motion to suppress hearing in Texas

2023“At a motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 (citing State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim.

2021“In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. Crim.

2008See Romero v. State , 800 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. Crim.

2014“In this review we give almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts and review the court’s application of search and seizure law de novo.” Id. (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 88-89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997)). *53 “In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex.Crim.App.2000).

2012See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89 ; State v. Hopper, 842 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1992, no pet.); see also Farias v. State, No. 01-93-00422-CR, 1995 WL 389671 , at *2 (Tex.App.-- Houston (1st Dist.) 1995, no pet.)(“In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court may believe all, some or none of any witness’ testimony.”), citing Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994).

2026In a motion to suppress hearing, “the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. Crim.

2023“At a motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.” Id. at 190 .

2016“In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the evidence and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 466 (Tex. Crim.

2016“In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the evidence- and the weight to be given their testimony.” State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 466 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (quoting State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000)).

2016Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); McKissick v. State, 209 S.W.3d 205, 212 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref‟d).

2015Massey v. State, 933 S.W.2d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim.

2015See State v. Ballard, 987 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim.

2012In a motion to suppress hearing, the trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence.6 In reviewing the ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must give almost total deference to a trial judge’s findings of historical fact and credibility determinations.7 First, “the trial judge is ‘Johnny-on-the-Spot,’ personally able to see and hear the witnesses testify.”8 Second, “[t]he trial judge’s major role is the determination of fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes expertise.” 9 Third, appellate courts that duplicate the trial

2024Findings of fact and conclusions of law “ensure that reviewing courts need not presume, assume, or guess at what historical facts a trial judge actually found when making a ruling in a motion to suppress hearing.” State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Tex. Crim.

2024Findings of fact and conclusions of law “ensure that reviewing courts need not presume, assume, or guess at what historical facts a trial judge actually found when making a ruling in a motion to suppress hearing.” State v. Mendoza, 365 S.W.3d 666, 671 (Tex. Crim.

2006Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). 1 At the conclusion of the testimony at the motion to suppress hearing, the court requested that counsel present their arguments by brief. 3 A police officer may stop and briefly detain persons reasonably suspected of criminal activity, even if probable cause to arrest is not then present.

2006When the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer and the trial court files findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. (footnote: 2) State v. Ballman , 157 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 327-28 ); Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 86-87, 89 ; James v. State , 102 S.W.3d 162, 169-79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d)).

2005See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); see also *656 King v. State, 35 S.W.3d 740, 742 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2004See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex.Crim.App.2000); King v. State, 35 S.W.3d 740, 742 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).

2009See Ballman v. State , 157 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d).

2006When the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer and the trial court files findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. (footnote: 2) State v. Ballman , 157 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 327-28 ); Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 86-87, 89 ; James v. State , 102 S.W.3d 162, 169-79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d)).

2007One benefit of the decision in State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 698-99 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), is that the losing party on a motion-to-suppress hearing in the trial court may require the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its ruling.

2007One benefit of the decision in State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 698-99 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006), is that the losing party on a motion-to-suppress hearing in the trial court may require the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its ruling.

2014See Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (“Statements made during a motion to suppress hearing do not factor into the probable cause determination; rather, we examine only the four corners of the affidavit to determine whether probable cause exists.”).

2010Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Tex.App.–Houston [1 st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (citations omitted).

2006When the sole witness at the motion to suppress hearing is the arresting officer and the trial court files findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only question before us is whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts it found. (footnote: 2) State v. Ballman , 157 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref’d) (citing Carmouche , 10 S.W.3d at 327-28 ); Guzman , 955 S.W.2d at 86-87, 89 ; James v. State , 102 S.W.3d 162, 169-79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d)).

2005See Carmouche, 10 S.W.3d at 327-28 ; Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 86-87, 89 ; Harrison, 144 S.W.3d at 85 ; James v. State, 102 S.W.3d 162, 169-79 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).

2015Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538, 540 (Tex. Crim.

2006See McVickers v. State, 874 S.W.2d 662, 663-66 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (holding eviden-tiary rules regarding hearsay apply at a motion to suppress hearing; case was reversed because of improper objected-to hearsay testimony that other officers told witness that defendant's vehicle had been stopped because he had run a red light); Tores v. State, 518 S.W.2d 378, 379-81 (Tex.Crim.App.1975) (restating general rule that an officer has probable cause to lawfully stop a vehicle and arrest a passenger when that officer observes a traffic violation, failure to stop at stop sign); Walter v. State, 997 S.W.

2024“In Woods, for example, the [C]ourt of [C]riminal [A]ppeals concluded that the defendant could not use a motion to suppress to challenge the legality of his detention in connection with a prosecution for evading arrest or detention, an element of which requires that the attempt to arrest or detain him be lawful.” Gonzalez, 501 S.W.3d at 286 (citing Woods, 153 S.W.3d at 415 ).

2012See Farias, 1995 WL 389671 , at *2, citing Wilson v. State, 857 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d)(“A motion to suppress hearing tests only the admissibility of evidence, not its sufficiency.”); see also Marquez, 281 S.W.3d at 60 , citing Woods, 153 S.W.3d at 415-16 (“A suppression order based on the ground that the evidence substantiating the offense was not credible would, in effect, deny the State its right to a jury trial.”).

2025Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24-25 .

2021Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim.

2017Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2017Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

2015The court of criminal appeals has held that when "a defendant objects to the [trial] court admitting evidence on the ground that it was unlawfully seized and the State relies on a search warrant, in the absence of a waiver, reversible error will result unless the record reflects that the warrant was exhibited to the trial judge." Handy v. State, 189 S.W.3d 296, 298 (Tex. Crim.

2012The court of criminal appeals has held that when “a defendant objects to the [trial] court admitting evidence on the ground that it was unlawfully seized and the State relies on a search warrant, in the absence of a waiver, reversible error will result unless the record reflects that the warrant was exhibited to the trial judge.” Handy v. State , 189 S.W.3d 296, 298 (Tex. Crim.

2015See id.

2015See id.

2013Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. 8 At the motion to suppress hearing, appellant’s trial counsel stated that appellant was not challenging the validity of the initial stop.

2012Amador v. State , 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim.

2012Appellant contends, “The evidence presented to the tidal court during the motion to suppress hearing failed to establish whether any of the prescribed violations took place.” This argument overstates the State’s burden. “[P]roof of the actual commission of the offense is not a requisite.” Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.Crim.App.1977); accord Valencia v. State, 820 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, pet. refd).

2011Appellant contends, ―The evidence presented to the trial court during the motion to suppress hearing failed to establish whether any of the prescribed violations took place.‖ This argument overstates the State‘s burden. ―[P]roof 12 of the actual commission of the offense is not a requisite.‖ Drago v. State, 553 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. Crim.

2011Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim.

2010See Gutierrez, 221 S.W.3d at 687 ; Radial, 917 S.W.2d at 809 .

2011PENAL CODE § 2.01 ("All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). [83] See Lalande v. State, 676 S.W.2d 115, 117-18 , 117 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (State is not required to prove propriety of a search beyond a reasonable doubt in a motion to suppress hearing.); see also Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (recognizing that "the burden is on the State to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion" but not specifying the nature of that burden). [84] See e.g.,

2011PENAL CODE § 2.01 ("All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."). [83] See Lalande v. State, 676 S.W.2d 115, 117-18 , 117 n. 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (State is not required to prove propriety of a search beyond a reasonable doubt in a motion to suppress hearing.); see also Castro v. State, 227 S.W.3d 737, 741 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (recognizing that "the burden is on the State to show that the officer had reasonable suspicion" but not specifying the nature of that burden). [84] See e.g.,

2010Wilson v. State , 277 S.W.3d 446, 447-49 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2008) ("The facts presented at the motion to suppress hearing and the plain language of section 37.09 lead to the conclusion that the detective violated section 37.09."). 5.

2010Wilson v. State, 277 S.W.3d 446, 447-49 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2008) ("The facts presented at the motion to suppress hearing and the plain language of section 37.09 lead to the conclusion that the detective violated section 37.09.”). .

2009See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 541-43 (4th Cir.2005) (at a motion to suppress hearing, trial judge could rely primarily upon letter written by defendant to his girlfriend regarding his intention to relinquish his interest in the apartment); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir.1975) (trial court could consider documentary evidence of completed customs form at motion to suppress even though it was hearsay); United States v. Barnes, 443 F.Supp. 137 , 139 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1977) ("Although the records [of testimony from a prior motion to suppress hearing in state c

2009EVID. 803(8) and 803(6). [37] United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 175 , 94 S.Ct. 988 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). [38] Id. at 175-76 , 94 S.Ct. 988 . [39] See, e.g., United States v. Stevenson, 396 F.3d 538, 541-43 (4th Cir.2005) (at a motion to suppress hearing, trial judge could rely primarily upon letter written by defendant to his girlfriend regarding his intention to relinquish his interest in the apartment); United States v. Bolin, 514 F.2d 554, 557 (7th Cir. 1975) (trial court could consider documentary evidence of completed customs form at motion to suppress even though it was hearsay)

2018Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878 ; Garcia–Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 241 .

2013Whether an interaction between police and a citizen constitutes a mere encounter or a detention is, I agree with the Court today, a mixed question of law and fact.3 Whether that mixed question of law and fact should be considered deferentially or de novo by a reviewing court depends upon whether that mixed question turns on a dispute of historical fact or credibility of the witnesses.4 A reviewing court must defer to a trial judge’s determination of historical facts, and make the legal determination whether a particular interaction is an encounter or a detention by applying the law to those ac