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24 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Micklegreen2 sentences2022(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [no error where trial court “simply offered to provide further instruction in open court . . . . [and] [t]he offer was not accepted”]; see also ibid. [“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel”].) In addition, “a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications for ‘“scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal. 2022(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [no error where trial court “simply offered to provide further instruction in open court . . . . [and] [t]he offer was not accepted”]; see also ibid. [“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel”].) In addition, “a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications for ‘“scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal. | 3 | 3 |
Agricultural Labor Relations Board v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2025(Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 99 Cal.App.3d at pp. 122–123.) The exception permitting immediate review of union certification decisions is only available in “ ‘extraordinary circumstances,’ ” and courts are “loath to find exceptions to the rule precluding direct review of orders in certification proceedings.” (Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1499, 1500 .) Instead, “under the statutory scheme the employers’ remedy [is] to refuse to bargain with the union and contest the issues in a subsequent unfair labor practice pro 2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 | 2 | 2 |
Woods v. Hortongreen2 sentences2026“The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response.” (Woods v. Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 .) “[P]arties are required to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant’s sanction issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 .) “[I]t is not this court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and 2025(See In re M.H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713 [forfeiture]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657 , 684 [we do not develop arguments for the parties]; Woods v. 7 Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 [“[a] court need not consider an issue where reasoned, substantial argument and citation to supporting authorities are lacking,” and “[t]he mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response”].) Finally, we find no merit to minor’s suggestion, citing P | 1 | 6 |
People v. Dancergreen2 sentences2001(E.g., People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 ; Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) However, we later disapproved this line of authority, holding that the confrontation clause gives no right to pretrial discovery that would override a statutory or constitutional privilege. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122-1128 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 .) No case has remotely held that the confrontation clause, or any other constitutional guarantee, could compel a witness to undergo a new court-ordered psychiatric examination, or impose 2001(E.g., People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 ; Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) However, we later disapproved this line of authority, holding that the confrontation clause gives no right to pretrial discovery that would override a statutory or constitutional privilege. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122-1128 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 .) No case has remotely held that the confrontation clause, or any other constitutional guarantee, could compel a witness to undergo a new court-ordered psychiatric examination, or impose | 1 | 2 |
People v. Rebergreen2 sentences2001(E.g., People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 ; Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) However, we later disapproved this line of authority, holding that the confrontation clause gives no right to pretrial discovery that would override a statutory or constitutional privilege. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122-1128 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 .) No case has remotely held that the confrontation clause, or any other constitutional guarantee, could compel a witness to undergo a new court-ordered psychiatric examination, or impose 2001(E.g., People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 ; Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) However, we later disapproved this line of authority, holding that the confrontation clause gives no right to pretrial discovery that would override a statutory or constitutional privilege. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122-1128 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 .) No case has remotely held that the confrontation clause, or any other constitutional guarantee, could compel a witness to undergo a new court-ordered psychiatric examination, or impose | 1 | 2 |
In re M.H. CA4/1green1 sentence2025(See In re M.H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713 [forfeiture]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657 , 684 [we do not develop arguments for the parties]; Woods v. 7 Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 [“[a] court need not consider an issue where reasoned, substantial argument and citation to supporting authorities are lacking,” and “[t]he mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response”].) Finally, we find no merit to minor’s suggestion, citing P | 1 | 1 |
People v. Clarkgreen1 sentence2022(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [no error where trial court “simply offered to provide further instruction in open court . . . . [and] [t]he offer was not accepted”]; see also ibid. [“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel”].) In addition, “a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications for ‘“scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Delgadogreen1 sentence2022(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [no error where trial court “simply offered to provide further instruction in open court . . . . [and] [t]he offer was not accepted”]; see also ibid. [“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel”].) In addition, “a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications for ‘“scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheelergreen2 sentences2022(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [no error where trial court “simply offered to provide further instruction in open court . . . . [and] [t]he offer was not accepted”]; see also ibid. [“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel”].) In addition, “a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications for ‘“scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal. 2022(People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 174 [no error where trial court “simply offered to provide further instruction in open court . . . . [and] [t]he offer was not accepted”]; see also ibid. [“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel”].) In addition, “a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications for ‘“scheduling, administrative purposes, or emergencies that do not deal with substantive matters . . . .”’ [Citations.]” (Clark, supra, 52 Cal. | 1 | 1 |
Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahonygreen2 sentences2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 | 1 | 1 |
United Farm Workers of America v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 | 1 | 1 |
Addam v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2008(Addam v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 368, 373 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 ]; People v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973, 994 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ].) The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response. 2008(Addam v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 368, 373 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 ]; People v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973, 994 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ].) The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response. | 1 | 1 |
Independent Roofing Contractors v. California Apprenticeship Councilgreen2 sentences2008(Independent Roofing Contractors v. California Apprenticeship Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 ].) Plaintiffs’ failure to develop their Proposition 209 argument is fatal. 2008(Independent Roofing Contractors v. California Apprenticeship Council (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339 [ 9 Cal.Rptr.3d 477 ].) Plaintiffs’ failure to develop their Proposition 209 argument is fatal. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Graygreen2 sentences2008(Addam v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 368, 373 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 ]; People v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973, 994 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ].) The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response. 2008(Addam v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 368, 373 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 39 ]; People v. Gray (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 973, 994 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 191 ].) The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response. | 1 | 1 |
Arcadia Redevelopment Agency v. Ikemotogreen2 sentences2000Barring a statutory or constitutional violation, it is not for this court to stop the Legislature if it transfers revenue from Peter to compensate Paul . . . .” (Arcadia Redevelopment Agency v. Ikemoto (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 444, 453 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 ] (Arcadia).) “Under these principles, there is no basis for applying section 6 as an equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities.” (City of San Jose v. State of California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] (City of San Jose).) Allocation of local property tax 2000Barring a statutory or constitutional violation, it is not for this court to stop the Legislature if it transfers revenue from Peter to compensate Paul . . . .” (Arcadia Redevelopment Agency v. Ikemoto (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 444, 453 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 ] (Arcadia).) “Under these principles, there is no basis for applying section 6 as an equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities.” (City of San Jose v. State of California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] (City of San Jose).) Allocation of local property tax | 1 | 1 |
City of San Jose v. State of Californiagreen2 sentences2000Barring a statutory or constitutional violation, it is not for this court to stop the Legislature if it transfers revenue from Peter to compensate Paul . . . .” (Arcadia Redevelopment Agency v. Ikemoto (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 444, 453 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 ] (Arcadia).) “Under these principles, there is no basis for applying section 6 as an equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities.” (City of San Jose v. State of California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] (City of San Jose).) Allocation of local property tax 2000Barring a statutory or constitutional violation, it is not for this court to stop the Legislature if it transfers revenue from Peter to compensate Paul . . . .” (Arcadia Redevelopment Agency v. Ikemoto (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 444, 453 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 ] (Arcadia).) “Under these principles, there is no basis for applying section 6 as an equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities.” (City of San Jose v. State of California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1802, 1817 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 ] (City of San Jose).) Allocation of local property tax | 1 | 1 |
Scott v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995(Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 135-136 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 176-177 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 ].) “In view of the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, consideration of official motives may play some part in determining whether application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate after a statutory or constitutional violation has been established. 1995(Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 135-136 [ 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 176-177 , 98 S.Ct. 1717 ].) “In view of the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule, consideration of official motives may play some part in determining whether application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate after a statutory or constitutional violation has been established. | 1 | 1 |
| Maryland v. MacOngreen | 1 | 1 |
Illinois v. Krullgreen2 sentences1995But the existence vel non of such a violation turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.” (Scott v. United States, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 135-136 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 176-177], italics added; accord, Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463, 470-471 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 370, 378 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 ]; and see Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S._[ 131 L.Ed.2d 34 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 ].) “[T]hat the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s actio 1995But the existence vel non of such a violation turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.” (Scott v. United States, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 135-136 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 176-177], italics added; accord, Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463, 470-471 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 370, 378 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 ]; and see Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S._[ 131 L.Ed.2d 34 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 ].) “[T]hat the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s actio | 1 | 1 |
| Armstrong v. County of San Mateogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rushen v. Spaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hogangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Jenningsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taliaferro v. Hoogsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Collins
green
2 sentences2026“The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response.” (Woods v. Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 .) “[P]arties are required to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant’s sanction issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 .) “[I]t is not this court’s role to construct theories or arguments that would undermine the judgment and 2023“A court need not consider an issue where reasoned, substantial argument and citation to supporting authorities are lacking. [Citations.] The mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response.” (Woods v. Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 .) “[P]arties are required to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant’s sanction issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (19 | 2 | 2023–2026 |
Okorie v. L. A. Unified Sch. Dist.
green
2 sentences2026Rather, an appellant is required to present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the judgment. ‘When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is unnecessary.’ [Citation.] ‘Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] waived.’ ” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 600 .) Shayna also claims the family court’s order for permanent spousal support is “too low.” If she challenges 2023Rather, an appellant is required to present a cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of the judgment. ‘When an issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument it may be deemed abandoned and discussion by the reviewing court is 16 unnecessary.’ [Citation.] ‘Issues do not have a life of their own: if they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] waived.’ [Citation.]” (Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600 , disapproved on another ground in Bonni v. St. | 2 | 2023–2026 |
People v. Hammon
green
2 sentences2001(E.g., People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 ; Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) However, we later disapproved this line of authority, holding that the confrontation clause gives no right to pretrial discovery that would override a statutory or constitutional privilege. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122-1128 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 .) No case has remotely held that the confrontation clause, or any other constitutional guarantee, could compel a witness to undergo a new court-ordered psychiatric examination, or impose 2001(E.g., People v. Dancer (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1691 , 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 282 ; Reber, supra, 177 Cal.App.3d 523, 528-532 , 223 Cal.Rptr. 139 .) However, we later disapproved this line of authority, holding that the confrontation clause gives no right to pretrial discovery that would override a statutory or constitutional privilege. ( Hammon, supra, 15 Cal.4th 1117, 1122-1128 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 938 P.2d 986 .) No case has remotely held that the confrontation clause, or any other constitutional guarantee, could compel a witness to undergo a new court-ordered psychiatric examination, or impose | 2 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Lent
green
1 sentence2025(See In re M.H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713 [forfeiture]; Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657 , 684 [we do not develop arguments for the parties]; Woods v. 7 Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677 [“[a] court need not consider an issue where reasoned, substantial argument and citation to supporting authorities are lacking,” and “[t]he mere assertion of a statutory or constitutional violation, followed by simply a citation to the statute or constitutional provision, does not merit a judicial response”].) Finally, we find no merit to minor’s suggestion, citing P | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence2025(Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 284, 305 .) “Instead, such recourse has been permitted in exceptional circumstances where the prescribed judicial review process was unavailable or patently inadequate and a significant statutory or constitutional violation was asserted that warranted such redress.” (Ibid. [collecting cases].) Thus, where the ALRB has violated “a specific and mandatory provision” of the ALRA for which the act “provides no means of redress,” a challenge thereto has been held to fall within the equitable powers of the superior cour | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Marina Tenants Ass'n v. Deauville Marina Development Co.
green
1 sentence2021(Marina Tenants Assn. v. Deauville Marina Development Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 122, 134 .) 15 IV. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Yamada Brothers v. AGRICULTURAL LABOR REL. BD.
green
2 sentences2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 2016(See Yamada Brothers v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 99 Cal.App.3d 112 , 118-124, 129 [ 159 Cal.Rptr. 905 ] [exception applied; trial court had jurisdiction to hear writ of mandate petition; demurrer ruling based on lack of jurisdiction per § 1160.8 reversed]; see also Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1489, 1498-1510 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 ] [noting exceptions exist permitting superior court jurisdiction, but concluding that such exceptions did not apply in that case]; United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 273-275 [ 140 | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Alvarado v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2015(Ibid.) In Alvarado v. Superior Court (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1121 , the trial court issued protective orders in a jail homicide case, permitting the prosecution to withhold the names of witnesses, both pretrial and during testimony at trial. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
County of Sonoma v. Commission on State Mandates
green
1 sentence2008Barring a statutory or constitutional violation, it is not for this court to stop the Legislature if it transfers revenue from Peter to compensate Paul....’” (Sonoma, supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1281 ; see San Jose, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1816-1817 [“there is no basis for applying section 6 as an equitable remedy to cure the perceived unfairness resulting from political decisions on funding priorities”].) Thus, because the Legislature is generally free to fund or not fund programs, Grossmont must identify some duty stemming from the California Constitution or federal law that limits the | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Dagnino
green
2 sentences2006“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel.” (Ibid.) People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 ], on which defendant relies, is inapposite. 2006“A statutory or constitutional violation occurs only where the court actually provides the jury with instructions or evidence during deliberations without first consulting counsel.” (Ibid.) People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 981 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 129 ], on which defendant relies, is inapposite. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
AMADOR VALLEY JT. UN. HIGH SCH. v. State Bd. of Equal.
green
2 sentences2000In Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , the court upheld Proposition 13 and the vesting in the Legislature of the general power to allocate revenues from local property taxes. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 225-226.) The court noted that the Legislature was not thereby empowered to reward or punish local agencies and thereby undermine local power to address regional issues by withholding funds. 2000In Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208 , the court upheld Proposition 13 and the vesting in the Legislature of the general power to allocate revenues from local property taxes. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 225-226.) The court noted that the Legislature was not thereby empowered to reward or punish local agencies and thereby undermine local power to address regional issues by withholding funds. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Arizona v. Evans
green
2 sentences1995But the existence vel non of such a violation turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.” (Scott v. United States, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 135-136 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 176-177], italics added; accord, Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463, 470-471 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 370, 378 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 ]; and see Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S._[ 131 L.Ed.2d 34 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 ].) “[T]hat the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s actio 1995But the existence vel non of such a violation turns on an objective assessment of the officer’s actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time.” (Scott v. United States, supra, 456 U.S. at pp. 135-136 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 176-177], italics added; accord, Maryland v. Macon (1985) 472 U.S. 463, 470-471 [ 86 L.Ed.2d 370, 378 , 105 S.Ct. 2778 ]; and see Arizona v. Evans (1995) 514 U.S._[ 131 L.Ed.2d 34 , 115 S.Ct. 1185 ].) “[T]hat the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer’s actio | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Orpheum Building Co. v. San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.