlying the foregoing language in Taylor , namely, that with respect to certain inherently da

2007If the law on second degree felony murder stopped here, we might have to conclude the instruction was proper, even though the act of shooting into an occupied vehicle contains all the elements of assault, that is, "an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another." ( People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 , 790 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 , 29 P.3d 197 ].) The Supreme Court, however, returned to the Mattison collateral purpose rationale in People v. Robert

2007If the law on second degree felony murder stopped here, we might have to conclude the instruction was proper, even though the act of shooting into an occupied vehicle contains all the elements of assault, that is, "an intentional act and actual knowledge of those facts sufficient to establish that the act by its nature will probably and directly result in the application of physical force against another." ( People v. Williams (2001) 26 Cal.4th 779 , 790 [ 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 114 , 29 P.3d 197 ].) The Supreme Court, however, returned to the Mattison collateral purpose rationale in People v. Robert

2003Words in a statute are given their usual and ordinary meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended or indicated. ( People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 , 27 *370 P.3d 283; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ; Estate of Richartz (1955) 45 Cal.2d 292 , 294, 288 P.2d 857 .) The term "could" ordinarily connotes an "ability" or a "possibility." (See American Heritage Diet. (4th ed.2000) pp. 269, 416 [defining "can" and "could"].) There is no basis to believe that the word "could" as used in section 246.3 has any uncommon m

2003Words in a statute are given their usual and ordinary meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended or indicated. ( People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 , 27 *370 P.3d 283; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ; Estate of Richartz (1955) 45 Cal.2d 292 , 294, 288 P.2d 857 .) The term "could" ordinarily connotes an "ability" or a "possibility." (See American Heritage Diet. (4th ed.2000) pp. 269, 416 [defining "can" and "could"].) There is no basis to believe that the word "could" as used in section 246.3 has any uncommon m

2003The opinion posits that "there would have been no factual basis for charging the Ireland defendant with a violation of section 246.3" because "the firing of shots at the victim from a close range was not a crime that could result in injury or death: It was a crime likely to result in injury or death." ( People v. Randle, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) The court goes on to express its "expectation that trial courts will recognize this distinction and instruct accordingly," and to admonish the People to refrain from "manipulation" in charging section 246.3 violations t

2003The opinion posits that "there would have been no factual basis for charging the Ireland defendant with a violation of section 246.3" because "the firing of shots at the victim from a close range was not a crime that could result in injury or death: It was a crime likely to result in injury or death." ( People v. Randle, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) The court goes on to express its "expectation that trial courts will recognize this distinction and instruct accordingly," and to admonish the People to refrain from "manipulation" in charging section 246.3 violations t

2003One bullet struck a window and the second and third struck her in the eye and chest, killing her. ( Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 528 , 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 .) This incident constituted an assault with a deadly weapon because the discharge of the gun directly at the victim was an act that "by its nature will likely result in physical force on another...." ( People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 217 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908 , 865 P.2d 704 .) The Ireland defendant's actions would not, however, fall within section 246.3's proscription of a grossly negligent discharge of a firearm in

2003One bullet struck a window and the second and third struck her in the eye and chest, killing her. ( Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 528 , 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 .) This incident constituted an assault with a deadly weapon because the discharge of the gun directly at the victim was an act that "by its nature will likely result in physical force on another...." ( People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 217 , 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 908 , 865 P.2d 704 .) The Ireland defendant's actions would not, however, fall within section 246.3's proscription of a grossly negligent discharge of a firearm in

2003The opinion posits that "there would have been no factual basis for charging the Ireland defendant with a violation of section 246.3" because "the firing of shots at the victim from a close range was not a crime that could result in injury or death: It was a crime likely to result in injury or death." ( People v. Randle, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) The court goes on to express its "expectation that trial courts will recognize this distinction and instruct accordingly," and to admonish the People to refrain from "manipulation" in charging section 246.3 violations t

2003The opinion posits that "there would have been no factual basis for charging the Ireland defendant with a violation of section 246.3" because "the firing of shots at the victim from a close range was not a crime that could result in injury or death: It was a crime likely to result in injury or death." ( People v. Randle, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 328 , 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 670 .) The court goes on to express its "expectation that trial courts will recognize this distinction and instruct accordingly," and to admonish the People to refrain from "manipulation" in charging section 246.3 violations t

2003Words in a statute are given their usual and ordinary meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended or indicated. ( People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 , 27 *370 P.3d 283; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ; Estate of Richartz (1955) 45 Cal.2d 292 , 294, 288 P.2d 857 .) The term "could" ordinarily connotes an "ability" or a "possibility." (See American Heritage Diet. (4th ed.2000) pp. 269, 416 [defining "can" and "could"].) There is no basis to believe that the word "could" as used in section 246.3 has any uncommon m

2003Words in a statute are given their usual and ordinary meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended or indicated. ( People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 , 27 *370 P.3d 283; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ; Estate of Richartz (1955) 45 Cal.2d 292 , 294, 288 P.2d 857 .) The term "could" ordinarily connotes an "ability" or a "possibility." (See American Heritage Diet. (4th ed.2000) pp. 269, 416 [defining "can" and "could"].) There is no basis to believe that the word "could" as used in section 246.3 has any uncommon m

2003Words in a statute are given their usual and ordinary meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended or indicated. ( People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 , 27 *370 P.3d 283; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ; Estate of Richartz (1955) 45 Cal.2d 292 , 294, 288 P.2d 857 .) The term "could" ordinarily connotes an "ability" or a "possibility." (See American Heritage Diet. (4th ed.2000) pp. 269, 416 [defining "can" and "could"].) There is no basis to believe that the word "could" as used in section 246.3 has any uncommon m

2003Words in a statute are given their usual and ordinary meaning unless another meaning is clearly intended or indicated. ( People v. Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 241 , 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 567 , 27 *370 P.3d 283; People v. Loeun (1997) 17 Cal.4th 1, 9 , 69 Cal.Rptr.2d 776 , 947 P.2d 1313 ; Estate of Richartz (1955) 45 Cal.2d 292 , 294, 288 P.2d 857 .) The term "could" ordinarily connotes an "ability" or a "possibility." (See American Heritage Diet. (4th ed.2000) pp. 269, 416 [defining "can" and "could"].) There is no basis to believe that the word "could" as used in section 246.3 has any uncommon m

1992Also as in Walker , it is “inconceivable the jury would find that [Raymond] intended to kill only the victims who survived, but not the one who died.” ( 47 Cal.3d at p. 634 .) We conclude the Ireland error was harmless. 3.

1992Also as in Walker , it is “inconceivable the jury would find that [Raymond] intended to kill only the victims who survived, but not the one who died.” ( 47 Cal.3d at p. 634 .) We conclude the Ireland error was harmless. 3.

1991Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 8, 1992. * See footnote, ante, page 1214. 2 People v. Shockley, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 669 and People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 197 ] held that section 273a was not integral to the homicide and did not violate the Ireland rule, and thus was appropriate to use the underlying felony for second degree murder.

1991Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 8, 1992. * See footnote, ante, page 1214. 2 People v. Shockley, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 669 and People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 197 ] held that section 273a was not integral to the homicide and did not violate the Ireland rule, and thus was appropriate to use the underlying felony for second degree murder.

1991Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 8, 1992. * See footnote, ante, page 1214. 2 People v. Shockley, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 669 and People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 197 ] held that section 273a was not integral to the homicide and did not violate the Ireland rule, and thus was appropriate to use the underlying felony for second degree murder.

1991Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied January 8, 1992. * See footnote, ante, page 1214. 2 People v. Shockley, supra, 79 Cal.App.3d 669 and People v. Northrop (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 1027 [ 182 Cal.Rptr. 197 ] held that section 273a was not integral to the homicide and did not violate the Ireland rule, and thus was appropriate to use the underlying felony for second degree murder.

1991(People v. Caffero, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 680 .) Caffero *1226 noted that two other cases had sustained second degree felony-murder convictions as against the Ireland challenge on the “unchallenged, unarticulated assumption that violation of section 273a, subdivision (1) is a felony inherently dangerous to human life.

1991(People v. Caffero, supra, 207 Cal.App.3d at p. 680 .) Caffero *1226 noted that two other cases had sustained second degree felony-murder convictions as against the Ireland challenge on the “unchallenged, unarticulated assumption that violation of section 273a, subdivision (1) is a felony inherently dangerous to human life.

1985Nor does the recent decision in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ] alter this conclusion, since it was there reiterated that: “In People v. Burton, supra, we refined the Ireland rule by adding the caveat that the felony-murder doctrine may nevertheless apply if the underlying offense was committed with an ‘independent felonious purpose.’ ( 6 Cal.3d at p. 387 .) Even if the felony was included within the facts of the homicide and was integral thereto, a further inquiry is required to determine if the homicide resulted ‘from conduct for an independent felon

1985Nor does the recent decision in People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798 [ 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 ] alter this conclusion, since it was there reiterated that: “In People v. Burton, supra, we refined the Ireland rule by adding the caveat that the felony-murder doctrine may nevertheless apply if the underlying offense was committed with an ‘independent felonious purpose.’ ( 6 Cal.3d at p. 387 .) Even if the felony was included within the facts of the homicide and was integral thereto, a further inquiry is required to determine if the homicide resulted ‘from conduct for an independent felon