Lemon test in California

2018To the extent that statute arguably provides greater protection to religious institutions against vandalism, it serves the legitimate secular purpose of protecting the free exercise of religion.6 Regarding the second prong of the Lemon test, we conclude section 594.3, subdivision (a) has a "primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion." (Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 612 .) That statute does not affirmatively advance religion, 6 Contrary to LaDuke's assertion, the fact that section 594.3, subdivision (b), which prohibits "hate crime" acts of vandalism against religious insti

2018To the extent that statute arguably provides greater protection to religious institutions against vandalism, it serves the legitimate secular purpose of protecting the free exercise of religion.6 Regarding the second prong of the Lemon test, we conclude section 594.3, subdivision (a) has a "primary effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion." (Lemon, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 612 .) That statute does not affirmatively advance religion, 6 Contrary to LaDuke's assertion, the fact that section 594.3, subdivision (b), which prohibits "hate crime" acts of vandalism against religious insti

2004(Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 29 , 105 S.Ct. 2479 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) *1287 Whereas the first criterion of the Lemon test involves a determination whether the purpose behind the challenged action is to endorse or disapprove religion, the second or effect criterion “asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” (Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668, 690 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Applying an objective standard, the qu

2004(Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 29 , 105 S.Ct. 2479 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) *1287 Whereas the first criterion of the Lemon test involves a determination whether the purpose behind the challenged action is to endorse or disapprove religion, the second or effect criterion “asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” (Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668, 690 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Applying an objective standard, the qu

2018(Zorach v. Clauson (1952) 343 U.S. 306, 314 .) Because section 594.3, subdivision (a) does not promote a particular religion or religious point of view, we conclude it has legitimate secular purposes and thereby satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test.

2018(Zorach v. Clauson (1952) 343 U.S. 306, 314 .) Because section 594.3, subdivision (a) does not promote a particular religion or religious point of view, we conclude it has legitimate secular purposes and thereby satisfies the first prong of the Lemon test.

2002“Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.” (Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 335 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 2868 ].) The court rejected the argument that only an exemption narrowly crafted to include the religious activities of religious employers, such as was the case before title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII) was amended in 1972, could pass muster under the establishment clause.

2002“Under the Lemon analysis, it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.” (Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 335 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 2868 ].) The court rejected the argument that only an exemption narrowly crafted to include the religious activities of religious employers, such as was the case before title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (title VII) was amended in 1972, could pass muster under the establishment clause.

2004(Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 29 , 105 S.Ct. 2479 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) *1287 Whereas the first criterion of the Lemon test involves a determination whether the purpose behind the challenged action is to endorse or disapprove religion, the second or effect criterion “asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” (Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668, 690 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Applying an objective standard, the qu

2004(Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) 472 U.S. 38, 74-75 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 29 , 105 S.Ct. 2479 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) *1287 Whereas the first criterion of the Lemon test involves a determination whether the purpose behind the challenged action is to endorse or disapprove religion, the second or effect criterion “asks whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.” (Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668, 690 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.).) Applying an objective standard, the qu

2000First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 , 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Walz, supra, at 674 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ." ( Lemon, supra, 403 U. S. at pp. 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) Collectively, these are the three prongs of the " Lemon test." Although, as the Court of Appeal noted here, the Lemon test, which derives in part from Walz , is ill-

2000First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 , 88 S.Ct. 1923 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster `an excessive government entanglement with religion.' Walz, supra, at 674 , 90 S.Ct. 1409 ." ( Lemon, supra, 403 U. S. at pp. 612-613, 91 S.Ct. 2105 .) Collectively, these are the three prongs of the " Lemon test." Although, as the Court of Appeal noted here, the Lemon test, which derives in part from Walz , is ill-

2001A statute "does not violate the second part of the Lemon test [whether the primary effect of the statute impermissibly enhances or inhibits religion] merely because it gives special consideration to a religious group or even because it better enables a religious institution to advance its cause." ( Children's Health, supra, 212 F.3d at p. 1095 .) Rather, "it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence," rather than advancement coming from the religious organization itself. *204 ( Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 337 , 107 S.Ct. at p.

2001A statute "does not violate the second part of the Lemon test [whether the primary effect of the statute impermissibly enhances or inhibits religion] merely because it gives special consideration to a religious group or even because it better enables a religious institution to advance its cause." ( Children's Health, supra, 212 F.3d at p. 1095 .) Rather, "it must be fair to say that the government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence," rather than advancement coming from the religious organization itself. *204 ( Amos, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 337 , 107 S.Ct. at p.

2002The district court “held that the Establishment Clause was not breached by the prayers, but was violated by paying the chaplain from public funds.” (Id. at p. 785 [ 103 S.Ct. at p. 3333 ].) On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the three-part test established by the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 91 S.Ct. 2105 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 ], The Lemon test set forth a standard for evaluating statutory violations of the establishment clause finding no violation if the following were proven: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal

2002The district court “held that the Establishment Clause was not breached by the prayers, but was violated by paying the chaplain from public funds.” (Id. at p. 785 [ 103 S.Ct. at p. 3333 ].) On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the three-part test established by the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 91 S.Ct. 2105 , 29 L.Ed.2d 745 ], The Lemon test set forth a standard for evaluating statutory violations of the establishment clause finding no violation if the following were proven: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal

2007The high court has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case (see Van Orden v. Perry (2005) 545 U.S. 677, 686 , 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2861 , 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (plur. opn. by Rehnquist, C.J.) ["[m]any of our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test"]; id. at p. 698, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2868 (cone. opn. of Breyer, J.) ["the Court has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case"]); and some members of the court have expressed disagreement with that test (e.g;., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union F

2007The high court has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case (see Van Orden v. Perry (2005) 545 U.S. 677, 686 , 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2861 , 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (plur. opn. by Rehnquist, C.J.) ["[m]any of our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test"]; id. at p. 698, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2868 (cone. opn. of Breyer, J.) ["the Court has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case"]); and some members of the court have expressed disagreement with that test (e.g;., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union F

1991(See, e.g., Board of Education v. Mergens (1990) 496 U.S. 226 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 191 , 110 S.Ct. 2356 ]; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization (1990) 493 U.S. 378 [ 107 L.Ed.2d 796 , 110 S.Ct. 688 ]; County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. 573 ; Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 890 ]; Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) 487 U.S. 589 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 520 , 108 S.Ct. 2562 ].) In County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. 573 , Justice Kennedy, in a separate opinion, departed from the court’s usual application of the Lemon test, arguing that there should be a “flexibl

1991(See, e.g., Board of Education v. Mergens (1990) 496 U.S. 226 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 191 , 110 S.Ct. 2356 ]; Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization (1990) 493 U.S. 378 [ 107 L.Ed.2d 796 , 110 S.Ct. 688 ]; County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. 573 ; Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock (1989) 489 U.S. 1 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 1 , 109 S.Ct. 890 ]; Bowen v. Kendrick (1988) 487 U.S. 589 [ 101 L.Ed.2d 520 , 108 S.Ct. 2562 ].) In County of Allegheny, supra, 492 U.S. 573 , Justice Kennedy, in a separate opinion, departed from the court’s usual application of the Lemon test, arguing that there should be a “flexibl

1999In concluding that the first and third parts of the Lemon test would be satisfied if the policy of the university allowed, rather than prohibited, such a use, the Supreme Court stated: “[A]n open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with religion.” (Widmar, supra, at pp. 271-272 [ 102 S.Ct. at p. 275 ], fn. omitted.) Regarding the second part of the Lemon test—that the statute’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion— Justice Nott’s opinion states that “the post

1999In concluding that the first and third parts of the Lemon test would be satisfied if the policy of the university allowed, rather than prohibited, such a use, the Supreme Court stated: “[A]n open-forum policy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with religion.” (Widmar, supra, at pp. 271-272 [ 102 S.Ct. at p. 275 ], fn. omitted.) Regarding the second part of the Lemon test—that the statute’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion— Justice Nott’s opinion states that “the post

2013Under this test, “a governmental practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. [Citation.]” (Lee v. Weisman (1992) 505 U.S. 577, 584-585 .) Here, the Static-99R, including the second risk factor, satisfies the first part of the Lemon test.

2013Under this test, “a governmental practice must (1) reflect a clearly secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) avoid excessive government entanglement with religion. [Citation.]” (Lee v. Weisman (1992) 505 U.S. 577, 584-585 .) Here, the Static-99R, including the second risk factor, satisfies the first part of the Lemon test.

2018(Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) 482 U.S. 578, 583 .) Regarding the first prong of the Lemon test, we conclude section 594.3, subdivision (a) has the clear secular purposes of protecting private property from vandalism, protecting religious institutions from disruption, and protecting the free exercise of religion.

2018(Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) 482 U.S. 578, 583 .) Regarding the first prong of the Lemon test, we conclude section 594.3, subdivision (a) has the clear secular purposes of protecting private property from vandalism, protecting religious institutions from disruption, and protecting the free exercise of religion.

2000To determine if the state is impermissibly entangled with religious activity under the Lemon test, the court considers "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." ( Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 615 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization (1990) 493 U.S. 378, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 688 , 107 L.Ed.2d 796 .) Here, of course, religious institutions benefit from the exemption.

2000To determine if the state is impermissibly entangled with religious activity under the Lemon test, the court considers "the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority." ( Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 615 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ; see also Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization (1990) 493 U.S. 378, 393 , 110 S.Ct. 688 , 107 L.Ed.2d 796 .) Here, of course, religious institutions benefit from the exemption.

2007The Agostini court overruled Aguilar completely and overruled Ball in part. ( Agostini supra, at pp. 218, 225 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 ; see Mitchell, supra, at p. 826 , 120 S.Ct. 2530 .) The high court's overruling of Aguilar has been said to signal its "intent to weaken the Lemon test in favor of a more neutral stance toward sectarian education." (Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction (1999) 49 Case W.

2007The Agostini court overruled Aguilar completely and overruled Ball in part. ( Agostini supra, at pp. 218, 225 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 ; see Mitchell, supra, at p. 826 , 120 S.Ct. 2530 .) The high court's overruling of Aguilar has been said to signal its "intent to weaken the Lemon test in favor of a more neutral stance toward sectarian education." (Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction (1999) 49 Case W.

1999On the contrary, because she was employed as a chaplain and campus minister, they simply underscore the futility of her arguments. 5 As one California court has observed, there is no rigid, ironclad constitutionality test, but Lemon provides a guideline which can be “a useful analytical approach to resolving many establishment clause challenges to government action.” (Duffy v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 10 .) We need not dwell on the first two Lemon factors: It is clear FEHA (1) has “a secular legislative purpose”; and (2) “its principal or primary effect . . . neither ad

1993(Duffy v. State Personnel Bd. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1, 11 [ 283 Cal.Rptr. 622 ].) As the court in Duffy put it, “Legislation exempting religious observers from generally applicable government obligations would seldom, if ever, pass the ‘purpose’ and ‘effects’ prongs of the Lemon test since by definition, such legislation has a religious purpose and effect in promoting the free exercise of religion. [Citation.] On the other hand, judicial deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate the establishment clause since any statute per

1996(Sands, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 867 .) In a separate concurring opinion in Sands, supra, 53 Cal.3d 863 , Chief Justice Lucas—who joined in the plurality’s holding that the school prayer practices there in question violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment under the “Lemon test” (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ])—further concluded, in light of that finding of a violation under the federal Constitution, that the Sands plurality need not have, and should not have, reached petitioners’ further claims that the prayer practices also violated arti

1996(Sands, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 867 .) In a separate concurring opinion in Sands, supra, 53 Cal.3d 863 , Chief Justice Lucas—who joined in the plurality’s holding that the school prayer practices there in question violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment under the “Lemon test” (Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 602 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 745 , 91 S.Ct. 2105 ])—further concluded, in light of that finding of a violation under the federal Constitution, that the Sands plurality need not have, and should not have, reached petitioners’ further claims that the prayer practices also violated arti

1991Soon after Lemon was decided the Supreme Court began describing the test as only a “guideline.” (Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) 6 In Mueller v. Allen (1983) 463 U.S. 388, 394 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 721, 727 , 103 S.Ct. 3062 ], the court described the test as “no more than [a] helpfiil signpos[t].” Although recognizing the continued usefulness of the three-part Lemon test, the court in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] [upholding the constitutionality of a city’s creche in a Christmas display] stat

1991Soon after Lemon was decided the Supreme Court began describing the test as only a “guideline.” (Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) 6 In Mueller v. Allen (1983) 463 U.S. 388, 394 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 721, 727 , 103 S.Ct. 3062 ], the court described the test as “no more than [a] helpfiil signpos[t].” Although recognizing the continued usefulness of the three-part Lemon test, the court in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] [upholding the constitutionality of a city’s creche in a Christmas display] stat

1991Soon after Lemon was decided the Supreme Court began describing the test as only a “guideline.” (Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) 6 In Mueller v. Allen (1983) 463 U.S. 388, 394 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 721, 727 , 103 S.Ct. 3062 ], the court described the test as “no more than [a] helpfiil signpos[t].” Although recognizing the continued usefulness of the three-part Lemon test, the court in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] [upholding the constitutionality of a city’s creche in a Christmas display] stat

1991Soon after Lemon was decided the Supreme Court began describing the test as only a “guideline.” (Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756 [ 37 L.Ed.2d 948 , 93 S.Ct. 2955 ].) 6 In Mueller v. Allen (1983) 463 U.S. 388, 394 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 721, 727 , 103 S.Ct. 3062 ], the court described the test as “no more than [a] helpfiil signpos[t].” Although recognizing the continued usefulness of the three-part Lemon test, the court in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) 465 U.S. 668 [ 79 L.Ed.2d 604 , 104 S.Ct. 1355 ] [upholding the constitutionality of a city’s creche in a Christmas display] stat

2018(Cf. Carter v. Peters (7th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3d 697, 699 ["incidental, indirect benefits to religion do not offend the second prong of the Lemon test"].) Contrary to LaDuke's assertion, the statute does not demonstrate a state preference for religious institutions over nonreligious institutions.

2018(Cf. Carter v. Peters (7th Cir. 1994) 26 F.3d 697, 699 ["incidental, indirect benefits to religion do not offend the second prong of the Lemon test"].) Contrary to LaDuke's assertion, the statute does not demonstrate a state preference for religious institutions over nonreligious institutions.

2015In order for a government program to be constitutional (1) the government program must have “a secular legislative purpose”; (2) the program’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor *886 inhibits religion . . .”; and (3) the program “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” (Lemon, supra, at pp. 612-613 .) While the United States Supreme Court “has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case” (California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc. (2007) 40 Cal.4t

2015In order for a government program to be constitutional (1) the government program must have “a secular legislative purpose”; (2) the program’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor *886 inhibits religion . . .”; and (3) the program “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” (Lemon, supra, at pp. 612-613 .) While the United States Supreme Court “has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case” (California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc. (2007) 40 Cal.4t

2015(See, e.g., Paulson v. Abdelnour (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 400, 422 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 ] [“we will use the Lemon test as a structure for our analysis and where applicable, employ the teaching of [other United States Supreme Court] and California authority”].) 14 C.

2015(See, e.g., Paulson v. Abdelnour (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 400, 422 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 575 ] [“we will use the Lemon test as a structure for our analysis and where applicable, employ the teaching of [other United States Supreme Court] and California authority”].) 14 C.

2015In order for a government program to be constitutional (1) the government program must have “a secular legislative purpose”; (2) the program’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor *886 inhibits religion . . .”; and (3) the program “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” (Lemon, supra, at pp. 612-613 .) While the United States Supreme Court “has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case” (California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc. (2007) 40 Cal.4t

2015In order for a government program to be constitutional (1) the government program must have “a secular legislative purpose”; (2) the program’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor *886 inhibits religion . . .”; and (3) the program “must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’ ” (Lemon, supra, at pp. 612-613 .) While the United States Supreme Court “has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case” (California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc. (2007) 40 Cal.4t

2007The high court has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case (see Van Orden v. Perry (2005) 545 U.S. 677, 686 , 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2861 , 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (plur. opn. by Rehnquist, C.J.) ["[m]any of our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test"]; id. at p. 698, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2868 (cone. opn. of Breyer, J.) ["the Court has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case"]); and some members of the court have expressed disagreement with that test (e.g;., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union F

2007The high court has acknowledged that it does not apply the Lemon test in every establishment clause case (see Van Orden v. Perry (2005) 545 U.S. 677, 686 , 125 S.Ct. 2854, 2861 , 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (plur. opn. by Rehnquist, C.J.) ["[m]any of our recent cases simply have not applied the Lemon test"]; id. at p. 698, 125 S.Ct. at p. 2868 (cone. opn. of Breyer, J.) ["the Court has found no single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line in every case"]); and some members of the court have expressed disagreement with that test (e.g;., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union F

2007The Agostini court overruled Aguilar completely and overruled Ball in part. ( Agostini supra, at pp. 218, 225 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 ; see Mitchell, supra, at p. 826 , 120 S.Ct. 2530 .) The high court's overruling of Aguilar has been said to signal its "intent to weaken the Lemon test in favor of a more neutral stance toward sectarian education." (Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction (1999) 49 Case W.

2007The Agostini court overruled Aguilar completely and overruled Ball in part. ( Agostini supra, at pp. 218, 225 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 ; see Mitchell, supra, at p. 826 , 120 S.Ct. 2530 .) The high court's overruling of Aguilar has been said to signal its "intent to weaken the Lemon test in favor of a more neutral stance toward sectarian education." (Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction (1999) 49 Case W.

2007Rather, Agostini stated, the entanglement inquiry was an aspect of Lemon's second inquiry, whether the government aid at issue has the impermissible "effect" of advancing religion. ( Agostini supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 232-233, 117 S.Ct;. 1997.) In determining such effect, Agostini explained, the pertinent inquiry is whether the government aid program "result[s] in governmental indoctrination; define[s] its recipients by reference to religion; or create[s] an excessive entanglement [between church and state]." ( Id. at p. 234, 117 S.Ct. 1997 .) By folding Lemon's "entanglement inquiry into the pri

2007Rather, Agostini stated, the entanglement inquiry was an aspect of Lemon's second inquiry, whether the government aid at issue has the impermissible "effect" of advancing religion. ( Agostini supra, 521 U.S. at pp. 232-233, 117 S.Ct;. 1997.) In determining such effect, Agostini explained, the pertinent inquiry is whether the government aid program "result[s] in governmental indoctrination; define[s] its recipients by reference to religion; or create[s] an excessive entanglement [between church and state]." ( Id. at p. 234, 117 S.Ct. 1997 .) By folding Lemon's "entanglement inquiry into the pri