motion to suppress hearing in Indiana

2014Chiszar, 936 N.E.2d at 824 .

2012Id.

2013Id.

2012Id.

2007Id. at 426 . “[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or incul-patory, stemming'from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2007Id. at 426 . “[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or incul-patory, stemming'from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

2023“The Amendment protects citizens from search or seizure absent a warrant supported by probable cause.” Tigner v. State, 142 N.E.3d 1064 , 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

2023When making such a determination, we “consider the foundational evidence from the trial as well as the evidence from (holding officer’s testimony that he initially believed brown substance found in defendant’s house was heroin constituted harmless error because “we are satisfied that there is no substantial likelihood that the challenged evidence contributed to the jury’s verdict”). 5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1869 (1968). the motion to suppress hearing which is not in direct conflict with the trial testimony.” Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 1.

2020Id. at 531 .

2010Id.

2005Our Supreme Court, in Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind.1997), 2 weighed in on this dilemma in order to provide trial courts with some guidance when faced with a trial objection to a confession previously determined to be admissible.

2005Our Supreme Court, in Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind.1997), 2 weighed in on this dilemma in order to provide trial courts with some guidance when faced with a trial objection to a confession previously determined to be admissible.

2005Our Supreme Court, in Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 (Ind.1997), 2 weighed in on this dilemma in order to provide trial courts with some guidance when faced with a trial objection to a confession previously determined to be admissible.

2005Several years later the Court revisited the issue and stated that a "policeman's unar-ticulated plan [to take the defendant into custody] has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was 'in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). 'At the motion to suppress hearing, Kelley testified that he felt that he was free to leave at anytime during the initial interview with Detective Whitley.

2005Several years later the Court revisited the issue and stated that a "policeman's unar-ticulated plan [to take the defendant into custody] has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was 'in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 , 104 S.Ct. 3138 , 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984). 'At the motion to suppress hearing, Kelley testified that he felt that he was free to leave at anytime during the initial interview with Detective Whitley.

1991On appeal, the State, citing Battle v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 70 , 415 N.E.2d 39 , claims the Everroads are chargeable with all the time from June 2, 1980, to July 20, 1981, the date for which trial was rescheduled following the denial of the motion to suppress.

1991On appeal, the State, citing Battle v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 70 , 415 N.E.2d 39 , claims the Everroads are chargeable with all the time from June 2, 1980, to July 20, 1981, the date for which trial was rescheduled following the denial of the motion to suppress.

1979Franklin v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 540 , 364 N.E.2d 1019 ; Montes v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 390 , 332 N.E.2d 786 .

1979Franklin v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 540 , 364 N.E.2d 1019 ; Montes v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 390 , 332 N.E.2d 786 .

1979Franklin v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 540 , 364 N.E.2d 1019 ; Montes v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 390 , 332 N.E.2d 786 .

1979Franklin v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 540 , 364 N.E.2d 1019 ; Montes v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 390 , 332 N.E.2d 786 .

1975We look only to that evidence which supports the trial court’s determination. . . ,” 2 There was sufficient evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing to support the trial court’s determination that Moreno was advised of his Miranda rights prior to confessing to the police. (2) Moreno further contends that his confession should have been suppressed under the rationale of Lewis v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 431 , 288 N.E.2d 138 .

1975We look only to that evidence which supports the trial court’s determination. . . ,” 2 There was sufficient evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing to support the trial court’s determination that Moreno was advised of his Miranda rights prior to confessing to the police. (2) Moreno further contends that his confession should have been suppressed under the rationale of Lewis v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 431 , 288 N.E.2d 138 .

1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 .

1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 .

1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 .

1975He argues (1) that the arresting officer did not have sufficient probable cause to make the arrest and (2) that the arresting officer was required to obtain an arrest warrant under the circumstances of this case. 3 We need not consider whether Moreno’s arrest was illegal and whether his confession should have been excluded under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule [Wong Sun v. United States (1963), 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441] 4 Koonce v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 5 , 323 N.E.2d 219 .