24 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1915–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilpin v. Stategreen2 sentences1991As early as 1923, this Court stated in Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 468 , 121 A. 354, 356 (1923) (quoting 16 C.J. 280), "`neither an acquittal nor a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a bar to a prosecution for the commission of that crime or for aiding and abetting another to commit it.'" Finally we should point out that, in addition to contending that Ms. Apostoledes aided and abetted by counseling and encouraging Lacey, the State also contended that Ms. Apostoledes gave direct assistance toward the accomplishment of the murder. 1991As early as 1923, this Court stated in Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 468 , 121 A. 354, 356 (1923) (quoting 16 C.J. 280), "`neither an acquittal nor a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a bar to a prosecution for the commission of that crime or for aiding and abetting another to commit it.'" Finally we should point out that, in addition to contending that Ms. Apostoledes aided and abetted by counseling and encouraging Lacey, the State also contended that Ms. Apostoledes gave direct assistance toward the accomplishment of the murder. | 1 | 3 |
Montgomery v. Statered2 sentences2021The following year, in Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91 , 437 A.2d at 658 , this Court held that a trial court erred in instructing a jury that it “could pay no attention to instructions on - 31 - the law which did not pertain to the elements of the crime but which were standard instructions invoked to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to assure the defendant a fair and impartial trial.” We explained that the trial court’s advisory only instructions were improper because instructions on certain “bedrock characteristics” of the American criminal justice system “are indispensable to the 2021The following year, in Montgomery, 292 Md. at 91 , 437 A.2d at 658 , this Court held that a trial court erred in instructing a jury that it “could pay no attention to instructions on - 31 - the law which did not pertain to the elements of the crime but which were standard instructions invoked to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to assure the defendant a fair and impartial trial.” We explained that the trial court’s advisory only instructions were improper because instructions on certain “bedrock characteristics” of the American criminal justice system “are indispensable to the | 1 | 2 |
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COM'N OF MARYLAND v. Atkinsongreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Atkinson, 857 Md. 646 , 650, 745 A.2d 1086 (2000). 2015See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Atkinson, 357 Md. 646, 650 , 745 A.2d 1086 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Randy Lamont Patterson AKA Randy Brown, Marcus Wayne Edmundson, Tony Burton, Don Grogans, and Billy Ray Browngreen1 sentence2013As appellant contends, multiple agreements can be part of a single conspiracy, State v. Choppy, 141 N.C.App. 32, 40 , 539 S.E.2d 44 (2000), because “[a] single conspiracy can include subgroups or subagreements[.]” 16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 36; United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir.1987). | 1 | 1 |
Guardino v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84 , [89-90], 437 A.2d 654, 657 (1981), the Court of Appeals found that “[i]t was error for the trial judge to tell the jury they could pay no attention to instructions on the law which did not pertain to the elements of the crime but which were standard instructions invoked to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to assure the defendant a fair and impartial trial.” The Court remanded the case for a new trial because there was no dispute as to the law of the crime and it was error to instruct the jury that instructions were non-binding. *680 As expl 2006In Montgomery v. State, 292 Md. 84 , [89-90], 437 A.2d 654, 657 (1981), the Court of Appeals found that “[i]t was error for the trial judge to tell the jury they could pay no attention to instructions on the law which did not pertain to the elements of the crime but which were standard instructions invoked to preserve the integrity of the judicial system and to assure the defendant a fair and impartial trial.” The Court remanded the case for a new trial because there was no dispute as to the law of the crime and it was error to instruct the jury that instructions were non-binding. *680 As expl | 1 | 1 |
Lynn v. Alabamagreen1 sentence2003Cf. Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 353 , 107 L.Ed.2d 340 (1989)(“a Sandstrom error is harmless when the evidence of the element of the crime to which the instruction relates is overwhelming or when that element is not in issue”); see generally 5 Lynn McClain, Maryland Evidence § 303:2, at 461 & n. 39 (2d ed.2001)(collecting cases discussing harmless error analysis after Sandstrom error). | 1 | 1 |
Johnny Lee Gates v. Walter Zant, Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Center, Respondentgreen1 sentence2003Cf. Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 353 , 107 L.Ed.2d 340 (1989)(“a Sandstrom error is harmless when the evidence of the element of the crime to which the instruction relates is overwhelming or when that element is not in issue”); see generally 5 Lynn McClain, Maryland Evidence § 303:2, at 461 & n. 39 (2d ed.2001)(collecting cases discussing harmless error analysis after Sandstrom error). | 1 | 1 |
Commercial Security Co. v. Donnald Drug Co.green1 sentence2003Cf. Gates v. Zant, 863 F.2d 1492, 1502 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 945 , 110 S.Ct. 353 , 107 L.Ed.2d 340 (1989)(“a Sandstrom error is harmless when the evidence of the element of the crime to which the instruction relates is overwhelming or when that element is not in issue”); see generally 5 Lynn McClain, Maryland Evidence § 303:2, at 461 & n. 39 (2d ed.2001)(collecting cases discussing harmless error analysis after Sandstrom error). | 1 | 1 |
New Jersey v. T. L. O.green2 sentences1998New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733, 742 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 734 (1985), held: [W]e have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable, ” do not rise to the level of probable cause. 1998New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 , 105 S.Ct. 733, 742 , 83 L.Ed.2d 720, 734 (1985), held: [W]e have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable, ” do not rise to the level of probable cause. | 1 | 1 |
Huber v. Stategreen2 sentences1995In Gooch v. State, 34 Md.App. 331, 337 , 367 A.2d 90 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 735 (1977), we held that a trial court had erred by not instructing the jury as requested on “the effect and weight to be given to character testimony as such.” In Huber v. State, 2 Md.App. 245, 256-58, 234 A.2d 264 (1967), we found that a trial court had erred by refusing a request for an instruction that the defendant’s prior convictions were to be considered only in “evaluating defendant’s credibility as a witness.” Id. at 258 , 234 A.2d 264 . 1995In Gooch v. State, 34 Md.App. 331, 337 , 367 A.2d 90 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 735 (1977), we held that a trial court had erred by not instructing the jury as requested on “the effect and weight to be given to character testimony as such.” In Huber v. State, 2 Md.App. 245, 256-58, 234 A.2d 264 (1967), we found that a trial court had erred by refusing a request for an instruction that the defendant’s prior convictions were to be considered only in “evaluating defendant’s credibility as a witness.” Id. at 258 , 234 A.2d 264 . | 1 | 1 |
McRae v. Stategreen1 sentence1968See McRae v. State, 3 Md. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Choppy
green
2 sentences2013As appellant contends, multiple agreements can be part of a single conspiracy, State v. Choppy, 141 N.C.App. 32, 40 , 539 S.E.2d 44 (2000), because “[a] single conspiracy can include subgroups or subagreements[.]” 16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 36; United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir.1987). 2013As appellant contends, multiple agreements can be part of a single conspiracy, State v. Choppy, 141 N.C.App. 32, 40 , 539 S.E.2d 44 (2000), because “[a] single conspiracy can include subgroups or subagreements[.]” 16 Am.Jur.2d Conspiracy § 36; United States v. Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir.1987). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Howell v. State
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 390, 364 A.2d at 798 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Stevenson v. State
red
2 sentences2006The law in Maryland is that the trial judge is charged with the duty to “delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury, under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive ‘law of the crime,’ as well as the ‘legal effects of the evidence,’ and that any comments by the judge concerning these matters are advisory only; and (ii) that, by virtue of this same constitutional provision, all other aspects of the law are beyond the jury’s pale, and that judge’s comments on these matters are binding upon that body.” Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. at 180 , 423 A.2d a 2006The law in Maryland is that the trial judge is charged with the duty to “delineate for the jury the following dichotomy: (i) that the jury, under Article 23, is the final arbiter of disputes as to the substantive ‘law of the crime,’ as well as the ‘legal effects of the evidence,’ and that any comments by the judge concerning these matters are advisory only; and (ii) that, by virtue of this same constitutional provision, all other aspects of the law are beyond the jury’s pale, and that judge’s comments on these matters are binding upon that body.” Stevenson v. State, 289 Md. at 180 , 423 A.2d a | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Monk v. State
green
2 sentences2005Razzaq also refers us to Monk v. State, 94 Md.App. 738 , 619 A.2d 166 (1993), to support his contention that the failure to instruct the jury on all of the elements of a crime is an error of constitutional dimension. 2005Razzaq also refers us to Monk v. State, 94 Md.App. 738 , 619 A.2d 166 (1993), to support his contention that the failure to instruct the jury on all of the elements of a crime is an error of constitutional dimension. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Sheets v. City of Hagerstown
green
2 sentences1998In Sheets, supra, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is not entitled to an indictment by a Grand Jury or a trial by jury under either the Maryland Constitution or the United States Constitution. 204 Md. at 117 , 102 A.2d 734 . 1998In Sheets, supra, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is not entitled to an indictment by a Grand Jury or a trial by jury under either the Maryland Constitution or the United States Constitution. 204 Md. at 117 , 102 A.2d 734 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gooch v. State
green
2 sentences1995In Gooch v. State, 34 Md.App. 331, 337 , 367 A.2d 90 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 735 (1977), we held that a trial court had erred by not instructing the jury as requested on “the effect and weight to be given to character testimony as such.” In Huber v. State, 2 Md.App. 245, 256-58, 234 A.2d 264 (1967), we found that a trial court had erred by refusing a request for an instruction that the defendant’s prior convictions were to be considered only in “evaluating defendant’s credibility as a witness.” Id. at 258 , 234 A.2d 264 . 1995In Gooch v. State, 34 Md.App. 331, 337 , 367 A.2d 90 (1976), cert. denied, 280 Md. 735 (1977), we held that a trial court had erred by not instructing the jury as requested on “the effect and weight to be given to character testimony as such.” In Huber v. State, 2 Md.App. 245, 256-58, 234 A.2d 264 (1967), we found that a trial court had erred by refusing a request for an instruction that the defendant’s prior convictions were to be considered only in “evaluating defendant’s credibility as a witness.” Id. at 258 , 234 A.2d 264 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Campbell v. State
green
2 sentences1992Campbell, 86 Md.App. at 161 , 586 A.2d 32 . 1992Campbell, 86 Md. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Gambrill v. State
neutral
2 sentences1991According to the Maryland Evidence Handbook, § 518(E)(1) at 186, “[although motive is neither an element of the crime nor a defense to it, absence of a motive is circumstantial evidence of innocence, and presence of a motive is circumstantial evidence of guilt.” In arguing that he should have been permitted to rebut the evidence of motive, appellant relies on Gambrill v. State, 120 Md. 203 , 87 A. 900 (1913), which stands for the proposition that once the prosecution has introduced evidence of a motive for fraud, it is reversible error for the trial judge to preclude a defendant from introduci 1991According to the Maryland Evidence Handbook, § 518(E)(1) at 186, “[although motive is neither an element of the crime nor a defense to it, absence of a motive is circumstantial evidence of innocence, and presence of a motive is circumstantial evidence of guilt.” In arguing that he should have been permitted to rebut the evidence of motive, appellant relies on Gambrill v. State, 120 Md. 203 , 87 A. 900 (1913), which stands for the proposition that once the prosecution has introduced evidence of a motive for fraud, it is reversible error for the trial judge to preclude a defendant from introduci | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences1990As the Court of Appeals stated in Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 468 , 121 A. 354 (1923) (quoting 16 C.J. 280), “ ‘[Njeither an acquittal nor a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a bar to prosecution for the commission of that crime or for aiding and abetting another to commit it.’ ” We echoed this rule in Jones v. State, 8 Md.App. 370, 380 , 259 A.2d 807 (1969) (citations omitted), “A criminal conspiracy is an offense distinct from the crime contemplated and the doctrine of merger is not applicable.” As the proof required for the murder and handgun charges, even if the State proce 1990As the Court of Appeals stated in Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 468 , 121 A. 354 (1923) (quoting 16 C.J. 280), “ ‘[Njeither an acquittal nor a conviction of a conspiracy to commit a crime is a bar to prosecution for the commission of that crime or for aiding and abetting another to commit it.’ ” We echoed this rule in Jones v. State, 8 Md.App. 370, 380 , 259 A.2d 807 (1969) (citations omitted), “A criminal conspiracy is an offense distinct from the crime contemplated and the doctrine of merger is not applicable.” As the proof required for the murder and handgun charges, even if the State proce | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Teeter v. State
green
2 sentences1988In Teeter v. State, 65 Md.App. 105 , 499 A.2d 503 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245 , 503 A.2d 253 (1986), we considered what the State must do to establish the basis for an enhanced punishment. 1988In Teeter v. State, 65 Md.App. 105 , 499 A.2d 503 (1985), cert. denied, 305 Md. 245 , 503 A.2d 253 (1986), we considered what the State must do to establish the basis for an enhanced punishment. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Cross v. State
green
1 sentence1978In Cross v. State, 282 Md. 468 (1978) the Court of Appeals said: “Though the evidence may fall within one or more of the exceptions, the trial judge still possesses discretion as to whether it should be received. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Howell and Kaschenbach v. State
green
2 sentences1976The convictions were affirmed in Howell and Kaschenbach v. State, 29 Md. 1976The convictions were affirmed in Howell and Kaschenbach v. State, 29 Md. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Scarlett v. State
green
1 sentence1970We think the holdings in Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310 , that the acquittal of a particular crime does not bar a subsequent prosecution for a conspiracy to commit the crime, and in Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481 , that *674 a prior conviction of a particular crime does not entitle the accused to the defense of res judicata in a subsequent prosecution for conspiracy, even though the same evidence was introduced as part of the proof of the conspiracy, still prevail. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Kucharczyk v. State
green
1 sentence1970Nor do we feel that all of the testimony of Detective Elmer Moore was inadmissible under the holding in Kucharczyk v. State, 235 Md. 334 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Rouse v. State
green
1 sentence1970We think the holdings in Scarlett v. State, 201 Md. 310 , that the acquittal of a particular crime does not bar a subsequent prosecution for a conspiracy to commit the crime, and in Rouse v. State, 202 Md. 481 , that *674 a prior conviction of a particular crime does not entitle the accused to the defense of res judicata in a subsequent prosecution for conspiracy, even though the same evidence was introduced as part of the proof of the conspiracy, still prevail. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1970Neither v... the qualification of the rule as discussed in Barnes v. State, 1 Md. 123 nor the holdings *477 in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 would control as here the statements were not made by any questioning initiated by a law enforcement official. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Ewell v. State
green
1 sentence1970In any event . had appellant simply stood mute in the face of Montgomery’s statements concerning the crime the rule set out in Ewell v. State, 228 Md. 615 would be applicable to permit his conduct to be received as an admission he ■ . .believed the statements to be true. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
JOHNSON, ETC. v. State
green
2 sentences1967He relies on Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528 , 209 A. 2d 765 . 1967He relies on Johnson v. State, 238 Md. 528 , 209 A. 2d 765 . | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Sealfon v. United States
green
2 sentences1953Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 , 68 S. Ct. 237 , 92 L. 1953Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 , 68 S. Ct. 237 , 92 L. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| People v. Liphardt neutral | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.