18 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1943–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Sterling Leroy Hainesgreen2 sentences2019See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perpet 2019Marks has not cited, and we have not found, any case suggesting we must disregard the legislature’s plain words, which expressly limit the effect of the 2016 amendment to “a conviction that occurs on or after July 1, 2016.” Indeed, it appears there is “no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perpetrator of a crime can claim the benefit of a later enacted statute which lessens the culpability level of that crime after it was committed.” U.S. v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., Dixon v. Iowa Dist. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Yong Shik Wongreen2 sentences2017In State v. Yong Shik Won, cited by the majority, the Hawaii Supreme Court held its implied-consent statute unconstitutional when the defendant was informed that if he refused to submit to a test, he could be convicted of a crime for that test refusal and subject to thirty days’ imprisonment and a fine of $1000. 372 P.3d 1065, 1069, 1081 (Haw. 2015). 2017In State v. Yong Shik Won, cited by the majority, the Hawaii Supreme Court held its implied-consent statute unconstitutional when the defendant was informed that if he refused to submit to a test, he could be convicted of a crime for that test refusal and subject to thirty days’ imprisonment and a fine of $1000. 372 P.3d 1065, 1069, 1081 (Haw. 2015). | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Gainesgreen2 sentences2022In United States v. Gaines, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant’s commission of a crime after discovery of a gun by police is admissible under the new crime exception. 668 F.3d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 2012). 2022In United States v. Gaines, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the defendant’s commission of a crime after discovery of a gun by police is admissible under the new crime exception. 668 F.3d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 2012). | 2 | 2 |
Dillon v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perpet 2018See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) 6 (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perp | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Albert Sorondogreen2 sentences2019See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perpet 2018See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) 6 (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perp | 2 | 2 |
Dorsey v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perpet 2018See Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 273 (2012) (stating as a general rule that statutes are not retroactive in the absence of an express provision or necessary implication that Congress intends to the contrary); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 828 (2010) (“We are aware of no constitutional requirement of retroactivity that entitles defendants sentenced to a term of imprisonment to the benefit of subsequent [ameliorative amendments].”); United States v. Haines, 855 F.2d 199, 200 (5th Cir. 1988) 6 (“[T]here is absolutely no constitutional authority for the proposition that the perp | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goodsealgreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2 |
State v. Herrera, Jr.green2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2 |
People v. Dillongreen2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 1 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005) (citing State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996)). 2018State v. Williams , 695 N.W.2d 23 , 27 (Iowa 2005) (citing State v. Crone , 545 N.W.2d 267 , 270 (Iowa 1996) ). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cronegreen2 sentences2018State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 27 (Iowa 2005) (citing State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Iowa 1996)). 2018State v. Williams , 695 N.W.2d 23 , 27 (Iowa 2005) (citing State v. Crone , 545 N.W.2d 267 , 270 (Iowa 1996) ). | 1 | 2 |
Overton v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Overton v. State, 493 N.W.2d 857, 858 (Iowa 1992). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Warren William Lovellgreen1 sentence2017See Lovell, 857 N.W.2d at 243 ; Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d at 301 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Wadegreen1 sentence2015See Iowa Code § 903B.2; see also State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618 , 629–30 (Iowa 2008) (finding section 903B.2 constitutional, and further holding it was properly imposed on a defendant who had committed a serious misdemeanor). 6 of this assertion. | 1 | 1 |
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wallinggreen2 sentences1984It notes in this regard that the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 , 66 S.Ct. 494, 498 , 90 L.Ed. 614, 622 (1946), held that where investigatory subpoenas are authorized by law probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime is not a requirement for the subpoena to issue. 1984It notes in this regard that the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 195 , 66 S.Ct. 494, 498 , 90 L.Ed. 614, 622 (1946), held that where investigatory subpoenas are authorized by law probable cause to suspect the commission of a crime is not a requirement for the subpoena to issue. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colemangreen2 sentences1974State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 976, 977 , 285 N.W. 269, 273 ; State v. Rhone, 223 Iowa 1221, 1222 , 275 N.W. 109, 110 ; State v. Smith, 217 Iowa 825, 826 , 253 N.W. 130, 131 , and citations. 1974State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 976, 977 , 285 N.W. 269, 273 ; State v. Rhone, 223 Iowa 1221, 1222 , 275 N.W. 109, 110 ; State v. Smith, 217 Iowa 825, 826 , 253 N.W. 130, 131 , and citations. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. State
green
2 sentences2022In Jones v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected application of the new crime exception in a case where the new crime was resisting arrest. 745 A.2d 856 , 873–74 (Del. 1999). 2022In Jones v. State, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected application of the new crime exception in a case where the new crime was resisting arrest. 745 A.2d 856 , 873–74 (Del. 1999). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Beauchesne
green
2 sentences2022Similarly, in State v. Beauchesne, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected application of the new crime exception where an officer unlawfully grabbed a defendant who then threw something away. 868 A.2d 972, 975 , 983–84 (N.H. 2005). 2022Similarly, in State v. Beauchesne, the New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected application of the new crime exception where an officer unlawfully grabbed a defendant who then threw something away. 868 A.2d 972, 975 , 983–84 (N.H. 2005). | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Dawdy
green
2 sentences2022This court first recognized the exception in 1995 in Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551 . 2022This court first recognized the exception in 1995 in Dawdy, 533 N.W.2d 551 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 , State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 , 162–63 (Kan. 1980); Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300 , 329–30, 336–37 (Md. 2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 , State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 , 162–63 (Kan. 1980); Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300 , 329–30, 336–37 (Md. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Underwood
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Evans v. State
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Campos
green
2 sentences2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre 2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Burkhart
green
2 sentences2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre 2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Mullaney v. Wilbur
green
2 sentences2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre 2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Watkins
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Bradley
green
2 sentences2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre 2018Nor is the burden of proof as to an element of the crime charged 'affirmatively shifted' from the Commonwealth to the defendant as prohibited by the Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur , 421 U.S. 684 , 701, 95 S.Ct. 1881 , 44 L.Ed. 2d 508 (1975)."); State v. Burkhart , 325 Mont. 27 , 103 P.3d 1037 , 1046-47 (2004) (holding the felony-murder rule does not violate due process since intent to kill is not an element of the crime under the felony-murder rule); State v. Bradley , 210 Neb. 882 , 317 N.W.2d 99 , 101-02 (1982) (rejecting defendant's argument that the felony-murder rule conclusively pre | 1 | 2018–2018 |
In Re WINSHIP
green
2 sentences2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea 2018See, e.g. , State v. Herrera , 176 Ariz. 21 , 859 P.2d 131 , 140 (1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant's intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon , 194 Cal.Rptr. 390 , 668 P.2d at 717-18 (holding the felony-murder rule does not create a conclusive presumption of the existence of an element of the crime in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since malice aforethought is not an element of felony murder); State v. Goodsea | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Lathrop
green
1 sentence2017See Lovell, 857 N.W.2d at 243 ; Lathrop, 781 N.W.2d at 301 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences1974State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 976, 977 , 285 N.W. 269, 273 ; State v. Rhone, 223 Iowa 1221, 1222 , 275 N.W. 109, 110 ; State v. Smith, 217 Iowa 825, 826 , 253 N.W. 130, 131 , and citations. 1974State v. Coleman, 226 Iowa 968, 976, 977 , 285 N.W. 269, 273 ; State v. Rhone, 223 Iowa 1221, 1222 , 275 N.W. 109, 110 ; State v. Smith, 217 Iowa 825, 826 , 253 N.W. 130, 131 , and citations. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| State v. Rhone green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Commonwealth v. Woodward green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| State v. Sopher green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| State v. Nolan neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.