statement within exception in Illinois

1990Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (6 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed. sec. 1950; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 13.28).” Poland, 22 Ill. 2d at 180-81 , 174 N.E.2d at 806-07 .

1990Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (6 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed. sec. 1950; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 13.28).” Poland, 22 Ill. 2d at 180-81 , 174 N.E.2d at 806-07 .

1974In People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464, 471 , 193 N.E.2d 25 , the Illinois Supreme Court set forth the requirements for the admissibility of spontaneous utterances: “ Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.’ ” In Damen, the complaining- witness had made a statement to the police in response to the question, “What happened?” The court held that this

1972Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rale: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (6 Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd ed. sec. 1950; Cleary, Handbook of Illinois Evidence, sec. 13.28.)” And in People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464 , 193 N.E.2d 25 , 29, we find this well-reasoned explanation for this pertinent exception to the hearsay rule: “A spontaneous exclamation may be defined as a statement or exc

1989(People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175 , 174 N.E.2d 804 .) The spontaneity of a statement is to be judged from the totality of the circumstances surrounding the event (People v. Smith (1984), 127 Ill.

1988(People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175 , 174 N.E.2d 804 ; People v. Webb (1984), 125 Ill.

1984The supreme court has held that there must be “some evidence of the existence of an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement ***.” (People v. Leonard (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 411, 418 , 415 N.E.2d 358 .) This requirement is satisfied by the testimony from Officer Salabura concerning Griffis’ condition when discovered in the alley.

1984The supreme court has held that there must be “some evidence of the existence of an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement ***.” (People v. Leonard (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 411, 418 , 415 N.E.2d 358 .) This requirement is satisfied by the testimony from Officer Salabura concerning Griffis’ condition when discovered in the alley.

1977App. 2d 431 , 208 N.E.2d 867 .) “Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. [Citations.]” (People v. Poland (1961), 22 Ill. 2d 175, 181 , 174 N.E.2d 804, 807 .) A collision of motor vehicles has been viewed as a startling event (Perkins), and in Poland it was held that the occurrence of the event need not be proved by direct evidence as “it is suf

1972(Dunn v. Dunn, 241 Ill.App. 11, 20 .) The statement was made almost immediately after the accident, in ruling the trial court said, “I feel it is part of the res gestae — close enough.” Absolute concurrence or separation in time is not the only test and the declarations need not be precisely concurrent in point of time with the principal fact if they spring out of the principal transaction, tend to explain it, are voluntary and spontaneous and are made at a time so near as to preclude the idea of deliberate design. 18 I.L.P.

1966Co., 16 Cal2d 460, 106 P2d 895 , 899: “When a declaration is made under the immediate influence of the occurrence to which it relates and so near in time- as to negative any probability of fabrication, said declaration is admissible.” Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflecting statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence.

1965The elements of this exception, which was formerly called the res gestae exception, * were defined in People v. Poland, 22 Ill2d 175, 174 NE2d 804 , in these terms: Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflective statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (22 Ill2d at page 181.) See also these cases which follow the Poland case: People v. Kelley, 29 Ill2d 53, 193 NE2d 21 ; People v. Damen, 28 I

1965The elements of this exception, which was formerly called the res gestae exception, * were defined in People v. Poland, 22 Ill2d 175, 174 NE2d 804 , in these terms: Three factors are necessary to bring a statement within this exception to the hearsay rule: (1) an occurrence sufficiently startling to produce a spontaneous and unreflective statement; (2) absence of time to fabricate; and (3) the statement must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence. (22 Ill2d at page 181.) See also these cases which follow the Poland case: People v. Kelley, 29 Ill2d 53, 193 NE2d 21 ; People v. Damen, 28 I

1964An unspontaneous narrative or recital of a past event does not come within this exception to the hearsay rule: Johnson v. Swords Co. (1936), 286 Ill App 377, 3 NE2d 705 ; Thompson v. Chicago & C.