sophisticated user defense in California

2025This failure to cite and analyze relevant law is an additional ground for waiver. 9 8 The Johnson Court did expressly decline to decide whether a plaintiff could negate the sophisticated user defense “by showing that the sophisticated user’s misuse of the product was foreseeable.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 69, fn. 5 .) 9 Bjoin has also failed to explain how he would be prejudiced by an unsupported product misuse finding with respect to his consumer expectations theory of strict liability design defect, given the sophisticated user finding.

2025This failure to cite and analyze relevant law is an additional ground for waiver.9 8 The Johnson Court did expressly decline to decide whether a plaintiff could negate the sophisticated user defense “by showing that the sophisticated user’s misuse of the product was foreseeable.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 69, fn. 5 .) 9 Bjoin has also failed to explain how he would be prejudiced by an unsupported product misuse finding with respect to his consumer expectations theory of strict liability design defect, given the sophisticated user finding.

2025(See Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1208 , 1216 expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer”].) Because Reyes-Gonzalez relied on both the consumer expectations theory and the risk-benefit theory in his cause of action for design defect, and the sophisticated intermediary defense does not apply to the risk-benefit theory (see Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1313 [“the sophisticated user defense does not bar a design defect cause of action asserted under a risk-benefit theory”]), the trial court erre

2025(See Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1208 , 1216 expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer”].) Because Reyes-Gonzalez relied on both the consumer expectations theory and the risk-benefit theory in his cause of action for design defect, and the sophisticated intermediary defense does not apply to the risk-benefit theory (see Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1313 [“the sophisticated user defense does not bar a design defect cause of action asserted under a risk-benefit theory”]), the trial court erre

2014Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 559 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 ].) The sophisticated user defense would apply only to plaintiffs’ failure to warn causes of action in the first through fourth counts.

2014Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 559 [ 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 726 ].) The sophisticated user defense would apply only to plaintiffs’ failure to warn causes of action in the first through fourth counts.

2016The court rejected the argument that the admission of such evidence would "improperly infuse negligence concepts into strict liability cases," stating that "the claim that a particular *661 component 'rings of' or 'sounds in' negligence has not precluded its acceptance in the context of *1382 strict liability." 8 ( Id. at p. 1001, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528 , 810 P.2d 549 .) And in Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 179 P.3d 905 the Supreme Court held that the sophisticated user defense applies in strict products liability failure-to-warn cases. ( Id. at p. 7

2016The court rejected the argument that the admission of such evidence would "improperly infuse negligence concepts into strict liability cases," stating that "the claim that a particular *661 component 'rings of' or 'sounds in' negligence has not precluded its acceptance in the context of *1382 strict liability." 8 ( Id. at p. 1001, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528 , 810 P.2d 549 .) And in Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56 , 74 Cal.Rptr.3d 108 , 179 P.3d 905 the Supreme Court held that the sophisticated user defense applies in strict products liability failure-to-warn cases. ( Id. at p. 7

2013(Id. at p. 67, quoting Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 ] (Plenger).) Furthermore, the court discussed two cases applying California law in which the sophisticated user defense had been extended to employees, namely, Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (Fierro) and In re Related Asbestos Cases (N.D.Cal. 1982) 543 F.Supp. 1142, 1152 (Asbestos Cases).

2013(Asbestos Cases, supra, 543 F.Supp. at p. 1150 .) In permitting the defendants to assert a sophisticated user defense based on the Navy’s superior knowledge of the dangers of asbestos, the federal court predicted that our Supreme Court would recognize such a defense, with the qualification that plaintiffs would be authorized to rebut it “by demonstrating that the defendants might have foreseen the Navy’s alleged negligence.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 69 .) In Johnson, the Supreme Court addressed the qualification proposed in Asbesto Cases, stating: “The federal court’s prediction that

2025(Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 65 (Johnson).) “The ‘should have known’ portion of the formulation is an objective standard. [Citation.] It examines what is generally known or should have been known to the class of sophisticated users at the time of the plaintiff's injury.” (Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 601 .) The defense applies to both strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims.

2025(Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 65 (Johnson).) “The ‘should have known’ portion of the formulation is an objective standard. [Citation.] It examines what is generally known or should have been known to the class of sophisticated users at the time of the plaintiff's injury.” (Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582, 601 .) The defense applies to both strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims.

2014Ford, in contrast, had a duty to warn of risks that were “ ‘known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.’ ” (Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 413, 428 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 ].) Determining what was “known or knowable” to Ford requires an evaluation not merely of the information reasonably available to a local automotive business, like Scott’s, but also the best available scientific knowledge and Ford’s own knowledge, public or not, as a large international busi

2014Ford, in contrast, had a duty to warn of risks that were “ ‘known or knowable in light of the generally recognized and prevailing best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time of manufacture and distribution.’ ” (Coleman v. Medtronic, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 413, 428 [ 167 Cal.Rptr.3d 300 ].) Determining what was “known or knowable” to Ford requires an evaluation not merely of the information reasonably available to a local automotive business, like Scott’s, but also the best available scientific knowledge and Ford’s own knowledge, public or not, as a large international busi

2025(See Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1208 , 1216 expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer”].) Because Reyes-Gonzalez relied on both the consumer expectations theory and the risk-benefit theory in his cause of action for design defect, and the sophisticated intermediary defense does not apply to the risk-benefit theory (see Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1313 [“the sophisticated user defense does not bar a design defect cause of action asserted under a risk-benefit theory”]), the trial court erre

2025(See Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School Dist. (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1208 , 1216 expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer”].) Because Reyes-Gonzalez relied on both the consumer expectations theory and the risk-benefit theory in his cause of action for design defect, and the sophisticated intermediary defense does not apply to the risk-benefit theory (see Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1313 [“the sophisticated user defense does not bar a design defect cause of action asserted under a risk-benefit theory”]), the trial court erre

2024(Johnson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 65; see Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 187 (Webb) [sophisticated user defense applies to both strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims].) By the same analysis, the sophisticated user defense applies to a design defect claim based on the consumer expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer.

2024(Johnson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 65; see Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 187 (Webb) [sophisticated user defense applies to both strict liability and negligent failure to warn claims].) By the same analysis, the sophisticated user defense applies to a design defect claim based on the consumer expectations test, as a sophisticated user may not claim to be an ordinary consumer.

2014(Garrett v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 173, 182 (Garrett); Johnson v. American Standard, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 64-65 .) “The sophisticated user defense exempts manufacturers from their typical obligation to provide product users with warnings about the products’ potential hazards. [Citation.]” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc., supra, at p. 65.) Where sophisticated users are already aware or should be aware about dangers, manufacturers need not provide warnings.

2013It is the lack of such a warning which renders a product unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective.” (Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1151 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 18 ].) In Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 56 , the California Supreme Court for the first time recognized the sophisticated user defense to a cause of action for failure to warn.

2013It is the lack of such a warning which renders a product unreasonably dangerous and therefore defective.” (Gonzales v. Carmenita Ford Truck Sales, Inc. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1143, 1151 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 18 ].) In Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th 56 , the California Supreme Court for the first time recognized the sophisticated user defense to a cause of action for failure to warn.

2013(Id. at p. 67, quoting Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 ] (Plenger).) Furthermore, the court discussed two cases applying California law in which the sophisticated user defense had been extended to employees, namely, Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (Fierro) and In re Related Asbestos Cases (N.D.Cal. 1982) 543 F.Supp. 1142, 1152 (Asbestos Cases).

2013(Id. at p. 67, quoting Plenger v. Alza Corp. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 349, 362 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 811 ] (Plenger).) Furthermore, the court discussed two cases applying California law in which the sophisticated user defense had been extended to employees, namely, Fierro v. International Harvester Co. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 862 [ 179 Cal.Rptr. 923 ] (Fierro) and In re Related Asbestos Cases (N.D.Cal. 1982) 543 F.Supp. 1142, 1152 (Asbestos Cases).

2012(See Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1669 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ] [“[p]roduct liability under a failure-to-wam theory is a distinct cause of action from one under the consumer expectation test”].) And, as in Honeywell, the sophisticated user defense is applicable to the failure to warn cause of action even though it is not applicable to the design defect cause of action based on the risk-benefit test.

2012(See Boeken v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1640, 1669 [ 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 638 ] [“[p]roduct liability under a failure-to-wam theory is a distinct cause of action from one under the consumer expectation test”].) And, as in Honeywell, the sophisticated user defense is applicable to the failure to warn cause of action even though it is not applicable to the design defect cause of action based on the risk-benefit test.

2008(Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 64 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 ]; Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 930, 933-934 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 483 ] (Bojorquez).) In addition, as we explain, the defense applies equally to strict liability and negligent failure to warn cases.

2008(Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co. (1973) 9 Cal.3d 51, 64 [ 107 Cal.Rptr. 45 , 507 P.2d 653 ]; Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 930, 933-934 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 483 ] (Bojorquez).) In addition, as we explain, the defense applies equally to strict liability and negligent failure to warn cases.

2008Credit Union (1982) 414 Mich. 624 [ 327 N.W.2d 814, 818-819, 821 ] [scaffolding manufacturer had no duty to give information and instruction about safe rigging procedure to a professional painter experienced in rigging procedure].) While this court has not expressly adopted a sophisticated user defense, it has adopted section 388 as law in California.

2008Credit Union (1982) 414 Mich. 624 [ 327 N.W.2d 814, 818-819, 821 ] [scaffolding manufacturer had no duty to give information and instruction about safe rigging procedure to a professional painter experienced in rigging procedure].) While this court has not expressly adopted a sophisticated user defense, it has adopted section 388 as law in California.

2008In other words, even if a user was truly unaware of a product’s hazards, that fact is irrelevant if the danger was objectively obvious. (3 American Law of Products Liability (3d ed. 1993) Warnings, § 32.66, pp. 113-114; Bowersfield v. Suzuki Motor Corp. (E.D.Pa. 2000) 111 F.Supp.2d 612, 622 ; see Solen v. Singer (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 708, 714 [ 201 P.2d 869 ] [there is no obligation “ ‘to give warning of an obvious danger or one which should have been perceived by the invitee’ ” (italics added)]; see also Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 190, 194 [ 293 P.2d 26 ].) Thus, under

2008In other words, even if a user was truly unaware of a product’s hazards, that fact is irrelevant if the danger was objectively obvious. (3 American Law of Products Liability (3d ed. 1993) Warnings, § 32.66, pp. 113-114; Bowersfield v. Suzuki Motor Corp. (E.D.Pa. 2000) 111 F.Supp.2d 612, 622 ; see Solen v. Singer (1949) 89 Cal.App.2d 708, 714 [ 201 P.2d 869 ] [there is no obligation “ ‘to give warning of an obvious danger or one which should have been perceived by the invitee’ ” (italics added)]; see also Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd. (1956) 46 Cal.2d 190, 194 [ 293 P.2d 26 ].) Thus, under