filed rate doctrine in Minnesota

2015Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 316-17 (Minn. 2006) (concluding that application of the filed-rate doctrine to bar insureds’ challenge to a premium surcharge would not violate Minn. Const. art.

2015Co., 721 N.W.2d 307, 316-17 (Minn.2006) (concluding that application of the filed-rate doctrine to bar insureds’ challenge to a premium surcharge would not violate Minn. Const, art.

2009See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 21-22 (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action that would require the court to determine a reasonable rate absent the fraud because court was incompetent to evaluate rate reasonableness); H.J., Inc., 954 F.2d at 493 (dismissing RICO action because damages sought to compensate for excessive service charges constituted a retroactive rate adjustment); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992) (same); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine barred breach of contract cl

2009See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd.., 27 F.3d at 21-22 (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action that would require the court to determine a reasonable rate absent the fraud because court was incompetent to evaluate rate reasonableness); H.J., Inc., 954 F.2d at 493 (dismissing RICO action because damages sought to compensate for excessive service charges constituted a retroactive rate adjustment); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992) (same); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine barred breach of contract c

2025See Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 764 N.W.2d 34, 42-43 (Minn. 2009) (explaining that the filed-rate doctrine applies to challenges that require courts to evaluate the reasonableness of the rate the MPUC has established for a utility and that the doctrine may 17 That we afford judicial deference in this regard does not immunize the city from challenges to its actions.

2011A reallocation of rates may set in motion an ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments.... ” 369 N.W.2d at 535 ; see also Hoffman, 764 N.W.2d at 42 (“Courts have recognized that the filed rate doctrine ... is grounded in ... non-discrimination principles.”).

2011In Hoffman , we similarly concluded that, although claims that involve judicial enforcement of a tariff do not “infringe on discretionary authority vested in the agency,” claims that “seek to expand services beyond what is provided for in the tariff ... indirectly challenge the reasonableness of the filed rates, and the filed rate doctrine bars the judiciary from considering such claims.” 764 N.W.2d at 44 (emphasis added) (citing ICOM Holding, Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.2001)).

2009See, e.g., ICOM Holding, Inc. v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 238 F.3d 219, 222-23 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that the filed rate doctrine barred a state law breach of contract claim because "the relief sought in the plaintiff's state-law claims would conflict with the provisions of the filed tariff").

2009The court of appeals held that the filed rate doctrine barred all of appellants' claims, Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn.App.2008), and we *39 granted appellants' petition for further review.

2009The court of appeals held that the filed rate doctrine barred all of appellants’ claims, Hoffman v. N. States Power Co., 743 N.W.2d 751, 756 (Minn.App.2008), and we granted appellants’ petition for further review.

2009Co., 954 F.2d 485 , 492 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that damages for telephone company's wrongdoing challenge rate reasonableness and "fall[] squarely within the filed rate doctrine").

2009Co., 954 F.2d 485 , 492 (8th Cir.1992) (holding that damages for telephone company’s wrongdoing challenge rate reasonableness and “fall[ ] squarely within the filed rate doctrine”).

2009See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 21-22 (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action that would require the court to determine a reasonable rate absent the fraud because court was incompetent to evaluate rate reasonableness); H.J., Inc., 954 F.2d at 493 (dismissing RICO action because damages sought to compensate for excessive service charges constituted a retroactive rate adjustment); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992) (same); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine barred breach of contract cl

2009See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd.., 27 F.3d at 21-22 (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action that would require the court to determine a reasonable rate absent the fraud because court was incompetent to evaluate rate reasonableness); H.J., Inc., 954 F.2d at 493 (dismissing RICO action because damages sought to compensate for excessive service charges constituted a retroactive rate adjustment); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992) (same); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine barred breach of contract c

2006The origin of the filed rate doctrine can be traced back to a 1922 United States Supreme Court decision, Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 , 43 S.Ct. 47 , 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922).

2006The origin of the filed rate doctrine can be traced back to a 1922 United States Supreme Court decision, Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 156 , 43 S.Ct. 47 , 67 L.Ed. 183 (1922).

2011In AT & T, the Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs tortious interference claim was barred by the filed rate doctrine, not because it arose out of tort, but because it was “wholly derivative of the contract claim for additional and better services.” 524 U.S. at 226 , 118 S.Ct. 1956 .

2011The Court also held that the filed rate doctrine barred the tortious interference claim because it was “wholly derivative of the contract claim for additional and better services.” Id.

2011A reallocation of rates may set in motion an ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments.... ” 369 N.W.2d at 535 ; see also Hoffman, 764 N.W.2d at 42 (“Courts have recognized that the filed rate doctrine ... is grounded in ... non-discrimination principles.”).

2009We have described the public regulation of utilities as "an intricate, ongoing process" subject to "an ever-widening set of consequences and adjustments." Peoples Natural Gas Co. v. Minn. P.U.C., 369 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Minn.1985).

2015I, § 8, because the Legislature provided a “reasonable substitute” in the form of investigation and review by the Department of Commerce); Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn. 1989) (concluding that municipal damages cap did not violate Minn. Const. art.

2015I, § 8, because the Legislature provided a “reasonable substitute” in the form of investigation and review by the Department of Commerce); Snyder v. City of Minneapolis, 441 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Minn.1989) (concluding that municipal damages cap did not violate Minn. Const, art.

2011See Satellite Sys., Inc. v. Birch Telecom of Okla., 51 P.3d 585, 588 (Okla.2002) (noting that “[a] presumption favors the preservation of common-law rights” and that courts should look at whether the state legislature has expressed an intent, “either explicitly or implicitly, that the policies supporting a state rate tariff doctrine were intended to abolish a common law ... claim”); cf. Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Commc’ns Grp., 89 Cal.App.4th 407 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 392, 398 (2001) (noting differences between the federal filed rate doctrine and California’s filed rate doctrine, and concluding th

2011See Satellite Sys., Inc. v. Birch Telecom of Okla., 51 P.3d 585, 588 (Okla.2002) (noting that “[a] presumption favors the preservation of common-law rights” and that courts should look at whether the state legislature has expressed an intent, “either explicitly or implicitly, that the policies supporting a state rate tariff doctrine were intended to abolish a common law ... claim”); cf. Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Commc’ns Grp., 89 Cal.App.4th 407 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 392, 398 (2001) (noting differences between the federal filed rate doctrine and California’s filed rate doctrine, and concluding th

2011The majority also relies heavily on the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 305 Wis.2d 538 , 742 N.W.2d 294 (2007), to conclude that the filed rate doctrine does not bar stray voltage claims because the plaintiffs are not seeking a "privilege” within the meaning of the filed rate doctrine and conformance with the tariff does not eliminate the common law duty of due care.

2011The majority also relies heavily on the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision of Schmidt v. N. States Power Co., 305 Wis.2d 538 , 742 N.W.2d 294 (2007), to conclude that the filed rate doctrine does not bar stray voltage claims because the plaintiffs are not seeking a "privilege” within the meaning of the filed rate doctrine and conformance with the tariff does not eliminate the common law duty of due care.

2011In 2007, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which has recognized the filed rate doctrine since 1911, see City of Manitowoc v. Manitowoc & N. Traction Co., 145 Wis. 13 , 129 N.W. 925, 927 (1911), confronted a case similar to the one before us.

2011Siewert v. N. States Power Co., 757 N.W.2d 909, 919, 920, 924 (Minn.App.2008).

2011In concluding that the Siewerts’ claims for damages were not barred by the filed rate doctrine, the court of appeals began with the principle that under the filed rate doctrine “the scope of service [to be provided by the utility] cannot be directed by a court and must be left to the MPUC.” Siewert, 757 N.W.2d at 917 .

2011See Satellite Sys., Inc. v. Birch Telecom of Okla., 51 P.3d 585, 588 (Okla.2002) (noting that “[a] presumption favors the preservation of common-law rights” and that courts should look at whether the state legislature has expressed an intent, “either explicitly or implicitly, that the policies supporting a state rate tariff doctrine were intended to abolish a common law ... claim”); cf. Pink Dot, Inc. v. Teleport Commc’ns Grp., 89 Cal.App.4th 407 , 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 392, 398 (2001) (noting differences between the federal filed rate doctrine and California’s filed rate doctrine, and concluding th

2009Co., 371 N.J.Super. 449 , 853 A.2d 955, 965 (2004) (noting that "a determination as to the manner in which the filed rate doctrine impacts upon plaintiff's complaint requires an examination of the asserted causes of action").

2009Co., 371 N.J.Super. 449 , 853 A.2d 955, 965 (2004) (noting that "a determination as to the manner in which the filed rate doctrine impacts upon plaintiff's complaint requires an examination of the asserted causes of action").

2009See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd., 27 F.3d at 21-22 (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action that would require the court to determine a reasonable rate absent the fraud because court was incompetent to evaluate rate reasonableness); H.J., Inc., 954 F.2d at 493 (dismissing RICO action because damages sought to compensate for excessive service charges constituted a retroactive rate adjustment); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992) (same); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine barred breach of contract cl

2009See, e.g., Wegoland Ltd.., 27 F.3d at 21-22 (filed rate doctrine barred RICO action that would require the court to determine a reasonable rate absent the fraud because court was incompetent to evaluate rate reasonableness); H.J., Inc., 954 F.2d at 493 (dismissing RICO action because damages sought to compensate for excessive service charges constituted a retroactive rate adjustment); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 (11th Cir.1992) (same); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Alabama Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir.1987) (en banc) (filed rate doctrine barred breach of contract c

2009Gas Co. v. Hall (Arkla), 453 U.S. 571, 577 , 101 S.Ct. 2925 , 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981) (holding that filed rate doctrine bars a consumer of a regulated product from paying any rate other than the filed rate); see also Crumley v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 554 F.Supp.2d 933, 936-37 (D.Minn.2008) (concluding that the filed rate doctrine barred claim for damages and declaratory relief based on services not performed under settlement agreement because claim challenged rate reasonableness); Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

2009Gas Co. v. Hall (Arkla), 453 U.S. 571, 577 , 101 S.Ct. 2925 , 69 L.Ed.2d 856 (1981) (holding that filed rate doctrine bars a consumer of a regulated product from paying any rate other than the filed rate); see also Crumley v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 554 F.Supp.2d 933, 936-37 (D.Minn.2008) (concluding that the filed rate doctrine barred claim for damages and declaratory relief based on services not performed under settlement agreement because claim challenged rate reasonableness); Rios v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

2009We agree with appellants that, at least in the absence of a legislative decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the agency, the filed rate doctrine does not bar a court from considering a request to enforce the clear terms of an agency-approved tariff. [5] See Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166 , 1171-72 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the filed rate doctrine did not bar a class action suit against a telephone company for a faulty system of account-number assignments that resulted in charging customers for more accounts than actual phone lines because enforcement of the

2009For example, in Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166 , 1171-72 (9th Cir.2002), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the filed rate doctrine would not bar an award of damages in the amount that the customer was overcharged above the enforceable rate.

2009This case therefore presents a situation appropriate for certification because "the record is developed to the point where the question is relevant and presents a substantive issue." Thompson v. State, 284 Minn. 274, 277 , 170 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1969).

2009This case therefore presents a situation appropriate for certification because "the record is developed to the point where the question is relevant and presents a substantive issue." Thompson v. State, 284 Minn. 274, 277 , 170 N.W.2d 101, 103 (1969).

2009Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 727, 739 (S.D.Iowa 2007) (concluding that the filed rate doctrine barred claim for rescission on insurance policy because return for full amount of paid premiums would challenge the agency-approved rates). *47 We recognized these dual reasons for barring the claim for damages in Schermer .

2009Co., 469 F.Supp.2d 727, 739 (S.D.Iowa 2007) (concluding that the filed rate doctrine barred claim for rescission on insurance policy because return for full amount of paid premiums would challenge the agency-approved rates).

2009We agree with appellants that, at least in the absence of a legislative decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the agency, the filed rate doctrine does not bar a court from considering a request to enforce the clear terms of an agency-approved tariff. [5] See Brown v. MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166 , 1171-72 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the filed rate doctrine did not bar a class action suit against a telephone company for a faulty system of account-number assignments that resulted in charging customers for more accounts than actual phone lines because enforcement of the

2009We agree with appellants that, at least in the absence of a legislative decision to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the agency, the filed rate doctrine does not bar a court from considering a request to enforce the clear terms of an agency-approved tariff. 5 See Brown v. MCI World-Com Network Servs., Inc., 277 F.3d 1166 , 1171-72 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that the filed rate doctrine did not bar a class action suit against a telephone company for a faulty system of account-number assignments that resulted in charging customers for more accounts than actual phone lines because enforcement of the p

2008See Schermer, 721 N.W.2d at 312-13 (explaining that “the adoption and application of the doctrine to rates filed with state agencies is a matter of state law and is not controlled by federal precedent”); see also State v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 644 N.W.2d 820, 828 (Minn.App.2002) (noting that federal interpretations of state law are not binding on state courts).