motion to suppress hearing in Georgia

2021Notwithstanding the difference between Gayton’s appearance and that of the suspect, as well as its findings that the officers determined that Gayton did not match the suspect’s appearance, the trial court determined that the officers “were not required to dismiss [Gayton] as the fleeing [suspect], outright, based on clothing alone.” The record does not support the trial court’s conclusion, however, because the State, which “has the burden of proving the lawfulness of a search and seizure at the motion-to-suppress hearing,” Abercrombie 10 v. State, 343 Ga. App. 774, 777 ( 808 SE2d 245 ) (2017),

2021Notwithstanding the difference between Gayton’s appearance and that of the suspect, as well as its findings that the officers determined that Gayton did not match the suspect’s appearance, the trial court determined that the officers “were not required to dismiss [Gayton] as the fleeing [suspect], outright, based on clothing alone.” The record does not support the trial court’s conclusion, however, because the State, which “has the burden of proving the lawfulness of a search and seizure at the motion-to-suppress hearing,” Abercrombie 10 v. State, 343 Ga. App. 774, 777 ( 808 SE2d 245 ) (2017),

2014“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” Postell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 275, 276 (1) ( 630 SE2d 867 ) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014“When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” Postell v. State, 279 Ga. App. 275, 276 (1) ( 630 SE2d 867 ) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2023In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we consider “all relevant evidence of record, including evidence introduced at trial, as well as evidence introduced at the motion to suppress hearing.” (Footnote, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 650 SE2d 302 ) (2007).

2023In reviewing a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we consider “all relevant evidence of record, including evidence introduced at trial, as well as evidence introduced at the motion to suppress hearing.” (Footnote, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Pittman v. State, 286 Ga. App. 415, 416 ( 650 SE2d 302 ) (2007).

2011Additionally, Thompson did not know of an address or city to which the two were traveling. 3 The officer testified that, in his experience, an air freshener is often used to mask the scent of narcotics. 4 At a pre-trial Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court held that this statement was admissible at trial. 5 See OCGA § 16-13-31 (a). 6 Jupiter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 386, 387 (1) ( 707 SE2d 592 ) (2011) (footnote and punctuation omitted). 7 Id. (footnote and punctuation omitted); see also Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 446 SE2d 532 ) (1994) (noting that appellate review is guided by three

2011Additionally, Thompson did not know of an address or city to which the two were traveling. 3 The officer testified that, in his experience, an air freshener is often used to mask the scent of narcotics. 4 At a pre-trial Jackson-Denno hearing, the trial court held that this statement was admissible at trial. 5 See OCGA § 16-13-31 (a). 6 Jupiter v. State, 308 Ga. App. 386, 387 (1) ( 707 SE2d 592 ) (2011) (footnote and punctuation omitted). 7 Id. (footnote and punctuation omitted); see also Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 446 SE2d 532 ) (1994) (noting that appellate review is guided by three

2016See State v. Depol, 336 Ga. App. 191 ( 784 SE2d 51 ) (2016) (conducting de novo review of defendant’s actual consent to breath test because “controlling facts are undisputed because they are plainly discernable from the patrol car-mounted video recording”) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) The evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing shows that on August 29, 2014, some time between 11:00 p.m and midnight, Domenge-Delhoyo sideswiped the passenger side of a car traveling in the same direction as she passed in the right lane.

2016See State v. Depol, 336 Ga. App. 191 ( 784 SE2d 51 ) (2016) (conducting de novo review of defendant’s actual consent to breath test because “controlling facts are undisputed because they are plainly discernable from the patrol car-mounted video recording”) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) The evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing shows that on August 29, 2014, some time between 11:00 p.m and midnight, Domenge-Delhoyo sideswiped the passenger side of a car traveling in the same direction as she passed in the right lane.

2013See Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. at 275 (1) (The affiant admitted on cross-examination at the motion to suppress hearing that the only basis for his characterization of the informant as a concerned citizen was “what the informant himself told the officer on the phone.”).

2013The affidavit does not indicate how the informant contacted the agent or whether the agent even observed the informant in person.). 6 See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. at 105-106 (2); Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. at 275 (1) (Although the officer described the informant in his affidavit as a “concerned citizen,” the officer later admitted that he did not know the identity of the informant.). 7 See Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. at 275 (1) (The affiant admitted on cross- examination at the motion to suppress hearing that the only basis for his characterization of the informant as a concerned citizen wa

2007Johnson, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur. 1 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 502 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004). 2 We may consider testimony adduced at trial in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.

2007Johnson, P. J., and Phipps, J., concur. 1 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 502 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004). 2 We may consider testimony adduced at trial in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.

2022To determine the admissibility of Appellee’s non-custodial statement, the trial court should have evaluated the voluntariness of that statement under a more general totality-of-the- circumstances due process analysis8 by inquiring “into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including “the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (III) ( 99 SCt 2560 , 61 LE2d ————————————————————— 8 Although the majority opinion suggests, as noted above, that the trial court applied such an analysis, that conclusion is not suppor

2022To determine the admissibility of Appellee’s non-custodial statement, the trial court should have evaluated the voluntariness of that statement under a more general totality-of-the- circumstances due process analysis8 by inquiring “into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including “the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (III) ( 99 SCt 2560 , 61 LE2d ————————————————————— 8 Although the majority opinion suggests, as noted above, that the trial court applied such an analysis, that conclusion is not suppor

2022To determine the admissibility of Appellee’s non-custodial statement, the trial court should have evaluated the voluntariness of that statement under a more general totality-of-the- circumstances due process analysis8 by inquiring “into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including “the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 725 (III) ( 99 SCt 2560 , 61 LE2d ————————————————————— 8 Although the majority opinion suggests, as noted above, that the trial court applied such an analysis, that conclusion is not suppo

2022To determine the admissibility of Appellee’s non-custodial statement, the trial court should have evaluated the voluntariness of that statement under a more general totality-of-the- circumstances due process analysis8 by inquiring “into all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” including “the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence.” Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (III) ( 99 SCt 2560 , 61 LE2d ————————————————————— 8 Although the majority opinion suggests, as noted above, that the trial court applied such an analysis, that conclusion is not suppor

2022State v. Holler, 224 Ga. App. 66, 71 (2) (b) ( 479 SE2d 780 ) (1996). “[I]n conducting our review, we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” Thompson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 844, 846 (1) ( 723 SE2d 85 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022State v. Holler, 224 Ga. App. 66, 71 (2) (b) ( 479 SE2d 780 ) (1996). “[I]n conducting our review, we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” Thompson v. State, 313 Ga. App. 844, 846 (1) ( 723 SE2d 85 ) (2012) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019That test is comprised of: (1) information gathered from objective observations, police reports, and "consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers" as determined by the inferences and deductions of trained police officers applying "common sense *416 conclusions about human behavior" viewed from the perspective of a reasonable police officer; and (2) "that during the process of analyzing the facts as described in the first element, a suspicion must arise that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." (Citations and punctuation omit

2019That test is comprised of: (1) information gathered from objective observations, police reports, and "consideration of the modes or patterns of operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers" as determined by the inferences and deductions of trained police officers applying "common sense *416 conclusions about human behavior" viewed from the perspective of a reasonable police officer; and (2) "that during the process of analyzing the facts as described in the first element, a suspicion must arise that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing." (Citations and punctuation omit

2019Brown v. State , 295 Ga. 695 , 697 (2), 763 S.E.2d 710 (2014) ("Upon review, we consider both the transcript of the hearing on Appellant's motion[ ] to suppress as well as the trial transcript.").

2019Brown v. State , 295 Ga. 695 , 697 (2), 763 S.E.2d 710 (2014) ("Upon review, we consider both the transcript of the hearing on Appellant's motion[ ] to suppress as well as the trial transcript.").

2016Compare Fore, supra, 180 Ga. App. at 196 (officer read implied consent after responding to a call resulting in second arrest while defendant in patrol car). 21 complying with her request to check her to see if she was safe to drive.9 While there was no testimony on this issue, probably due to it not being raised in the motion to suppress hearing, it is reasonable to conclude that Domenge-Delhoyo changed her mind with the hope that she could change the officer’s mind about arresting her if she performed well on the field sobriety tests.

2016Compare Fore, supra, 180 Ga. App. at 196 (officer read implied consent after responding to a call resulting in second arrest while defendant in patrol car). 21 complying with her request to check her to see if she was safe to drive.9 While there was no testimony on this issue, probably due to it not being raised in the motion to suppress hearing, it is reasonable to conclude that Domenge-Delhoyo changed her mind with the hope that she could change the officer’s mind about arresting her if she performed well on the field sobriety tests.

2016But this ground was not argued in the motion to suppress hearing, not ruled upon by the trial court, and not addressed by the parties in their briefs on appeal. 3 While we recognize that this court can affirm the grant of a motion to suppress if it is right for any reason raised below, Dryer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2), n. 22 ( 747 SE2d 895 ) (2013), the ground relied upon by the dissent does not support the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress here.

2016But this ground was not argued in the motion to suppress hearing, not ruled upon by the trial court, and not addressed by the parties in their briefs on appeal. 3 While we recognize that this court can affirm the grant of a motion to suppress if it is right for any reason raised below, Dryer v. State, 323 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2), n. 22 ( 747 SE2d 895 ) (2013), the ground relied upon by the dissent does not support the trial court’s grant of a motion to suppress here.

2016As part of our review, “we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” (Footnote omitted.) Green v. State, 282 Ga. App. 5, 5 ( 637 SE2d 498 ) (2006).

2016As part of our review, “we may consider trial testimony in addition to the testimony submitted during the motion to suppress hearing.” (Footnote omitted.) Green v. State, 282 Ga. App. 5, 5 ( 637 SE2d 498 ) (2006).

2016See Kendrick v.State, 335 Ga. App. 766, 771 ( 782 SE2d 842 ) (2016) (“the implied consent notice accurately recites Georgia law as contained within OCGA § 50-6-67.1 (b) (2) and informs suspect of her choice of either agreeing or refusing to submit to chemical testing, and the possible consequences for each choice”). 3 Indeed, if the defendant were appealing a denial of her motion to suppress, we would conclude that the ground relied upon by the dissent has been abandoned. 16 the grant of a motion to suppress if it is right for any reason raised below, Dukes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2)

2016See Kendrick v.State, 335 Ga. App. 766, 771 ( 782 SE2d 842 ) (2016) (“the implied consent notice accurately recites Georgia law as contained within OCGA § 50-6-67.1 (b) (2) and informs suspect of her choice of either agreeing or refusing to submit to chemical testing, and the possible consequences for each choice”). 3 Indeed, if the defendant were appealing a denial of her motion to suppress, we would conclude that the ground relied upon by the dissent has been abandoned. 16 the grant of a motion to suppress if it is right for any reason raised below, Dukes v. State, 323 Ga. App. 734, 738 (2)

2016Hughes, supra, 296 Ga. at 746 (1); Fennell v. State, 292 Ga. 834, 836 (2) ( 741 SE2d 877 ) (2013). 2 So viewed, the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing shows that on the night of August 2, 2012, the arresting officer, a Georgia State Trooper, was patrolling Forest Hill Road in Bibb County.

2016Hughes, supra, 296 Ga. at 746 (1); Fennell v. State, 292 Ga. 834, 836 (2) ( 741 SE2d 877 ) (2013). 2 So viewed, the evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing shows that on the night of August 2, 2012, the arresting officer, a Georgia State Trooper, was patrolling Forest Hill Road in Bibb County.

2015“Testimony from a motion to suppress may supplement the four corners of an affidavit in order for a trial court to determine what the magistrate knew at the time of the issuance of the warrant[.]” Pailette v. State, 232 Ga. App. 274, 277 ( 501 SE2d 603 ) (1998).

2015“Testimony from a motion to suppress may supplement the four corners of an affidavit in order for a trial court to determine what the magistrate knew at the time of the issuance of the warrant[.]” Pailette v. State, 232 Ga. App. 274, 277 ( 501 SE2d 603 ) (1998).

2014Tobias v. State, 319 Ga. App. 320, 323 (1) ( 735 SE2d 113 ) (2012) (at a motion to suppress hearing, a trial court has no obligation to believe a witness’s testimony, even in the absence of contradictory testimony).

2014Tobias v. State, 319 Ga. App. 320, 323 (1) ( 735 SE2d 113 ) (2012) (at a motion to suppress hearing, a trial court has no obligation to believe a witness’s testimony, even in the absence of contradictory testimony).

2014Copeland maintains that the police officer’s testimony was hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial court. 1 However, “at a suppression hearing, unlike most trials, the conduct and motives of the officers are at issue, and the court must look to the information available to the officer, including hearsay.” (Citation omitted.) McDaniel v. State, 263 Ga. App. 625, 627 (1) ( 588 SE2d 812 ) (2003).

2014Copeland maintains that the police officer’s testimony was hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial court. 1 However, “at a suppression hearing, unlike most trials, the conduct and motives of the officers are at issue, and the court must look to the information available to the officer, including hearsay.” (Citation omitted.) McDaniel v. State, 263 Ga. App. 625, 627 (1) ( 588 SE2d 812 ) (2003).

2013See Davis v. State, 214 Ga. App. at 37; cf. Bryant v. State, 288 Ga. at 893 (13) (a) (According to the affiant, “the informant had provided other information involving Bryant’s case that he had confirmed as truthful. ... [As the affiant] was the lead investigator on Bryant’s case, this is some indication of the informant’s reliability[.]”).

2013The affidavit does not indicate how the informant contacted the agent or whether the agent even observed the informant in person.). 6 See Harper v. State, 283 Ga. at 105-106 (2); Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. at 275 (1) (Although the officer described the informant in his affidavit as a “concerned citizen,” the officer later admitted that he did not know the identity of the informant.). 7 See Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. at 275 (1) (The affiant admitted on cross- examination at the motion to suppress hearing that the only basis for his characterization of the informant as a concerned citizen wa

2013Jones v. State, 314 Ga. App. 107 ( 722 SE2d 918 ) (2012); Walker v. State, 314 Ga. App. 67, 67 (1) ( 722 SE2d 887 ) (2012).

2013Jones v. State, 314 Ga. App. 107 ( 722 SE2d 918 ) (2012); Walker v. State, 314 Ga. App. 67, 67 (1) ( 722 SE2d 887 ) (2012).

2012See, e.g., Mondragon v. State, 270 Ga. App. 780, 781-782 ( 607 SE2d 914 ) (2004).

2012See, e.g., Mondragon v. State, 270 Ga. App. 780, 781-782 ( 607 SE2d 914 ) (2004).

2012Mikell, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur. 1 Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 396 ( 710 SE2d 598 ) (2011). 2 See OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8). 3 Hammont, 309 Ga. App. at 396 (punctuation omitted). 4 Id. (punctuation omitted); see also Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 446 SE2d 532 ) (1994) (noting that appellate review is guided by three principles: (1) the trial judge sits as the trier of facts in a motion to suppress hearing; (2) the trial judge’s decision as to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and (3) the appellate court must construe the evidence mo

2012Mikell, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur. 1 Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 396 ( 710 SE2d 598 ) (2011). 2 See OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8). 3 Hammont, 309 Ga. App. at 396 (punctuation omitted). 4 Id. (punctuation omitted); see also Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 446 SE2d 532 ) (1994) (noting that appellate review is guided by three principles: (1) the trial judge sits as the trier of facts in a motion to suppress hearing; (2) the trial judge’s decision as to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and (3) the appellate court must construe the evidence mo

2012Mikell, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur. 1 Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 396 ( 710 SE2d 598 ) (2011). 2 See OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8). 3 Hammont, 309 Ga. App. at 396 (punctuation omitted). 4 Id. (punctuation omitted); see also Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 446 SE2d 532 ) (1994) (noting that appellate review is guided by three principles: (1) the trial judge sits as the trier of facts in a motion to suppress hearing; (2) the trial judge’s decision as to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and (3) the appellate court must construe the evidence mo

2012Mikell, P. J., and Boggs, J., concur. 1 Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 396 ( 710 SE2d 598 ) (2011). 2 See OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (8). 3 Hammont, 309 Ga. App. at 396 (punctuation omitted). 4 Id. (punctuation omitted); see also Lowe v. State, 214 Ga. App. 92, 93 ( 446 SE2d 532 ) (1994) (noting that appellate review is guided by three principles: (1) the trial judge sits as the trier of facts in a motion to suppress hearing; (2) the trial judge’s decision as to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous; and (3) the appellate court must construe the evidence mo

2024As the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, Miranda warnings “must be administered when the accused is in custody and is subjected to interrogation or its functional equivalent, but a spontaneous and unsolicited statement is admissible without Miranda warnings if it was not elicited by questioning or made in response to any form of custodial interrogation.”22 Furthermore, the question of whether a statement was “made in response to interrogation or was volunteered is a question of fact, and the trial court’s resolution of this issue will be upheld unless it is clearly erroneous.”23 Here, th

1991In the case sub judice, Steffel testified at a motion to suppress hearing that he approached defendant “less than five minutes” after *328 defendant had been detained; that defendant was then “handcuffed” and “on the floor in the den [of the Cane house]” and that he informed defendant that the officers were “executing a search warrant. . . .” Steffel also testified that defendant was advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694); that defendant indicated an understanding of his constitutional rights; that defendant did not appear to be intimidated; tha