motion without hearing in District of Columbia

2012Although the determination whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion to seal is confided to the trial court’s discretion, White v. United States, 582 A.2d 1199, 1201 (D.C.1990), we are satisfied that the proffer that B.S. and J.H. both testified under oath that the alleged choking did not occur was sufficient to preclude the denial of the motion without a hearing.

1998He relies specifically on White v. United States, 582 A.2d 1199 (D.C.1990), in which we said: Where ... the movant has submitted sworn materials that on their face are adequate to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the movant qualifies for relief, and the government has not submitted any countervailing sworn materials, it is not appropriate for the trial court to deny the motion without a hearing.

2003On appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case, holding that a hearing on the motion was required, because “[t]he [trial] judge failed altogether to address Dobson’s most plausible claim, namely, that counsel’s promise of an alibi in his opening statement, combined with his subsequent failure to present available alibi testimony, substantially prejudiced Dob-son’s defense.” Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 84-85 (D.C.1998) (Dobson II).

2003On appeal, this court reversed and remanded the case, holding that a hearing on the motion was required, because "[t]he [trial] judge failed altogether to address Dobson's most plausible claim, namely, that counsel's promise of an alibi in his opening statement, combined with his subsequent failure to present available alibi testimony, substantially prejudiced Dobson's defense." Dobson v. United States, 711 A.2d 78, 84-85 (D.C.1998) ( Dobson II ).

2025See Hardy v. United States, 988 A.2d 950, 960 (D.C. 2010).

2012The resolution of a § 23-110 motion requires a hearing “[ujnless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is enti- tied to no relief.” D.C.Code § 23-110(c). “[W]here the court is faced with a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, ... [§ 23 — 110(c) ] creates a presumption that a hearing should be held, especially where the allegations of ineffectiveness relate to facts outside the trial record.” Hollis v. United States, 623 A.2d 1229, 1232 (D.C.1993) (citations omitted).

2012Id. at 1201 ; Mahaise v. United States, 722 A.2d 29, 29-30 (D.C.1998).

2005See (Michael) Johnson v. United States, 633 A.2d 828, 832 (D.C.1993) (hearing on § 23-110 motion unnecessary when appellant presented no new information relevant to his competency to enter guilty plea); Vaughn, 600 A.2d at 97-98 (hearing on motion unnecessary when appellant’s ineffective assistance claims were “vague and conclusory”); McClurkin v. United States, 472 A.2d 1348, 1353 (D.C.1984) (hearing not required if allegations in motion “are vague and conclusory, are wholly incredible, or *647 do not merit relief even if true” (citations omitted)).

2005See (Michael) Johnson v. United States, 633 A.2d 828, 832 (D.C.1993) (hearing on § 23-110 motion unnecessary when appellant presented no new information relevant to his competency to enter guilty plea); Vaughn, 600 A.2d at 97-98 (hearing on motion unnecessary when appellant’s ineffective assistance claims were “vague and conclusory”); McClurkin v. United States, 472 A.2d 1348, 1353 (D.C.1984) (hearing not required if allegations in motion “are vague and conclusory, are wholly incredible, or *647 do not merit relief even if true” (citations omitted)).

2005See (Michael) Johnson v. United States, 633 A.2d 828, 832 (D.C.1993) (hearing on § 23-110 motion unnecessary when appellant presented no new information relevant to his competency to enter guilty plea); Vaughn, 600 A.2d at 97-98 (hearing on motion unnecessary when appellant’s ineffective assistance claims were “vague and conclusory”); McClurkin v. United States, 472 A.2d 1348, 1353 (D.C.1984) (hearing not required if allegations in motion “are vague and conclusory, are wholly incredible, or *647 do not merit relief even if true” (citations omitted)).

2002See Newman, 705 A.2d at 260 .

2001In Spencer v. United States, 688 A.2d 412, 420 (D.C.1997), this court stated that the defendant’s failure to submit an affidavit in response to an affidavit by his trial counsel permitted the court to treat counsel's affidavit as unrebutted and to deny the defendant’s § 23-110 motion without a hearing.

2001This case would be in a different posture, and denial of the motion without a hearing might have been appropriate, if the trial judge had given Lanton a specified brief period to present his allegations and the allegations of his witnesses in affidavit form, and if Lanton had failed to comply. [11] In Spencer v. United States, 688 A.2d 412, 420 (D.C.1997), this court stated that the defendant's failure to submit an affidavit in response to an affidavit by his trial counsel permitted the court to treat counsel's affidavit as unrebutted and to deny the defendant's § 23-110 motion without a heari

1998See Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 237 (D.C.1993) (citation omitted).

1996In Jenkins v. United States, 548 A.2d 102, 108 (D.C.1988), this court held that “denial of a request for counsel in connection with pursuit of a collateral attack on a conviction ... under [D.C.Code] § 23-110” 3 is not a final order, and hence not appealable.

1993“To uphold the denial of a § 23-110 motion without a hearing, this court must conclude that under no circumstances could the movant establish facts warranting relief.” Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 766 (D.C.1992).

1993In response, appellee maintains that a hearing is not mandatory upon a suspension motion, and that the motions judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the motion without a hearing, citing Super.Ct.Neg.R. 28(a) and Super.Ct.Dom.Rel.R. 12-1, and Scott v. Scott, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 245 , 246, 382 F.2d 461, 463 (1967).

1991Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1283 (D.C.1987).