filed rate doctrine in New York

2025We decline to dismiss the action against LIPA under the filed rate doctrine, as the applicable rate is yet to be determined and plaintiffs apparently seek to establish "equal rates" for all religious organizations entitled to utility services at residential rates ( see Porr , 230 AD2d at 573-574; see also Matter of Multiple Intervenors v Public Serv.

2025We decline to dismiss the action against LIPA under the filed rate doctrine, as the applicable rate is yet to be determined and plaintiffs apparently seek to establish "equal rates" for all religious organizations entitled to utility services at residential rates ( see Porr , 230 AD2d at 573-574 ; see also Matter of Multiple Intervenors v Public Serv.

2013The filed rate doctrine bars actions against federal- and state-regulated entities which are “grounded on the allegation that the rates charged by [those entities] are unreasonable” (Wegoland Ltd. v NYNEX Corp., 27 F3d 17, 18 [2d Cir 1994]; see Porr v NYNEX Corp., 230 AD2d 564, 568, 569 [1997]).

2013The filed rate doctrine bars actions against federal- and state-regulated entities which are “grounded on the allegation that the rates charged by [those entities] are unreasonable” (Wegoland Ltd. v NYNEX Corp., 27 F3d 17, 18 [2d Cir 1994]; see Porr v NYNEX Corp., 230 AD2d 564, 568, 569 [1997]).

2013The filed rate doctrine “is applied strictly to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action even in the face of apparent inequities whenever either the nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand underlying the doctrine is implicated by the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to pursue” (Marcus v AT&T Corp., 138 F3d at 59).

2013The filed rate doctrine “is applied strictly to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a cause of action even in the face of apparent inequities whenever either the nondiscrimination strand or the nonjusticiability strand underlying the doctrine is implicated by the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to pursue” (Marcus v AT&T Corp., 138 F3d at 59).

2013Co., 260 US 156, 163 [1922]).

2013Co., 260 US 156, 163 [1922]).

2013The Appellate Division, Third Department, rejected the petitioner’s claims as barred by the filed rate doctrine (see id. at 830-831 ).

2013The Appellate Division, Third Department, rejected the petitioner’s claims as barred by the filed rate doctrine (see id. at 830-831 ).

2013In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Central Office Telephone, Inc. ( 524 US 214 [1998]), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the filed rate doctrine applies not only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges” (id. at 223 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Kross Dependable Sanitation v AT&T Corp., 268 AD2d 874, 875 [2000]).

2013In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Central Office Telephone, Inc. ( 524 US 214 [1998]), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the filed rate doctrine applies not only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges” (id. at 223 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Kross Dependable Sanitation v AT&T Corp., 268 AD2d 874, 875 [2000]).

2004It has been recognized, as a matter of law, that interstate shipping enterprises can no longer rely on a presumption that the customer has knowledge of a tariff (Tempel Steel Corp. v Landstar Inway, Inc., 211 F3d 1029, 1031 [7th Cir 2000]; Dean Foods Co. v Consolidated Freightways Mtr., 29 F Supp 2d 495, 496 [ND 111 1998] [because binding tariffs are no longer required, there is no presumption that a customer would know what they are]).

2004It has been recognized, as a matter of law, that interstate shipping enterprises can no longer rely on a presumption that the customer has knowledge of a tariff ( Tempel Steel Corp. v Landstar Inway, Inc. , 211 F3d 1029, 1031 [7th Cir 2000]; Dean Foods Co. v Consolidated Freightways Mtr. , 29 F Supp 2d 495, 496 [ND Ill 1998] [because binding tariffs are no longer required, there is no presumption that a customer would know what they are]).

2004It has been recognized, as a matter of law, that interstate shipping enterprises can no longer rely on a presumption that the customer has knowledge of a tariff (Tempel Steel Corp. v Landstar Inway, Inc., 211 F3d 1029, 1031 [7th Cir 2000]; Dean Foods Co. v Consolidated Freightways Mtr., 29 F Supp 2d 495, 496 [ND 111 1998] [because binding tariffs are no longer required, there is no presumption that a customer would know what they are]).

2004It has been recognized, as a matter of law, that interstate shipping enterprises can no longer rely on a presumption that the customer has knowledge of a tariff ( Tempel Steel Corp. v Landstar Inway, Inc. , 211 F3d 1029, 1031 [7th Cir 2000]; Dean Foods Co. v Consolidated Freightways Mtr. , 29 F Supp 2d 495, 496 [ND Ill 1998] [because binding tariffs are no longer required, there is no presumption that a customer would know what they are]).

2013In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Central Office Telephone, Inc. ( 524 US 214 [1998]), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the filed rate doctrine applies not only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges” (id. at 223 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Kross Dependable Sanitation v AT&T Corp., 268 AD2d 874, 875 [2000]).

2013In American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Central Office Telephone, Inc. ( 524 US 214 [1998]), the United States Supreme Court clarified that the filed rate doctrine applies not only to charges, but to the “classifications, practices, and regulations affecting such charges” (id. at 223 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Kross Dependable Sanitation v AT&T Corp., 268 AD2d 874, 875 [2000]).

2009That doctrine states that a regulated entity may not “charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate . . . regulatory authority” (Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v Hall, 453 US 571, 577 [1981]).

2009That doctrine states that a regulated entity may not "charge rates for its services other than those properly filed with the appropriate. . . regulatory authority" ( Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v Hall, 453 US 571, 577 [1981]).

2025Commn. of State of N.Y. , 194 Misc 2d 85, 91 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2002] [GRTs are "part of a utility's cost structure that is recovered through Commission approved rates"]).

2025Commn. of State of N.Y. , 194 Misc 2d 85, 91 [Sup Ct, Albany County 2002] [GRTs are "part of a utility's cost structure that is recovered through Commission approved rates"]).

2019Commn. of State of N.Y. , 295 AD2d 859, 862-863 [2002]).

2009As the majority observed in Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. ( 8 NY3d 186, 196 [2007] [Walton i]), “[w]hile the PSC concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over DOCS, it could have [rejected] MCI’s call rate and surcharge as a whole” (emphasis added). 1 It was for this reason alone that the Walton I court found petitioners’ lawsuit to be timely, reckoning that their claims accrued on October 30, 2003 because up until the point of the PSC’s order their alleged injuries might have been ameliorated (id. at 197).

2009As the majority observed in Walton v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. ( 8 NY3d 186, 196 [2007] [ Walton I ]), "[w]hile the PSC concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over DOCS, it could have [rejected] MCI's call rate and surcharge as a whole " (emphasis added). [1] It was for this reason alone that the Walton I court found petitioners' lawsuit to be timely, reckoning that their claims accrued on October 30, 2003 because up until the point of the PSC's order their alleged injuries might have been ameliorated ( id. at 197 ).

2009Commn. of State of N.Y., 80 AD2d 977, 978 [3d Dept 1981], Iv denied 54 NY2d 601 [1981]). 2 Once petitioners chose not to contest the PSC’s October 30, 2003 order, the filed rate doctrine kicked in to bar them from launching this collateral attack on the rate. .

2009Commn. of State of N.Y., 80 AD2d 977, 978 [3d Dept 1981], lv denied 54 NY2d 601 [1981]). [2] Once petitioners chose not to contest the PSC's October 30, 2003 order, the filed rate doctrine kicked in to bar them from launching this collateral attack on the rate.

2009Valdez v State, 132 NM 667 , 671, 54 P3d 71, 75 [Sup Ct 2002] [filed rate doctrine barred claims for damages, restitution, or imposition of constructive trust on account of commissions on inmate collect calls where regulatory agency had “exempted inmate telephone services from several of its regulations and (had) authorized the rates at issue”]; see also Severin, Is There a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for Collect Calls from Prisoners ?, 25 Cardozo L Rev 1469, 1483-1490 [2004] [discussing cases where filed rate doctrine prevented litigants from successfully challenging prison phone

2009Valdez v State, 132 NM 667 , 671, 54 P3d 71, 75 [Sup Ct 2002] [filed rate doctrine barred claims for damages, restitution, or imposition of constructive trust on account of commissions on inmate collect calls where regulatory agency had "exempted inmate telephone services from several of its regulations and (had) authorized the rates at issue"]; see also Severin, Is There a Winning Argument Against Excessive Rates for Collect Calls from Prisoners?, 25 Cardozo L Rev 1469, 1483-1490 [2004] [discussing cases where filed rate doctrine prevented litigants from successfully challenging prison phone

2008Co. of N.Y., 8 AD3d at 313 ; cf. Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d at 678 [concluding that the filed rate doctrine barred similar claims arising out of DOCS’s 1996 contract with MCI after the PSC approved the filed rate, including DOCS’s commission, in its entirety]).

2008Co. of N.Y., 8 AD3d at 313 ; cf. Bullard v State of New York, 307 AD2d at 678 [concluding that the filed rate doctrine barred similar claims arising out of DOCS’s 1996 contract with MCI after the PSC approved the filed rate, including DOCS’s commission, in its entirety]).

2004Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v Qwest Communications Inti., Inc., 294 F3d 924, 929 [7th Cir 2002], cert denied 537 US 1090 [2002].)