6 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gallegos v. Peoplegreen2 sentences2022In Gallegos v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held "[t]he refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser degrees of the alleged crime is error, requiring. . . a new erroneously failed to charge (quoting State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 331 (Haw. 2002))). 8 Commonwealth v. Covil, 378 A.2d 841, 843-44 (Pa. 1977) (finding the "denial of a voluntary manslaughter instruction [wa]s not harmless error simply because the jury returned a verdict of murder of the first degree" and had the option of convicting the defendant of murder of the second degree). 35 trial," when the trial court 2022In Gallegos v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held "[t]he refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser degrees of the alleged crime is error, requiring. . . a new trial," when the trial court charged the jury only on first-degree murder and not second-degree murder or manslaughter, despite evidence supporting the lesser offenses. 316 P.2d 884, 884 (Colo. 1957). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Covilgreen1 sentence2022In Gallegos v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held "[t]he refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser degrees of the alleged crime is error, requiring. . . a new erroneously failed to charge (quoting State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 331 (Haw. 2002))). 8 Commonwealth v. Covil, 378 A.2d 841, 843-44 (Pa. 1977) (finding the "denial of a voluntary manslaughter instruction [wa]s not harmless error simply because the jury returned a verdict of murder of the first degree" and had the option of convicting the defendant of murder of the second degree). 35 trial," when the trial court | 1 | 1 |
State v. Paulinegreen1 sentence2022In Gallegos v. People, the Colorado Supreme Court held "[t]he refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the lesser degrees of the alleged crime is error, requiring. . . a new erroneously failed to charge (quoting State v. Pauline, 60 P.3d 306, 331 (Haw. 2002))). 8 Commonwealth v. Covil, 378 A.2d 841, 843-44 (Pa. 1977) (finding the "denial of a voluntary manslaughter instruction [wa]s not harmless error simply because the jury returned a verdict of murder of the first degree" and had the option of convicting the defendant of murder of the second degree). 35 trial," when the trial court | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Charles Hoppergreen1 sentence2013We agree with the McGruder analysis.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.1992) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s view that the eighth amendment ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime’ is the rule of Harmelin.”); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1991). (“Hooper’s ten-month jail term easily survives the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ applied by the Harmelin plurality, the opinion that is, we believe, binding upon us.”); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 409 (8th Cir.1991) (declining to fi | 1 | 1 |
cluster 567985green1 sentence2013We agree with the McGruder analysis.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.1992) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s view that the eighth amendment ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime’ is the rule of Harmelin.”); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1991). (“Hooper’s ten-month jail term easily survives the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ applied by the Harmelin plurality, the opinion that is, we believe, binding upon us.”); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 409 (8th Cir.1991) (declining to fi | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Warren James Blandgreen1 sentence2013We agree with the McGruder analysis.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.1992) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s view that the eighth amendment ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime’ is the rule of Harmelin.”); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1991). (“Hooper’s ten-month jail term easily survives the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ applied by the Harmelin plurality, the opinion that is, we believe, binding upon us.”); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 409 (8th Cir.1991) (declining to fi | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Stategreen2 sentences2013We agree with the McGruder analysis.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.1992) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s view that the eighth amendment ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime’ is the rule of Harmelin.”); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1991). (“Hooper’s ten-month jail term easily survives the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ applied by the Harmelin plurality, the opinion that is, we believe, binding upon us.”); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 409 (8th Cir.1991) (declining to fi 2013We agree with the McGruder analysis.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir.1992) (“We conclude that Justice Kennedy’s view that the eighth amendment ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime’ is the rule of Harmelin.”); United States v. Hopper, 941 F.2d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1991). (“Hooper’s ten-month jail term easily survives the ‘narrow proportionality principle’ applied by the Harmelin plurality, the opinion that is, we believe, binding upon us.”); United States v. Johnson, 944 F.2d 396, 409 (8th Cir.1991) (declining to fi | 1 | 1 |
Dunaway v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013First, we must ‘determine whether the sentence appears to be grossly disproportionate.’ If so, then we should ‘engage in a more detailed Solem [v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ] type analysis.’ ”) (citations omitted); Dunaway v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 Va.App. 281 , 663 S.E.2d 117, 132 (2008) (“Thus, we examine the sentence at issue in relation to the crime only for ‘gross disproportionality.’ ” “Only if we find such gross disparity will we proceed further with the analysis.”) 2 We find that the foregoing authority demonstrates the proper articulation of pro 2013First, we must ‘determine whether the sentence appears to be grossly disproportionate.’ If so, then we should ‘engage in a more detailed Solem [v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ] type analysis.’ ”) (citations omitted); Dunaway v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 Va.App. 281 , 663 S.E.2d 117, 132 (2008) (“Thus, we examine the sentence at issue in relation to the crime only for ‘gross disproportionality.’ ” “Only if we find such gross disparity will we proceed further with the analysis.”) 2 We find that the foregoing authority demonstrates the proper articulation of pro | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2000Furthermore, three different witnesses claim to have heard McPhail make similar statements on three separate occasions. 7 After consideration of these facts, we conclude the statements were sufficiently corroborated and, therefore, were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). “[T]he admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 34 , 522 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1999) (citing State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501 , 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996)). 2000Furthermore, three different witnesses claim to have heard McPhail make similar statements on three separate occasions. 7 After consideration of these facts, we conclude the statements were sufficiently corroborated and, therefore, were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). “[T]he admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 34 , 522 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1999) (citing State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501 , 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mata-Medina v. People
green
2 sentences2022In Mata-Medina, the Colorado Supreme Court noted Gallegos was not instructive in cases "in which the jury received an intermediate offense instruction and declined to convict on that charge." 71 P.3d at 980 . 2022In Mata-Medina, the Colorado Supreme Court noted Gallegos was not instructive in cases "in which the jury received an intermediate offense instruction and declined to convict on that charge." 71 P.3d at 980 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
North Carolina v. Alford
green
2 sentences2019At the time of his New Jersey suspension, Respondent was licensed in South Carolina, but administratively suspended for failing to pay his license fees. 1 According to the New Jersey order, Respondent entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands to one count of compounding a crime in violation of Virgin Islands law. 2019At the time of his New Jersey suspension, Respondent was licensed in South Carolina, but administratively suspended for failing to pay his license fees. 1 According to the New Jersey order, Respondent entered a plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford , 400 U.S. 25 , 91 S.Ct. 160 , 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands to one count of compounding a crime in violation of Virgin Islands law. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2013First, we must ‘determine whether the sentence appears to be grossly disproportionate.’ If so, then we should ‘engage in a more detailed Solem [v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ] type analysis.’ ”) (citations omitted); Dunaway v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 Va.App. 281 , 663 S.E.2d 117, 132 (2008) (“Thus, we examine the sentence at issue in relation to the crime only for ‘gross disproportionality.’ ” “Only if we find such gross disparity will we proceed further with the analysis.”) 2 We find that the foregoing authority demonstrates the proper articulation of pro 2013First, we must ‘determine whether the sentence appears to be grossly disproportionate.’ If so, then we should ‘engage in a more detailed Solem [v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 , 103 S.Ct. 3001 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983) ] type analysis.’ ”) (citations omitted); Dunaway v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 52 Va.App. 281 , 663 S.E.2d 117, 132 (2008) (“Thus, we examine the sentence at issue in relation to the crime only for ‘gross disproportionality.’ ” “Only if we find such gross disparity will we proceed further with the analysis.”) 2 We find that the foregoing authority demonstrates the proper articulation of pro | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Nance
green
2 sentences2000Furthermore, three different witnesses claim to have heard McPhail make similar statements on three separate occasions. 7 After consideration of these facts, we conclude the statements were sufficiently corroborated and, therefore, were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). “[T]he admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 34 , 522 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1999) (citing State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501 , 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996)). 2000Furthermore, three different witnesses claim to have heard McPhail make similar statements on three separate occasions. 7 After consideration of these facts, we conclude the statements were sufficiently corroborated and, therefore, were admissible under Rule 804(b)(3). “[T]he admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed by this Court absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 337 S.C. 27, 34 , 522 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1999) (citing State v. Nance, 320 S.C. 501 , 466 S.E.2d 349 (1996)). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Koon
green
1 sentence1984In State v. Koon, 278 S. C. 528, 298 S. E. (2d) 769 (1982) {Koon I), this Court held the admission of testimony that Koon had previously attempted a similar crime was not error as the testimony indicated Koon’s individual characteristics and his predisposition to commit similar crimes. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.