24 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1999–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blakely v. Danbury Hospitalgreen2 sentences2023See Blakely v. Danbury Hospital, 323 Conn. 741, 745 , 150 A.3d 1109 (2016) (‘‘[T]he subject matter juris- diction of our appellate courts is limited by statute to appeals from final judgments . . . . [However], the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the test set forth in [Curcio].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). 2023See Blakely v. Danbury Hospital, 323 Conn. 741, 745 , 150 A.3d 1109 (2016) (‘‘[T]he subject matter juris- diction of our appellate courts is limited by statute to appeals from final judgments . . . . [However], the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the test set forth in [Curcio].’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2010We have recognized, however, in both criminal and civil cases, that certain otherwise interlocutory orders may be final judgments for appeal purposes, and “the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, [supra, 191 Conn. 31 ].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 202 , 990 A.2d 853 (2010); see State v. Jenkins, 288 Conn. 610, 618 , 954 A.2d 806 (2008). 2010We have recognized, however, in both criminal and civil cases, that certain otherwise interlocutory orders may be final judgments for appeal purposes, and “the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, [supra, 191 Conn. 31 ].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 202 , 990 A.2d 853 (2010); see State v. Jenkins, 288 Conn. 610, 618 , 954 A.2d 806 (2008). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Curciogreen2 sentences2025The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even on [their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear. . . . ‘‘A judgment that disposes of only a part of a com- plaint is not a final judgment . . . unless the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties . . . or if the trial court makes a written determination regarding the signifi- cance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the chief justice or chief judge of the court having appellate jurisdiction concurs. . . . ‘‘Alternatively, the courts may deem interlocutory orders 2025The appellate courts have a duty to dismiss, even on [their] own initiative, any appeal that [they lack] jurisdiction to hear. . . . ‘‘A judgment that disposes of only a part of a com- plaint is not a final judgment . . . unless the partial judgment disposes of all causes of action against a particular party or parties . . . or if the trial court makes a written determination regarding the signifi- cance of the issues resolved by the judgment and the chief justice or chief judge of the court having appellate jurisdiction concurs. . . . ‘‘Alternatively, the courts may deem interlocutory orders | 1 | 12 |
Abreu v. Leonegreen2 sentences2015It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he legislature may . . . deem otherwise interlocutory actions of the trial courts to be final judgments, as it had done by statute in limited circumstances.’’ Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009); see, e.g., General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (deeming remand order issued by trial court to be final judgment where trial court finds ‘‘that substantial rights’’ of person appealing ‘‘have been prejudiced’’ by error in administrative rul- ing). ‘‘Alternatively, the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to ‘have the attributes of a final judg- ment 2015It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he legislature may . . . deem otherwise interlocutory actions of the trial courts to be final judgments, as it had done by statute in limited circumstances.’’ Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009); see, e.g., General Statutes § 4-183 (j) (deeming remand order issued by trial court to be final judgment where trial court finds ‘‘that substantial rights’’ of person appealing ‘‘have been prejudiced’’ by error in administrative rul- ing). ‘‘Alternatively, the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to ‘have the attributes of a final judg- ment | 1 | 5 |
BROWN AND BROWN, INC. v. Blumenthalgreen2 sentences2014Under Curcio , the landmark case *661 in the refinement of final judgment jurisprudence . . . interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338-39 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009); see Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 288 Conn. 646, 652-53 , 954 A.2d 816 (2008); see also Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 753 , 620 A.2d 1276 (1993) (Curcio provides stand 2014Under Curcio , the landmark case *661 in the refinement of final judgment jurisprudence . . . interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338-39 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009); see Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 288 Conn. 646, 652-53 , 954 A.2d 816 (2008); see also Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 753 , 620 A.2d 1276 (1993) (Curcio provides stand | 1 | 2 |
Madigan v. Madigangreen2 sentences2014Under Curcio , the landmark case *661 in the refinement of final judgment jurisprudence . . . interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338-39 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009); see Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 288 Conn. 646, 652-53 , 954 A.2d 816 (2008); see also Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 753 , 620 A.2d 1276 (1993) (Curcio provides stand 2014Under Curcio , the landmark case *661 in the refinement of final judgment jurisprudence . . . interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 338-39 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009); see Brown & Brown, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 288 Conn. 646, 652-53 , 954 A.2d 816 (2008); see also Madigan v. Madigan, 224 Conn. 749, 753 , 620 A.2d 1276 (1993) (Curcio provides stand | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fielding
green
2 sentences2014Under Curcio, interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a sepa- rate and distinct proceeding, or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fielding, 296 Conn. 26 , 37–38, 994 A.2d 96 (2010). ‘‘The first prong of the Curcio test . . . requires that the order being appealed from be severable from the central cause of action so that the main action can proceed independent of the ancillary proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hart- 2014Under Curcio, interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a sepa- rate and distinct proceeding, or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fielding, 296 Conn. 26 , 37–38, 994 A.2d 96 (2010). ‘‘The first prong of the Curcio test . . . requires that the order being appealed from be severable from the central cause of action so that the main action can proceed independent of the ancillary proceeding.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hart- | 4 | 2011–2014 |
BNY Western Trust v. Roman
green
2 sentences2010We have recognized, however, in both criminal and civil cases, that certain otherwise interlocutory orders may be final judgments for appeal purposes, and “the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, [supra, 191 Conn. 31 ].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 202 , 990 A.2d 853 (2010); see State v. Jenkins, 288 Conn. 610, 618 , 954 A.2d 806 (2008). 2010We have recognized, however, in both criminal and civil cases, that certain otherwise interlocutory orders may be final judgments for appeal purposes, and “the courts may deem interlocutory orders or rulings to have the attributes of a final judgment if they fit within either of the two prongs of the test set forth in State v. Curcio, [supra, 191 Conn. 31 ].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) BNY Western Trust v. Roman, 295 Conn. 194, 202 , 990 A.2d 853 (2010); see State v. Jenkins, 288 Conn. 610, 618 , 954 A.2d 806 (2008). | 3 | 2010–2017 |
Redding Life Care, LLC v. Town of Redding
green
2 sentences2022Under Curcio . . . interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn. 711, 730 , 207 A.3d 493 (2019); see also Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 346 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009) (‘‘an order issued upon a motion for discovery ordinarily is not appealable because it does not constitute a final judgment, and . . . a wit- ness’ only access to appell 2022Under Curcio . . . interlocutory orders are immediately appealable if the order or ruling (1) terminates a separate and distinct proceeding or (2) so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn. 711, 730 , 207 A.3d 493 (2019); see also Abreu v. Leone, 291 Conn. 332, 346 , 968 A.2d 385 (2009) (‘‘an order issued upon a motion for discovery ordinarily is not appealable because it does not constitute a final judgment, and . . . a wit- ness’ only access to appell | 1 | 2022–2022 |
California v. United States
green
2 sentences2012The two prongs of our test in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors are both threshold jurisdictional requirements that must be met for a plaintiff to have standing to pursue a hearing on the merits, and the trial court in the present case plainly held that neither was satisfied. [5] Sensible jurisprudence and weighty authority strongly support the proposition, consistent with this court's past practice, [6] that "when two independent reasons are given to support a judgment, the ruling on neither is obiter [dictum], but each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with the o 2012The two prongs of our test in Connecticut Associated Builders & Contractors are both threshold jurisdictional requirements that must be met for a plaintiff to have standing to pursue a hearing on the merits, and the trial court in the present case plainly held that neither was satisfied. [5] Sensible jurisprudence and weighty authority strongly support the proposition, consistent with this court's past practice, [6] that "when two independent reasons are given to support a judgment, the ruling on neither is obiter [dictum], but each is the judgment of the court and of equal validity with the o | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Miller v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2010Quoting Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 465, 470 , 922 A.2d 221 (2007), the court concluded that the petitioner had “failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial—he [was] actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner’s two arguments relating to his claim of actual innocence correspond with the two prongs of the standard for actual innocence claim 2010Quoting Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 465, 470 , 922 A.2d 221 (2007), the court concluded that the petitioner had “failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial—he [was] actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner’s two arguments relating to his claim of actual innocence correspond with the two prongs of the standard for actual innocence claim | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction
green
2 sentences2010Quoting Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 465, 470 , 922 A.2d 221 (2007), the court concluded that the petitioner had “failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial—he [was] actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner’s two arguments relating to his claim of actual innocence correspond with the two prongs of the standard for actual innocence claim 2010Quoting Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 101 Conn. App. 465, 470 , 922 A.2d 221 (2007), the court concluded that the petitioner had “failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, taking into account all of the evidence—both the evidence adduced at the original criminal trial and the evidence adduced at the habeas corpus trial—he [was] actually innocent of the crime of which he stands convicted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The petitioner’s two arguments relating to his claim of actual innocence correspond with the two prongs of the standard for actual innocence claim | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Department of Children & Families v. Freedom of Information Commission
green
1 sentence2000Rather . . . once it is established that the matter is CT Page 12860 of public concern, the invasion of privacy claim must fail." Dept. of Children Families v. FOIC, 48 Conn. App. 467 , 473 (1998). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Fair v. Warden
green
1 sentence1999"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential and courts must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy." CT Page 15930 Fair v. Warden 211 Conn. 398 , 403 , 404 (1989). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.