motion to suppress hearing in Illinois

2025See Webb, 2023 IL 128957, ¶ 34 (“Had counsel filed a motion to suppress *** on the basis that the canine sniff, without more, did not establish probable cause *** the trial court would have been bound to apply Campbell *** and would have denied that motion.”) “[A]n attorney will not be deemed deficient for failing to make an argument that has no basis in law.” Id. ¶ 73 Because we have determined that defendant has not demonstrated that the dog sniff itself constituted an unlawful search, we also reject defendant’s second argument on appeal—namely, that the trial court erred by finding that Mac

2025See Webb, 2023 IL 128957, ¶ 34 (“Had counsel filed a motion to suppress *** on the basis that the canine sniff, without more, did not establish probable cause *** the trial court would have been bound to apply Campbell *** and would have denied that motion.”) “[A]n attorney will not be deemed deficient for failing to make an argument that has no basis in law.” Id. ¶ 73 Because we have determined that defendant has not demonstrated that the dog sniff itself constituted an unlawful search, we also reject defendant’s second argument on appeal—namely, that the trial court erred by finding that Mac

2023“At a motion to suppress hearing, ‘the State bears the burden of proving the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Id. ¶ 53 (quoting People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008)).

2020Specifically, a petitioner may obtain the suppression of his statement. ¶ 53 At a motion to suppress hearing, “the State bears the burden of proving the confession was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence.” People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 149 (2008).

2003See People v. Brown, 277 Ill.App.3d 989, 997 , 214 Ill.Dec. 679 , 661 N.E.2d 533 (1996) (court held that there was no reason why officers could not have maintained a stakeout for a time to procure a warrant where police had all exits to the apartment secured).

2003See People v. Brown, 277 Ill.App.3d 989, 997 , 214 Ill.Dec. 679 , 661 N.E.2d 533 (1996) (court held that there was no reason why officers could not have maintained a stakeout for a time to procure a warrant where police had all exits to the apartment secured).

2023See Cregan, 2014 IL 113600, ¶ 23 ; Thornton, 2020 IL App (1st) 170753, ¶ 23 . ¶ 32 And, that brings us to our next point.

2020Id. ¶ 96 The essence of defendant’s argument during the motion-to-suppress hearing was defense counsel’s remarks that “[n]ot a single witness states that a cell phone was used in the commission of the offense” and that it was “actually incredibly rare” for someone to tape an assault.

2019The record evidence simply does not support that conclusion. 8 See United States v. Dunn , 480 U.S. 294 , 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134 , 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (identifying factors for determining curtilage); cf. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255 , ¶¶ 3-5, 28, 415 Ill.Dec. 389 , 82 N.E.3d 593 (noting police committed fourth amendment violation by reaching inside the outer doorframe to obtain incriminating evidence, where the defendant's mother specifically testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the space between the interior and exterior doors of her two-flat building was private and not subje

2019The record evidence simply does not support that conclusion. 8 See United States v. Dunn , 480 U.S. 294 , 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134 , 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (identifying factors for determining curtilage); cf. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255 , ¶¶ 3-5, 28, 415 Ill.Dec. 389 , 82 N.E.3d 593 (noting police committed fourth amendment violation by reaching inside the outer doorframe to obtain incriminating evidence, where the defendant's mother specifically testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the space between the interior and exterior doors of her two-flat building was private and not subje

2019The record evidence simply does not support that conclusion. 8 See United States v. Dunn , 480 U.S. 294 , 301, 107 S.Ct. 1134 , 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (identifying factors for determining curtilage); cf. Martin , 2017 IL App (1st) 143255 , ¶¶ 3-5, 28, 415 Ill.Dec. 389 , 82 N.E.3d 593 (noting police committed fourth amendment violation by reaching inside the outer doorframe to obtain incriminating evidence, where the defendant's mother specifically testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the space between the interior and exterior doors of her two-flat building was private and not subje

2019The record evidence simply does not support that conclusion. 8 See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (identifying factors for determining curtilage); cf. Martin, 2017 IL App (1st) 143255, ¶¶ 3-5, 28 (noting police committed fourth amendment violation by reaching inside the outer door frame to obtain incriminating evidence, where the defendant’s mother specifically testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the space between the interior and exterior doors of her two-flat building was private and not subject to trespassing with the exterior door normally locked).

2025“The recantation of testimony is regarded as inherently unreliable.” People v. Steidl, 177 Ill. 2d 239, 260 (1997).

2023See Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 44 (noting that trial court may consider hearsay evidence at a pretrial forfeiture hearing); People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 111-12 (2000) (acknowledging that under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), hearsay evidence is admissible during a motion to suppress hearing even though it is not admissible at trial).

2023See Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 44 (noting that trial court may consider hearsay evidence at a pretrial forfeiture hearing); People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 111-12 (2000) (acknowledging that under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), hearsay evidence is admissible during a motion to suppress hearing even though it is not admissible at trial).

2023District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. ___ , ___, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018). ¶ 66 The trial court conducted the motion to suppress hearing on May 2, 2017.

2023See United States v. Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (The aim of the sixth amendment is “to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers”). ¶ 40 We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that defendant’s continuance request to obtain new counsel was a delay tactic; indeed, the three-year timeline, over which defendant hired three private lawyers, represented himself twice, and accepted the 11 appointment of the public defender three times, more than su

2023Under Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory traffic stop when the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion to believe “that the person has committed, or is about to, commit a crime.” People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2010). ¶ 13 At the outset we note that, for the first time on appeal, both parties support their arguments with testimony elicited at trial that was not presented to the circuit court during the motion to suppress hearing.